Society for Judgment and Decision Making
The 2009 30th Annual Conference

Sheraton Boston Hotel, Boston, MA
39 Dalton Street
Nov 20 – 23, 2009

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(abstracts are available at www.sjdm.org)

2009 Program Committee: Craig McKenzie (Chair), Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Melissa Finucane, Nathan Novemsky, Michel Regenwetter, Ulf-Dietrich Reips, Alan Schwartz, Gal Zauberman.

Thanks to Julie Downs (conference coordinator), Jon Baron (webmaster), Dan Ariely (President), Mike Norton (social event), Shahar Ayal (book auction), and the ad hoc reviewers: Rachel Barkan, Lyle Brenner, Gretchen Chapman, Ravi Dhar, Dan Goldstein, Mike Norton, Ilana Ritov, Baba Shiv, Klaus Wertenbroch.
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20

Psychonomic Society JDM Sessions (See p. 5 of this program and the Psychonomic Society program for details)

5:00-7:00 pm Welcome Reception / Early Registration Back Bay Ballroom A (2nd floor)
7:15-9:15 pm Executive Board Dinner Brasserie JO, 120 Huntington Avenue

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21

7:30-8:30 am Registration and Continental Breakfast Fairfax (3rd floor)
8:30-10:00 am Paper Session #1 Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
10:00-10:30 am Morning Coffee Break Fairfax (3rd fl)
10:30-12:00 am Paper Session #2 Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
10:30-12:00 am Special Symposium: Medical Dec. Making Back Bay Ballroom B (2nd fl)
12:00-1:45 pm Women in SJDM Networking Event Harvard University
12:00-1:45 pm Lunch Break (on your own)
1:45-2:45 pm Paper Session #3 Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
3:00-4:30 pm Paper Session #4 Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
4:30-5:00 pm Afternoon Coffee Break Fairfax (3rd fl)
5:00-6:30 pm Paper Session #5 Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
6:30-8:30 pm Graduate Student Social Event Liberty Ballroom (2nd fl)

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22

8:30-10:30 am Poster Session #1 w/ Continental Breakfast Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C (Attached to Sheraton through walkway)
10:30-12:00 am Paper Session #6 Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
12:00-1:30 pm Lunch Break (on your own)
1:30-2:15 pm Presidential Address by Dan Ariely Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)
2:30-4:00 pm Paper Session #7 Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
4:00-4:30 pm Afternoon Coffee Break Fairfax (3rd fl)
4:30-5:00 pm Einhorn Award Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)
5:00-7:00 pm Poster Session #2 & Cash Bar Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C (Attached to Sheraton through walkway)
9:00pm-1:00am SJDM Evening Social Event King’s Bowling, 50 Dalton Street

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23

8:00-8:45 am Business Meeting w/ Continental Breakfast Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)
8:45-10:15 am Paper Session #8 Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
10:15-10:30 am Morning Coffee Break Fairfax (3rd fl)
10:30-12:00 am Paper Session #9 Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
12:00-1:30 pm Luncheon Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)

Keynote address by Steven Pinker
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<td><strong>Symposium:</strong> Seeing the Future Self as an Other: Intertemporal Choices As Interpersonal Decisions</td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Affective Forecasting</td>
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<td>8:30</td>
<td>Rachlin - Hyperbolic All Around? Similarities…</td>
<td>Radzевич - Competing To Be Certain…</td>
<td>Tsai - The Effects of Duration Knowledge on…</td>
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<td>8:50</td>
<td>Kennedy - When the Self is Someone Else…</td>
<td>Garcia - The N-Effect: More Competitors, Less…</td>
<td>Liersch - Choosing to re-experience painful…</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:10</td>
<td>Milch - Investing In and For Oneself…</td>
<td>Budescu - The Appeal of Vague Financial…</td>
<td>Morewedge - Motivated Underpinnings of the Impact…</td>
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<td>9:30</td>
<td>Ersner-Hershfield - Is it Just in Your Head?…</td>
<td>Karelaia - Under-achievement and the glass ceiling…</td>
<td>Promberger - Public policy and predicted preference…</td>
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<th>Special Symposium: Connections with Medical Decision Making</th>
<th>Behavioral Finance</th>
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<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>Chou - Helping the less fortunate, but not the…</td>
<td>Kostopoulou (w/ Russo) - Coherence-based…</td>
<td>Rixom - One or Many: How number of accounts…</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:50</td>
<td>Kogut - Someone to blame: When identifying…</td>
<td>Zikmund-Fisher (w/ Gaissmaier) - What does “less…</td>
<td>Rick - Account Aversion: When More Debt is…</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>Mellers - An Economical Way to Increase the…</td>
<td>Medow (w/ Ayton) - Are residents’ decisions…</td>
<td>Salisbury - The Effects of Information Disclosure…</td>
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<td>11:30</td>
<td>Sanna - Construing Cooperation: Broadening…</td>
<td>Acquisti - The Impact of Relative Standards on…</td>
<td>Carp - Toward a Testable Behavioral Asset Pricing…</td>
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<th>SESSION #3</th>
<th>Affect and Emotion</th>
<th>Interpersonal Knowledge and Chance</th>
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<tr>
<td>1:45</td>
<td>Bereby-Meyer - Cool down, it is worth money…</td>
<td>Shen - Belittling Can Be Flattering</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:05</td>
<td>Kassam - Decisions under distress: Stress…</td>
<td>Arora - Status as a Guide in Strategic Coordination…</td>
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<td>2:25</td>
<td>Maimaran - Rosy Side of Negative Emotions…</td>
<td>Acquisti - The Impact of Relative Standards on…</td>
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<th>SESSION #4</th>
<th>Incidental Influence I</th>
<th>Motivation Effects of Uncertainty</th>
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<tr>
<td>3:00</td>
<td>Lerner - Disgust Promotes Disposal: Souring…</td>
<td>Hsee - “Please Give Me A Reason to Be Busy!”…</td>
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<td>3:40</td>
<td>Williams - From formulas to faith: Consistency…</td>
<td>Broomell - Understanding of Global Climate…</td>
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<td>4:00</td>
<td>Larson - The Balance Metaphor and its Effect…</td>
<td>Gao - Mere Influence Effect: When Motivation to…</td>
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<tr>
<th>SESSION #5</th>
<th>Incidental Influence II</th>
<th>Feedback and Performance Symposium: Are Crowds Always Wiser?</th>
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<tr>
<td>5:00</td>
<td>Levav - Physical Contact Increases Financial…</td>
<td>Finkelstein - Giving, Seeking, and Responding to…</td>
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<tr>
<td>5:20</td>
<td>Ahn - Being Hot or Being Cold: The Influence…</td>
<td>Kettle - Motivation by Anticipation: Expecting…</td>
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<tr>
<td>5:40</td>
<td>Liu - Does Resisting Temptation Evoke…</td>
<td>Wu - Goals, Performance, and Satisfaction in…</td>
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<td>6:00</td>
<td>Buell - The Labor Illusion: When Waiting…</td>
<td>Page - The momentum effect in competitions…</td>
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# 2009 SJDM Conference Paper Sessions – SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22

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<tr>
<td>POSTERS 8:30</td>
<td>POSTER SESSION #1 W/CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST</td>
<td>Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C (Attached to Sheraton through walkway)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SESSION #6: <strong>Symposium: Whither Optimism: Inquiries into the Existence and Persistence of Optimistic Biases</strong></td>
<td><strong>Judgment under Uncertainty</strong></td>
<td><strong>Choice Models and Methodology</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>10:50 Windschitl - The Role of Selective Exposure in…</td>
<td>Oppenheimer - Categorical Cue Weighting</td>
<td>Regenwetter - Choice Variability Versus Structural…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:10 Moore - Motivation and Overconfidence</td>
<td>Gray - Torture and Judgments of Guilt</td>
<td>Pardo - Verbatim and Gist Cues Produce Opposite…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30 Dunning - Top-Down Self-Beliefs Alter…</td>
<td>Haran - The More, the Merrier: The Perverse…</td>
<td>Horton - Online Experiments for Judgment and…</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADDRESS 1:30</td>
<td>PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: Dan Ariely – Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SESSION #7: <strong>Consumer Behavior and Incentives</strong></td>
<td><strong>Subjective Probability</strong></td>
<td><strong>Intertemporal and Medical Choice</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:30 Isaac - Disposal Biases: Why Sellers of Used…</td>
<td>Li - A pairwise-contrast model of intuitive…</td>
<td>Scholten - Three reasons why discounting doesn’t work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:50 Hall - Mental Accounting in the Context of Poverty</td>
<td>Abbas - Assessing Joint Probability Distributions…</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:10 Handgraaf - Private Payment versus Public Praise…</td>
<td>Ways - Perceiving Intentions Makes Streaks…</td>
<td>Sah - Burdening Patients with Doctors’ Conflicts…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:30 Slonim - Will there be blood? Incentives and…</td>
<td>Frederick - Unpacking Unpacking: When Greater…</td>
<td>Schwartz - Are patients too trusting? The unintended…</td>
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<tr>
<td>EINHORN 4:30</td>
<td>EINHORN AWARD PRESENTATION – Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)</td>
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<tr>
<td>POSTERS 5:00-7:00</td>
<td>POSTER SESSION #2 W/CASH BAR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C (Attached to Sheraton through walkway)</td>
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# 2009 SJDM Conference Paper Sessions – MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23

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<tr>
<td>SESSION #8: <strong>Heuristics</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consumer Behavior</strong></td>
<td><strong>Metacognition</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:45 Simonsohn - Ignoring invalid information just fine…</td>
<td>Huh - Thought for Food: Top-down Processes…</td>
<td>Critcher - Inferring Preferences From Mental…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:05 Smith - The (lack of) Downstream Consequences…</td>
<td>Zhu - Can Visual Images in Advertisements Curb…</td>
<td>Zhang - When a choice is too easy: Meta-cognitive…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:45 Schweickart - On the role of recognition and…</td>
<td>Milosavljevic - Are Fast Choices Driven by Value…</td>
<td>Schrift - Complicating Choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESSION #9: <strong>Choice under Uncertainty</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dual Processes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Choice Set</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30 Venkatraman - Individual Differences in Strategic…</td>
<td>Inbar - People’s Intuitions About Intuitive…</td>
<td>Parker - The Rejectable Choice Set: How Seemingly…</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:10 Rubaltelli - Loss aversion and the comparative…</td>
<td>Tennant - An Empirical Comparison of Intuitive…</td>
<td>Kirkeboen - The cost of changing your mind…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30 Shapira - Graininess, Similarity and Decision…</td>
<td>Hardman - Reflecting on dilemmas: Individual…</td>
<td>Fan - Comparison Process at Retrieval (CPR)…</td>
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<tr>
<td>LUNCHEON 12:00-1:30</td>
<td>LUNCHEON AND KEYNOTE ADDRESS: Steven Pinker – Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)</td>
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19

5:30-7:00 pm  Psychonomic Society Poster Session  
JDM posters: 1026 - 1038  
Hynes Convention Center Ballroom

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20

Psychonomic Sessions (Sheraton Boston Hotel):

10:20-11:55 am  Decision Making I  
Republic Ballroom
12:00-1:30 pm  Psychonomic Society Poster Session  
JDM posters: 2165-2178  
Hynes Convention Center Ballroom
1:30-3:25 pm  Models of Decision Making  
Back Bay Ballroom D
6:30-8:00 pm  Psychonomic Society Poster Session  
JDM posters: 3001-3005  
Hynes Convention Center Ballroom
5:00-7:00 pm  Welcome Reception & Early Registration  
Back Bay Ballroom A

Please join us at the Welcome Reception at the Sheraton Boston Hotel (39 Dalton Street). The reception will feature appetizers and a cash bar. This event will also provide an opportunity for early conference registration so that you can avoid the lines Saturday morning. The reception is generously sponsored by Fidelity Investments' Center for Applied Behavioral Economics.

7:15-9:15 pm  Executive Board Dinner

Members of the executive board, JDM officers, and program chairs for this year and next year are invited to a working dinner at Brasserie JO, 120 Huntington Avenue (in the Colonnade Boston Hotel, around the corner from the Sheraton Boston Hotel). Contact Craig McKenzie (cmckenzie@ucsd.edu) for further details.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21

Psychonomic Sessions (Sheraton Boston Hotel):

8:00-9:35 am  Decision Making II  
Back Bay Ballroom D
3:50-5:25 pm  Applications of Decision Making  
Independence Ballroom

10:30-12:00 pm  Special Symposium: Connections with Medical Decision Making  
Back Bay Ballroom B

This special symposium, supported by the National Science Foundation Decision, Risk, and Management Sciences program, brings three members of the Society for Medical Decision Making to the SJDM annual meeting to present recent work in MDM that connects with JDM work but has not been widely disseminated in the JDM literature. Each SMDM presenter will be paired with an SJDM researcher whose basic work complements the applied work of the SMDM researcher, and these research pairs will present together. A sister symposium by SJDM members is being held at the annual meeting of the SMDM in October.

12:15-1:30 pm  Women in SJDM Networking Event

All (women and men) are welcome to attend the sixth annual Women in SJDM Luncheon, focused on promoting the advancement of women in JDM. The event will feature lunch, networking opportunities, and a keynote address by Judith Singer, Senior Vice Provost for Faculty Development and Diversity and James Bryant Conant Professor of Education at Harvard University. The event will take place on Saturday, November 21st, from 12:15 - 1:30 pm (during the conference lunch break). The event will take place at, and is hosted by, the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory, directed by SJDM member Jennifer Lerner. The cost is free for students and post-docs who pre-register, $15 for faculty, and $25 for nonmembers. Shuttle service will be provided. Pick up will
be at 12:00 p.m. and drop-off will be by 1:45 p.m. at the Dalton Street entrance of the Sheraton Boston Hotel. This year's event is cosponsored by the Center for Public Leadership and the Women and Public Policy Program of the John F. Kennedy School of Government as well as the Society for Judgment and Decision Making. For more information, contact Mary Steffel (mary.steffel@cba.ufl.edu).

6:15-8:15 pm  Graduate Student Social  Liberty Ballroom

This informal event will provide student members of SJDM an opportunity to imbibe and network with the future stars of the field. But wait, there’s more: SJDM is buying the first round of drinks! For more information contact Julie Downs (downs@cmu.edu).

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22

1:30-2:45  Presidential Address: Dan Ariely  Independence Ballroom

4:30-5:00 pm  Einhorn Award Presentation  Independence Ballroom

The winner will make a presentation of the research paper for which he/she won the award.

9:00 pm-1:00 am  SJDM Social Event

SJDM is sponsoring a party at King’s Bowling (address below), which is essentially across the street from the conference hotel, from 9pm to 1am. In addition to unlimited use of the pool tables (and feel free to rent lanes to bowl as well!), there is a dessert bar and the first 250 people to arrive at the venue will receive a free drink ticket. There will also be a surprise guest (think “mindreading magician”…).

King’s Bowling
50 Dalton Street
Boston, MA 02115

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23

8:00-8:45 am  Business Meeting & Breakfast  Independence Ballroom

All members of SJDM are invited to attend the business meeting (and it’s where the food is). Remember, every vote counts.

12:00-1:30 pm  Luncheon and Keynote Address: Steven Pinker  Independence Ballroom

"A History of Violence"

Contrary to the popular impression that we are living in extraordinarily violent times, rates of violence at all scales have been in decline over the course of history. I explore how this decline could have happened despite the existence of a constant human nature, and why people systematically misjudge the historical trend.

The luncheon will also include a presentation of the student poster awards by Joe Johnson.
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21

(1A) Symposium: Seeing the Future Self as an Other: Intertemporal Choices As Interpersonal Decisions

Organizers: Olivola, Christopher Y. (University College London); Ersner-Hershfield, Hal (Northwestern University)

Intertemporal and interpersonal decision-making have largely been considered separate domains of inquiry. Yet some theorists have suggested parallels between the two. Until recently, however, this assertion was based mainly on introspection and often considered purely metaphorical. This symposium examines how the perception of one’s future-self—as either an extension of the current-self or as a different person altogether—can have serious implications for intertemporal choice. The research presented here demonstrates that these parallels are more than metaphors: people literally seem to treat their future-self much like another person. Rachlin and Jones show that interpersonal discounting follows the same hyperbolic functional form as intertemporal discounting. Kennedy, Olivola, and Pronin show that decisions for future-selves resemble decisions made for other people more than those made for the present-self—a tendency rooted in a lack of attention to the internal subjective experiences of future-selves and others. Milch, Weber, and Higgins find that fewer resources are allocated to the future-self when it is perceived as another person and they explore the specific elements of future-self connectedness. Finally, Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, and Knutson show that neural differences that arise from thinking about the current-self compared to the future-self can predict discounting of future rewards.

Constituent papers:

Hyperbolic All Around? Similarities Between Social and Delay Discounting
Rachlin, Howard (Stony Brook University); Jones, Bryan A. (University of Arkansas For Medical Sciences)

We show parallels between delay and social discounting. Specifically, we find that the amount of present money forgone to obtain a fixed amount in the future (delay discounting) is a hyperbolic function of delay. Similarly, the amount of money forgone by one person to give a fixed amount to another person (social discounting) is a hyperbolic function of the social distance between them. Furthermore, the shape of the function relating delay of reward for one person to an equal-magnitude immediate reward for other people at varying social distances can be predicted from individual delay and social discount functions.

When the Self is Someone Else: Parallel Effects of Temporal and Social Distance on Decision Making
Kennedy, Kathleen A. (Princeton University); Olivola, Christopher Y. (University College London); Pronin, Emily (Princeton University)

Four studies demonstrated that decisions for future-selves differ from those made for the present, ongoing self, but resemble decisions made for other people. These comparable effects of temporal and social distance seem to stem from a lack of attention to internal subjective experiences, making decisions for future-selves and others psychologically parallel. By contrast, decisions for present-selves appear uniquely dependent on internal thoughts and feelings. Consequently, manipulating attention to subjective experiences affects decisions (e.g., increased salience of future-self subjective experiences mitigated the effects of temporal distance, resulting in decisions resembling those for present-selves). Implications for intertemporal and interpersonal decision-making are discussed.

Investing In and For Oneself: The Meaning of Feeling Close to One's Future Self and Other Determinants of Intertemporal Resource Allocation
Milch, Kerry F. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University); Higgins, E. Tory (Columbia University)

What does it mean to "feel close" to one's future self? How does closeness interact with other factors that affect divisions of resources between now and later? We show that closeness to future self can be manipulated and is distinct from attitude toward future self (liking/disliking). Closeness, not attitude, influences intertemporal resource allocation. Additionally, framing of a resource's value is shown to interact with closeness to future self. We explore individuals' theories about stability in self-concept over time and examine which elements of closeness to future self (similarity, empathy, responsibility) matter for how people divide resources between present and future.

Is it Just in Your Head? Neural Measures of Future Self-Continuity Predict Temporal Discounting
Ersner-Hershfield, Hal (Northwestern University); Wimmer, G. Elliott (Columbia University); Knutson, Brian (Stanford University)
According to a future self-continuity hypothesis, individuals perceive and treat the future self differently from the present self, and so might fail to save for their future. Neuroimaging offers a novel means of testing this hypothesis, since previous research indicates that self- versus other-judgments elicit activation in the rostral anterior cingulate (rACC). Using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we predicted and found not only individual differences in rACC activation while rating the current versus future self, but also that individual differences in current versus future self activation predicted temporal discounting assessed behaviorally a week after scanning.

(1B) Competition

Competing To Be Certain (But Wrong): Social Pressure and Overprecision in Judgment
Radzevick, Joseph R. (Carnegie Mellon University); Moore, Don A. (Carnegie Mellon University)

Overprecision in judgment is both the most robust and the least understood form of overconfidence. In this paper, we investigate whether the competitive social pressure of a market contributes to overprecision among those competing for influence. We find evidence that markets do indeed exacerbate overprecision. This evidence comes from two experiments in which advisors attempt to sell their advice. In the first experiment, advisors must compete with other advice sellers. In the second, advisors and decision makers are paired. Overprecision exists in both studies, and it helps advisors’ sell their advice. However, the market also exacerbates overprecision.

The N-Effect: More Competitors, Less Competition
Garcia, Stephen (University of Michigan); Tor, Avishalom (University of Haifa)

This paper introduces the N-Effect – the discovery that increasing the number of competitors (N) can decrease competitive motivation, controlling for expected payoffs. Studies 1a-b found evidence that average test scores (e.g., SAT scores) fall as the average number of test-takers at test-taking venues increases. Study 2 found that individuals trying to finish an easy quiz among the top 20 percent in terms of speed finished significantly faster if they believed they were competing in a pool of 10 versus 100 competitors. Studies 3-5 replicated the N-Effect in other domains and found that it is mediated by the social comparison process.

The Appeal of Vague Financial Forecasts
Budescu, David V. (Fordham University); Du, Ning (DePaul University)

We analyzed earnings forecasts over 11 years and documented a higher proportion of range estimates than point forecasts, contradicting with the general preference for precision. Overall, range forecasts are quite narrow and inaccurate. Experimental results suggest that investors’ preference for forecast precision coincides with managers’ possibly because they believe that the (less precise) range forecasts are appropriate to represent the underlying vagueness, and judge them to be of higher quality. The preference for vague forecasts is curvilinear – it peaks for low levels of imprecision and diminishes when the ranges get wider – as predicted by the trade-off between accuracy and informativeness.

Under-achievement and the glass ceiling: Evidence from a TV game show
Hogarth, Robin M. (ICREA & Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain); Karelaia, Natalia (INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France); Trujillo, Carlos Andrés (Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia)

We use a TV game show to test gender differences in competitive behavior where there is no discrimination or gender-specific external constraints. In each game, six contestants answered general knowledge questions, and the worst performer is eliminated in each round. Despite equality in starting numbers, women earn less than men and voluntarily exit the game earlier. We draw a parallel to the process by which employees rise through the levels of a corporation. It appears that “glass ceilings” may result, in part, from women’s own behavior and this raises the issue of how women are socialized to behave.

(1C) Affective Forecasting

The Effects of Duration Knowledge on Forecasting Versus Actual Affective Experiences
Tsai, Claire I. (University of Toronto); Zhao, Min (University of Toronto)

We propose that the duration knowledge of an affective episode would interfere with the process of hedonic adaptation by intensifying the experience towards the end and thus increase the extremity of the overall experience. However, people are generally unaware of this effect of duration knowledge. In three experiments, we show that although people prefer to know the duration of negative episodes (e.g., listen to a pop song by a terrible singer) but not for the positive episodes (e.g., listen to a pop song by the original singer), duration knowledge intensifies affective episodes experienced over time and increases the overall enjoyment/pain.

Choosing to re-experience painful memories: Duration neglect in memory, but not in prospective choice
Liersch, Michael J. (NYU (Stern)); McKenzie, Craig R. M. (UC San Diego)
When evaluating uncomfortable experiences, people often neglect duration, instead only attending to peak and end moments of pain. As a consequence, people can remember longer, objectively more painful experiences as subjectively better. In two experiments, we examined whether people would prospectively choose an objectively more painful experience that they would remember as less painful, or an objectively less painful experience that they would remember as more painful. A majority of participants indicated they would choose an objectively less painful experience that would be remembered as more painful. Normative implications are discussed.

Motivated Underpinnings of the Impact Bias in Affective Forecasts
Morewedge, Carey K (Carnegie Mellon University); Buechel, Eva C. (University of Miami); Vosgerau, Joachim (Carnegie Mellon University)

Affective forecasters exhibit an impact bias, overestimating the intensity and duration of their emotional reaction to future events. We suggest that forecasters make extreme forecasts to motivate themselves to produce desirable outcomes. In two studies, affective forecasts were more extreme when outcomes were more important, and when forecasters could influence an outcome than when it was determined but unknown. Subsequent studies found that the extremity of forecasts determined the amount of mental and physical effort forecasters expended to produce desirable outcomes. Errors in affective forecasting may thus not be solely cognitive in origin, but have a motivated component as well.

Public policy and predicted preference change
Promberger, Marianne (King’s College London); Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania)

When they think about public policy proposals, how do people predict everyone's preferences to change in response to the policies, and does that prediction influence what they think of the policy? In several studies, we asked subjects about hypothetical policy proposals. Subjects consistently predicted preferences to change in their favored direction: subjects who initially think the policy is good predict preferences to change adaptively, and vice versa. Second-order preferences are a possible cause: subjects who think the policy is good for everyone want others to like it; those who think the policy is bad want others not to like it.

(2A) Helping and Giving

Helping the less fortunate, but not the most unfortunate: The Attribution-Prospect-Empathy-States (APES) model of helping behavior
Chou, Eileen (Northwestern University); Murnighan, J. Keith (Northwestern University)

How do we decide who and when to help? The APES model, validated by three lab and field studies, suggests that loss aversion increases people’s helping tendency, independent of why others need help or how empathic the potential helpers feel. However, loss aversion deters people from helping those who are less likely to succeed – people prefer to minimize their own loss more than other people’s. Psychological sanctioning increases overall volume of helping while retaining the same egocentric loss aversion. A blood donations field experiment suggests that people are more motivated by their potential impact than how urgently help is needed.

Someone to blame: When identifying a victim decreases helping
Kogut, Tehila (Ben-Gurion University)

People’s willingness to contribute (WTC) more resources to identifiable victims (as compared to unidentifiable ones) is known as The Identifiable Victim Effect. Previous research suggests that the emotional arousal toward a single identified victim is a major source of the effect. However, the emotional response to identified targets may also strengthen negative emotions in situations where the target is perceived responsible for his/her plight. In the current research we show that identification may decrease helping in such cases, especially when the perceiver holds strong beliefs in a just world. Such beliefs have a weaker influence on WTC to unidentifiable targets.

An Economical Way to Increase the Pleasure of Gift Giving
Mellers, Barbara (UC Berkeley); Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew University)

People spend billions of dollars on gifts each year. To economists, gift giving leads to deadweight losses because recipients have far more detailed information about their own preferences than do gift givers. This analysis overlooks the fact that, to most gift givers, it is the pleasure a recipient derives from the gift, not the material value of the gift that really matters. We conducted three studies to examine how surprise influence pleasure. Value may have little to do with the pleasure of the gift, and gifts are more pleasurable when surprising. The results are consistent with decision affect theory.

Construing Cooperation: Broadening Construals to Increase Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Sanna, Lawrence J. (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

Many of the most challenging issues faced by society involve increasing the collective good, but people are often caught between cooperating and competing, called social dilemmas. Although most people agree that contributing to public services, recycling
waste, conserving energy, and refraining from overharvesting are great ideas, fewer engage in such activities. Individuals can exploit the collective. This research tests a novel, theoretically driven approach to furthering cooperation in social dilemmas following construal level theory (CLT). Using a fishing analogue, it was hypothesized and found that high-level, relative to low-level, construals increased cooperation in social dilemmas.

(2B) Symposium: Connections with Medical Decision Making
(Special symposium by members of the Society for Medical Decision Making, paired with members of SJDM)

Organizers: Alan Schwartz (University of Illinois), Craig R. M. McKenzie (UC San Diego)

The goal of this symposium is to present and discuss recent work in MDM that connects with JDM work but has not been widely disseminated in the JDM literature. Each SMDM presenter will be paired with an SJDM researcher whose basic work complements the applied work of the SMDM researcher. SJDM members are presenting a complementary symposium at this year's annual meeting of SMDM. This symposium swap is supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-0921776/SES-0922023.

Constituent papers:

Coherence-based reasoning in medical diagnosis
Kostopoulou, Olga (King's College London)
Paired with SJDM member: Russo, J. Edward (Cornell University)

What does "Less is More" Mean in the Real World?: Operationalizing Simplified Information Presentations for Breast Cancer Decision Making
Zikmund-Fisher, Brian J. (University of Michigan)
Paired with SJDM member: Gaissmeier, Wolfgang (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

Are Residents' Decisions Influenced More by Specialist or Decision Aid Opinion?
Medow, Mitchell (Boston University School of Medicine)
Paired with SJDM member: Ayton, Peter (City University London)

(2C) Behavioral Finance

One or Many: How number of accounts facilitate spending or saving behavior
Mishra, Himanshu (University of Utah); Mishra, Arul (University of Utah); Rixom, Jessica (University of Utah)

The current recessionary trend has motivated people to control spending and increase savings. The stock market crisis has led several people to prefer liquid accounts in FDIC insured banks. Across three studies we find that people save more and spend less when they maintain a single account compared to multiple accounts. We find that this occurs because people are able to justify spending with multiple accounts (since there is more ambiguity about the amounts in each account) but not with single accounts (since it provides precise account information). We demonstrate the effect across three studies and test the underlying process.

Account Aversion: When More Debt is Preferred to Less
Rick, Scott (University of Michigan); Cryder, Cynthia (Washington University in St. Louis)

Most decision research on credit cards has focused on understanding why consumers over-spend with credit. Much less is known about how consumers make debt repayment decisions. We observe evidence of account aversion: because it is easier to evaluate the number of credit card accounts carrying debt than the total amount of debt across accounts, there are situations in which high debt (concentrated in a single account) is less distressing than low debt (spread over several accounts). This can lead to repayment mistakes (allocating payments to cards with the lowest balances, rather than the highest interest rates). Deliberation reduces account aversion.

The Effects of Information Disclosure on Consumer Debt Repayment Decisions
Salisbury, Linda Court (Boston College); Lemon, Katherine N. (Boston College)

We examine the effects of minimum required payment (MinReq) and supplemental interest cost information on credit card debt repayment decisions. We examine differential effects of “time” versus “money” information, as well as temporal framing of cost information (monthly versus total). Results revealed a strong negative effect of MinReq information on repayment amount. This effect was attenuated by disclosing interest cost and time-to-payoff information. Temporal framing of cost information, individuals’ future orientation, and financial knowledge moderated the information effects. Total dollar cost information led consumers to pay more than time-to-payoff information, but this effect was eliminated for consumers with an immediate-orientation.

Toward a Testable Behavioral Asset Pricing Model
Carp, Sari (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Feldman, Ronen (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
We use text mining to construct an empirically verifiable asset pricing model grounded in both finance and psychology. Our model incorporates a version of the traditional financial asset pricing model, the CAPM, then adds two types of behavioral factors. One, generated by text mining techniques across thousands of news articles, quantifies the degree of negative or positive sentiment toward a particular stock. The others are pure psychological factors structured around Tversky and Kahneman’s three main heuristics. We use text mining and the psychology of language to predict their effects. Our model demonstrates significant predictive value over traditional financial models alone.

(3A) Affect and Emotion

Cool down, it is worth money: evidence from Ultimatum and Trust games
Bereby-Meyer, Yoella (Ben-Gurion University); Moran, Simone (Ben-Gurion University); Halali, Eliran (Ben-Gurion University); Schweitzer, Maurice (Wharton, University of Pennsylvania)

We explore the role of emotion regulation in economic decision-making. As predicted, in line with Gross's Emotion Regulation theory, regulating positive and negative emotions by means of cognitive reappraisal, compared to expressive suppression, led to more economically rational decisions. In Experiment 1, employing an ultimatum game, participants in the reappraisal condition responded to extremely unfair offers with lower rejection rates than participants in the suppression and no regulation conditions. In Experiment 2, employing a trust game, participants in the reappraisal condition responded to extremely generous proposers by returning lower amounts than participants in the suppression and no regulation conditions.

Decisions under distress: Stress profiles influence anchoring and adjustment
Kassam, Karim (Harvard University); Koslov, Katrina (Harvard University); Mendes, Wendy Berry (Harvard University)

Understanding how stress affects decision making is complicated by the fact that not all stress responses are created equal. Challenge states are characterized by efficient cardiovascular profiles and are associated with approach motivation. Threat states, in contrast, involve less efficient cardiovascular profiles and are associated with withdrawal motivation. We randomly assigned participants to conditions designed to engender challenge and threat states, as well as a control condition. Participants then completed an anchoring and adjustment questionnaire. Those assigned to the challenge condition adjusted more than those assigned to the threat condition. Cardiovascular responses mediated the relationship between condition and adjustment.

Rosy Side of Negative Emotions: The Effect of Anger in Decision-Making
Khan, Uzma (Stanford University); Maimaran, Michal (Kellogg – Northwestern University); Dhar, Ravi (Yale University)

While anger is generally perceived as negative, in four studies we show positive effects of anger on decision-making. Study 1 shows that angry people are less likely to defer choice. Study 2 demonstrates that anger decreases a bias to choose the compromise option. Study 3 shows that the effects are driven by a decreased tendency to make attribute-level tradeoffs among angry participants. Study 4 replicates the choice-deferral findings and additionally shows greater post-choice satisfaction among angry people. Taken together, these studies suggest that anger plays an important role in eliminating several decision biases and can lead to potentially better decisions.

(3B) Interpersonal

Belittling Can Be Flattering
Shen, Luxi (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Hsee, Chris (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Zhang, Jiao (The University of Miami School of Business); Dai, Xianchi (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

This research examines how one affectively reacts to a special form of interpersonal evaluations, others’ guesses at the value of an aspect one cares about. Existing literature and common knowledge hold that more positive evaluations make people happier than less positive evaluations. However, we found that in certain situations people feel happier with less positive guesses than with more positive guesses. We propose a model that accounts for this effect and specifies when it will happen and when it will not happen. The present research extends previous research on self-enhancement theory and offers practical recommendations on interpersonal interactions.

Status as a Guide in Strategic Coordination: The Minimal Status Effect
Arora, Poonam (Columbia University); Krantz, David H. (Columbia University); Higgins, E. Tory (Columbia University)

We examine the influence of status decoupled from power in strategic coordination hypothesizing that status changes expectations of the other’s actions and thus what one should do to coordinate. Prior to the coordination task, participants were randomly assigned to Teammate or Competitor dyads followed by a game that resulted in a winner and a loser. Competitor Losers perceived themselves at a lower status despite lack of any legitimate basis for the lower status. They expected behavior suit the higher status of their Competitor Winner and made choices accordingly, thereby accepting sub-optimal outcomes. Manipulated status mediated choice in the coordination task.

The Impact of Relative Standards on Concern About Privacy
We present the results of two studies that illustrate the impact on the propensity to reveal personal information of our own situation in the past and the situation of other people. One study focuses on the impact of receiving information about the self-revelations made by others on an individual’s self-revelatory behavior. The other study focuses on the comparative nature of sequential judgments about the intrusiveness of personal questions. We find that admission to sensitive and even unethical behaviors by others elicits information disclosure and admissions by the subject, and that questions of increasing sensitivity throughout a survey inhibit information disclosure.

(3C) Knowledge and Chance

Subjective knowledge and Willingness to Act in Riskless Choice
Hadar, Liat (The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel ); Sood, Sanjay (UCLA Anderson School of Management)

Willingness to bet in the face of ambiguity depends on decision-makers’ subjective feeling of knowledge: Decision-makers prefer betting when they feel competent or knowledgeable, but they avoid betting when they feel ignorant or unknowledgeable (e.g., Heath & Tversky, 1991). We show that decision-makers are reluctant to act in any situation in which they feel ignorant, whether the situation involves risk or not, especially when only few choice options are available. The results of three studies demonstrate that feelings or ignorance reduce willingness to join pension plans or to purchase a product. An opportunity to improve knowledge, however, attenuates this effect.

Internal versus external modes of expressing uncertainty
Fox, Craig R. (UCLA); Ülkümen, Gülden (USC); Malle, Bertram F. (Brown University)

We show that speakers and listeners distinguish INTERNAL mode statements (e.g., “I am 80% sure that…”) that express EPISTEMIC uncertainty (in the mind of the speaker) from EXTERNAL mode statements (e.g., “I think there is an 80% chance that…”) that express ALEATORY uncertainty (chance factors). Speakers place more weight on singular information (e.g. feeling-of-knowing) when using “%sure” statements and more weight on distributional information (e.g. relative frequencies) when using “%chance” statements. Meanwhile, listeners associate “sure”/“confident” language with singular reasoning and uncertainty in the speaker’s mind whereas they associate “chance”?“probability” language with distributional reasoning and uncertainty in the world.

When “hope springs eternal:” The role of chance in risk taking
Karelaia, Natalia (INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France); Hogarth, Robin M. (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain)

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We contrast experimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill as opposed to combinations of skill and chance. Our data show differential attitudes toward chance by those whose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making chance more important induces greater optimism for the former who start taking more risk, while the latter maintain a belief that high levels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance. Finally, although we observed “excess entry” (i.e., too many participants entered markets), this could not be attributed to overconfidence.

(4A) Incidental Influence I

Disgust Promotes Disposal: Souring the Status Quo
Han, Seunghee (Carnegie Mellon University); Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard University); Zeckhauser, Richard (Harvard University)

Humans naturally dispose of objects that disgust them. Is this phenomenon so deeply embedded that even incidental disgust triggers disposal? Two experiments were designed to answer this question. Two film clips served as disgust and neutral primes; the objects were routine commodities (boxes of office supplies). Results revealed that the incidental disgust condition powerfully increased the frequency with which decision makers traded away a commodity they owned for a new commodity, thereby countering otherwise robust status quo bias. Decision makers were unaware of disgust’s impact. Even when warned to correct for it, they failed to do so.

The Signature Effect: How Signing One’s Name Affects Behavior
Häubl, Gerald (University of Alberta); Kettle, Keri (University of Alberta)

Can providing a signature affect subsequent decisions and actions? We propose that, because a signature symbolizes an person’s identity, signing one’s name promotes identity-consistent behavior. Four studies demonstrate that merely signing one’s name has strong, contrasting effects on information search and choice – it amplifies the difference between product experts and non-experts in terms how much product information they inspect (Study 1) and how much time they spend in a retail store (Study 2), and it widens the gap between female and male participants in terms of their inclination to consume snack food (Study 3) and to buy chocolate (Study 4).
From formulas to faith: Consistency leads to confidence
Williams, Elanor F. (University of Florida); Dunning, David (Cornell University)

Systematic research is vital to scientific progress; systematic decision making, however, may have unintended consequences. In three studies we found that consistency increased miscalibration between confidence and accuracy, making people more confident in their judgments without making them more accurate. When completing logic problems, estimating calories, and searching for hidden images, participants who were more systematic were more confident but no more accurate in their responses than unsystematic participants. We suggest that people may rely on how they make a decision as a guide to its quality, rather than what the decision was or their true ability to make it.

The Balance Metaphor and its Effect on Choice
Larson, Jeff (Brigham Young University); Billeter, Darron M. (Brigham Young University)

According to research on embodied cognition, our understanding of abstract concepts is grounded in our physical experience. One indication of this grounding is the use of perceptual-motor terms to communicate abstract concepts. Metaphorical language serves to strengthen the association between perceptual-motor experiences and abstract concepts. We investigate the impact of the physical metaphor of balance on choice behavior and find that activating balance increases the selection of the compromise choice. In three experiments, we show that the effect holds when balance is physically activated, conceptually activated, and that activating balance on one task can carry-over and impact subsequent choice.

(4B) Motivation

“Please Give Me A Reason to Be Busy!” The Needs for Busyness and for Busyness Justifications
Hsee, Christopher (University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Yang, Adelle (Shanghai Jiaotong University)

We theorize that people dread idleness, yet they need a justification to be busy. Specifically, we propose (a) that without a justification, people will choose to be idle rather than to be busy, (b) that with a justification to be busy, people will choose to be busy, even if the justification is specious, and (c) that people are happier when busy than when idle, even if they are forced to be busy. Four experiments tested and confirmed these hypotheses. This research suggests that many purported goals people are pursuing may be merely justifications to keep themselves busy.

Moving beyond deliberative control of impulses: The effect of construal levels on evaluative associations and self-control
Fujita, Kentaro (The Ohio State University); Han, H. Anna (St. Mary's College of Maryland)

Many theories propose that self-control requires deliberative control of impulses. Three experiments suggest that people’s subjective mental construals of events can alter temptation impulses without requiring effortful deliberation. High-level construals (mental representations that capture core, essential, and abstract features of events) vs. low-level construals (representations that capture secondary, incidental, and concrete features) promoted associating temptations with negativity, as measured by the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1988). Importantly, these associations also mediated the effect of construals on subsequent self-control choices. Rather than requiring effortful deliberation, self-control decision-making may simply entail seeing the proverbial “forest beyond the trees.”

Understanding of Global Climate Change: Beliefs vs. Actions
Broomell, Stephen (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Han-Hui Por (Fordham University); David Budescu (Fordham University)

Research on global climate change (GCC) is surrounded by uncertainty and fierce debates. This makes it difficult to communicate to the public clear and easy to interpret information. We report results of a survey (n=456) and analyze several variables which are expected to affect both the belief in GCC and to intention to act on GCC. The results support the claim that beliefs in GCC and intentions to act are distinct and they are influenced by different variables. We highlight the important role of beliefs in the free market system in predicting intentions to act.

Mere Influence Effect: When Motivation to Influence Drives Decision
Dai, Xianchi (Chinese University of Hong Kong); Gao, Leilei (Chinese University of Hong Kong); Shiv, Baba (Stanford)

People want to make sure that they are living a meaningful life. One way to make life meaningful is to show that their actions can influence the environment around them. We propose that this motivation for influence, independent of hedonic consideration of the choice options, can systematically affect decision making. In three studies, in the contexts of actual presidential elections, donation decisions of real consequence, and program evaluations, we find strong support for the mere influence effect. Our theorizing also provides an alternative explanation for the well recorded phenomenon in political elections called the Incumbent Rule (Panagakis, 1989).
(4C) Effects of Uncertainty

The Endowment Effect Under Uncertainty
Liersch, Michael J (Stern (NYU)); Rottenstreich, Yuval (Stern (NYU)); Kunreuther, Howard (Wharton (Penn)); Gong, Min (Penn)

In standard endowment effect experiments, participants cannot lose their holdings. However, endowment is often uncertain. For example, post-Madoff, investors worry their investments will disappear. We examine how uncertainty impacts reluctance to trade by extending standard experiments: after trades are completed, there is a 50% chance that participants will lose their holdings. We find that uncertainty exacerbates the reluctance to trade. Evidently people are even more averse to trade when they cannot count on maintaining their holdings. This finding suggests that attachment does not underlie reluctance to trade. One should presumably be less attached to items that are only tentatively held.

Unsure What the Future Will Bring? You May Overindulge: Uncertainty Increases the Appeal of Wants over Shoulds
Milkman, Katherine (The Wharton School)

I examine the effect of uncertainty about the future on whether individuals select want options (e.g., junk foods) or should options (e.g., healthy foods). Three studies demonstrate that uncertainty about what the future may bring increases individuals’ tendency to favor want options over should options, and these results hold even when individuals are able to make choices contingent upon the outcomes of uncertain events. These results are strongest in situations where uncertainty pertains to similar outcomes, suggesting that the effects of uncertainty are enhanced when a decision maker finds it more difficult to distinguish between the possible contingencies she faces.

Why and When does Uncertainty Reduce Inter-group Competition and Encourage inter-group Cooperation
Gong, Min (Columbia University); Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania); Kunreuther, Howard (University of Pennsylvania)

Previous research has shown groups were less cooperative than individuals in a prisoner’s dilemma, but were more cooperative than individuals in a stochastic version of the game. This paper investigates why and when uncertainty reduces inter-group competition and encourages inter-group cooperation. Three mechanisms underlying group cooperation are examined. The data support the hypothesis that groups are more risk-concerned than individuals and more likely to cooperate to reduce risks. Uncertainty reducing inter-group competition is replicated in various scenarios, but the effect of uncertainty encouraging inter-group cooperation was moderated by two factors: whether mutual-cooperation removes uncertainty and whether the game is repeated.

Temporal Distance and Objectivity-Seeking in Choice
Zhang, Jiao (University of Miami)

People often choose for future consumption (e.g., reserving a hotel for a future vacation). In this research, I distinguish between objective attributes, those on which it is certain which option is better, and subjective attributes, those on which it is uncertain which option is better, and propose that because people are uncertain about their preferences and outcome utilities in the future and want to minimize such uncertainty, they are more likely to choose an option superior on an objective attribute over one superior on a subjective attribute in the distant future than in the near future.

(5A) Incidental Influence II

Physical Contact Increases Financial Risk-Taking
Levav, Jonathan (Columbia University); Argo, Jennifer J. (University of Alberta)

In three experiments, with both hypothetical and real payoffs, we show that a light, comforting pat on the shoulder by a female leads to greater financial risk-taking. This effect was both mediated and moderated by feelings of security in both male and female subjects. We establish the boundary conditions for the impact of physical contact on risk-taking behaviors by demonstrating that the effect does not occur when the touching is performed by a male and when the type of touch is a handshake. The results suggest that subtle physical contact can be influential in decision-making and the willingness to accept risk.

Being Hot or Being Cold: The Influence of Temperature on Judgment and Choice
Ahn, Hee-Kyung (University of Toronto)

Temperature-related words such as “hot” and “cold” are often used to describe impulsive and calculated behaviors, respectively. These metaphoric connotations of thermal concepts raise the question as to whether temperature, psychological states and decision making are related to each other, and if so, how. The current paper examines these questions and finds support for a relationship. Across five studies, I demonstrate that the actual experiences of physical temperature trigger decision outcomes in line with the metaphoric association between temperature and impulsivity. Moreover, these temperature effects persist when the concept of temperature is primed by temperature-related words and pictures.
Does Resisting Temptation Evoke Displaced Anger?
Gal, David (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Wendy Liu (Anderson School of Management, UCLA)

Prior research shows that yielding to temptation evokes feelings of guilt. In the present research, we propose that there is an analogous process whereby resisting temptation evokes feelings of anger. We argue that resisting temptation evokes anger because resisting temptation represents a restriction of one’s freedom to act on one’s desires. However, because people are unlikely to have a schema to interpret the situation as anger-provoking, they may not be able to subjectively recognize their affective state as anger. Nonetheless, anger arising from resisting temptation will be displaced to subsequent tasks.

The Labor Illusion: When Waiting Increases Liking

A ubiquitous feature of even the fastest online search interfaces is the wait. While conventional wisdom suggests that the longer people wait, the less satisfied they become, we document and explore waiting’s ironic benefits. In particular, we demonstrate that when websites signal the work in which they are engaging, for example by displaying the steps in the search process, people not only mind the wait less, but actually value the experience more. Due to what we term the “labor illusion,” people can actually prefer websites with longer waits to those that return instantaneous results, even when those results are identical.

(5B) Feedback and Performance

Giving, Seeking, and Responding to Negative Feedback
Finkelstein, Stacey R (University of Chicago, Booth School of Business); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago, Booth School of Business)

What increases the likelihood that a person will decide to pursue a goal, getting negative feedback on unsuccessful actions or getting positive feedback on successful actions? In four studies, we explore when individuals give and seek positive versus negative feedback, and what are the motivational consequences of these distinct feedbacks. We propose a model stating that as individuals gain expertise in a domain of goal pursuit (e.g., taking a language class), they seek and give more negative feedback. In addition, these individuals respond more to negative feedback by increasing their efforts in that domain.

Motivation by Anticipation: Expecting Rapid Feedback Reduces Optimism But Enhances Performance
Kettle, Keri (University of Alberta); Häubl, Gerald (University of Alberta)

People tend to appear less optimistic about their performance the closer they are to receiving feedback on it. This research examines whether the anticipated temporal proximity of feedback also affects actual performance. A field experiment involving a consequential behavior (student presentations in a university course) shows that individuals perform better when they anticipate more proximate feedback, even though they make less optimistic performance predictions. These findings have important implications for all those who are responsible for (mentoring and) evaluating the performance of others.

Goals, Performance, and Satisfaction in Marathon Running
Wu, George (University of Chicago); Markle, Alex (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology); Sackett, Aaron (University of St. Thomas); White, Rebecca (University of Chicago)

Marathon running offers a compelling and real-world context for understanding the motivating forces underlying goals. We surveyed approximately 2000 runners across 15 major marathons regarding their marathon goals, performance, and satisfaction, both before and after race day. We show that goals act as reference points: both anticipated pre- and actual post-marathon satisfaction exhibit the properties of the prospect theory value function. Notably, satisfaction with performance exhibits loss aversion. The decrease in satisfaction for every minute performance falls short of the goal is approximately two times the increase in satisfaction for every minute performance exceeds the goal.

The momentum effect in competitions: field evidence from tennis matches
Page, Lionel (University of Westminster/University of Cambridge)

It is often suggested that there is a psychological advantage to be leading in a competition. It is, however, hard to identify such an effect statistically. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design over a large dataset of tennis matches (N=634,095) the present paper exploits the randomised variation in first set results that occurs when the first set is decided by a close tie break (N=72,294). I find that winning the first set by the closest margin makes the player much more likely to win the second set. Winning seems therefore to have a positive influence on subsequent performances.

(5C) Symposium: Are Crowds Always Wiser?
Organizers: Herzog, Stefan M (University of Basel); Lee, Leonard (Columbia Business School)
The “wisdom-of-crowds” hypothesis maintains that the aggregation of independent information in groups will often result in better judgments than any single member of the group could make. This symposium brings together four recent papers that present boundary conditions to and extensions of the “wisdom-of-crowds” phenomenon. Simmons, Nelson, Galak, and Frederick show that point spread betting markets led to systematically biased predictions of NFL football winnings, even when bettors had the opportunity to learn throughout the season. However, using estimates of point differentials, rather than point spreads, led to improved predictions. Soll, Mannes, Benson, and Payne demonstrate that interacting three-person-groups often ignore valuable, outlying estimates. These groups are often outperformed by a simple average of their member’s private prior estimates, which includes the outlier. Lee, Pham, and Stephen argue that using one’s feelings (as opposed to one’s deliberative thoughts), can improve one’s predictions of a wide variety of crowd behavior (e.g., movies’ box-office revenues, Dow Jones index, 2008 Democratic presidential nomination). Herzog and Hertwig propose exploiting the power of aggregation to improve judgments of a single person using an approach they call “dialectical bootstrapping”: averaging a first estimate with a second, dialectical one, stemming from the same person.

Constituent papers:

*Are Crowds Wise When Predicting Against Point Spreads? It Depends on How You Ask*
Simmons, Joseph P. (Yale University); Nelson, Leif (University of California at San Diego); Galak, Jeff (Carnegie Mellon University); Frederick, Shane (Yale University)

Point spread betting markets are considered an important example of crowd wisdom, because point spreads are accurate and are believed to reflect the “crowd’s” predictions of sporting events. However, a season-long experiment found that a sample of football bettors was systematically biased and performed poorly when predicting which team would win against a point spread. Moreover, the crowd’s biases worsened over time. However, when the crowd was instead asked to predict game outcomes by estimating point differentials, its predictions were unbiased and wiser. Thus, the same “crowd” of bettors can appear wise or unwise, depending on how predictions are elicited.

*Outliers in Groups: Most Valuable but Least Heard*
Soll, Jack B. (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University); Mannes, Al (Carnegie Mellon University); Benson, Lehman (University of Arizona); Payne, John (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University)

In any three-person group, one member’s quantitative opinion will typically be more discrepant than the others. We show that although this outlier opinion is often least accurate individually, it should be included in any average of two estimates; the added diversity of the outlier more than offsets the lower individual accuracy. We also find that groups overweight outliers, to the detriment of accuracy. Surprisingly, groups put the least weight on outliers precisely when their inclusion in a composite adds the most value, which is when the other two group members agree on the same answer.

*The Emotional Oracle: Predicting Crowd Behavior with Feelings*
Lee, Leonard (Columbia Business School); Pham, Michel T. (Columbia Business School); Stephen, Andrew T. (INSEAD)

Predictions of crowd behavior are often associated with careful reasoning and logic. However, what role do emotions play? We examine how reliance on feelings affects the accuracy of such predictions across four studies covering short- and long-range forecasts and four distinct prediction contexts (movies’ box-office revenues, the Dow Jones stock market index, the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, and American Idol 2009). We find greater accuracy in feeling-based predictions than those based more on logical reasoning, and propose that reliance on affect helps foster a more comprehensive processing of available information, distilling the situation to its gist or essential elements.

*Dialectical Bootstrapping: When Should You Trust Your “Crowd Within”?*
Herzog, Stefan M. (University of Basel); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel)

We propose exploiting “The Wisdom of Crowds” to improve judgments of a single person using an approach we call dialectical bootstrapping: Reducing a person’s error by averaging his or her first estimate with a second, dialectical one that harks back to somewhat different knowledge and assumptions or stems from a different estimation strategy. We present evidence for accuracy improvement and that the benefits of dialectical bootstrapping can go beyond mere reliability increases. Analytical results show that averaging the first and dialectical estimates stemming from the same person is the preferred strategy under a surprisingly broad range of situations.
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22

(6A) Symposium: Whither Optimism: Inquiries into the Existence and Persistence of Optimistic Biases

Organizer: Massey, Cade (Yale)

For years optimistic biases of many sorts were considered ubiquitous (Weinstein, 1980). Indeed, the debate focused far more on whether these biases were adaptive than whether they existed (Taylor & Brown, 1988). In recent years this orthodoxy has been challenged by research showing, for example, that people actually underestimate their performance on easy tasks (Kruger, 1999), or more generally, that many biases can be readily explained by a Bayesian model of judgment (Moore & Healy, 2008). Even the evidence for an effect as simple and intuitive as the desirability bias has been called into question (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). In this session we bring together researchers with differing perspectives on this debate. The group focuses on mechanisms that facilitate or mitigate optimistic biases, such as desirability, selective exposure and top-down beliefs. By considering this research side-by-side we hope to sharpen the debate about where optimistic biases do and don’t exist, and why.

Constituent papers:

Keeping the Faith: The Persistence of Optimism and the Role of Desirability
Massey, Cade (Yale); Simmons, Joseph (Yale); Armor, David (San Diego State)

Does optimism persist in the face of feedback? To investigate we asked NFL fans to predict outcomes throughout the football season. Participants were optimistic before the season, predicting their favorite team would perform better than did neutral parties. Optimism was robust, persisting until the season’s final weeks. It was also strongly related to desirability. An advantage of this setting is that the desirability of team outcomes varies significantly with eligibility for post-season play. Using data from publicly traded prediction markets we find an extremely strong relation between post-season eligibility and optimism. In short, where there is hope, there is optimism.

The Role of Selective Exposure in Overconfidence Effects and the Desirability Bias
Windschitl, P.D. (Iowa); Scherer, A.M. (Iowa); Smith, A.R. (Iowa); Rose, J.P. (Iowa)

After making a tough decision, people tend to select information that is consonant rather than dissonant with their choice. Our first study demonstrated that people exhibit a similar tendency after making a prediction. While this tendency has been theorized as a possible cause of overconfidence, could it also be a mediator of the desirability bias? In a second study, we used a monetary incentive to make one possible outcome more desired than another. This caused participants, who did not make initial predictions, to select evidence consonant rather than dissonant with the desired outcome, resulting in inflated likelihood judgments.

Motivation and Overconfidence
Moore, Don A. (Carnegie Mellon); Benoit, Jean-Pierre (London Business School); Dubra, Juan (Universidad de Montevideo); Haran, Uriel (Carnegie Mellon); Shidlovski, Daniella (Hebrew University)

Many researchers have assumed that overconfidence is driven by motivation: that people are motivated to believe that they are better than they are and that they are better than others. But the glaring gap in this literature is direct evidence that changes in motivation influence these beliefs. In two experiments, we find that manipulating motivation has little effect on the tendency to overestimate one’s own performance or to claim that it is better than that of others. Instead, we find that motivation can increase actual performance but also that strong motivation can undermine performance (choking under pressure).

Top-Down Self-Beliefs Alter Perceptions of Bottom-Up Experience: Implications for Performance Evaluation
Dunning, David (Cornell); Critcher, Clayton R. (Cornell)

People's top-down, usually overly-optimistic, self-beliefs influence their performance evaluations of how well they have objectively done on a specific task—with this influence producing more error than accuracy. New data suggest that those top-down beliefs affect performance evaluations because they shape perceptions of bottom-up experience with the task. People who believe they are skilled think they find solutions faster and expend less effort than those without such favorable self-beliefs. These perceptions are unrelated to actual objective measures of bottom-up experience. Implications for undue optimism and self-stereotyping effects are discussed.

(6B) Judgment under Uncertainty

How Does Motivation Affect Judgment?
Dai, Xianchi (The Chinese University of Hong Kong); Hsee, Chris (University of Chicago)

We propose a two-process model of the effect of motivation on judgment. According to our model, motivation leads to two opposite effects. One is wishful thinking, in which people’s evaluation is assimilated toward their motivated expectation. The other
is a contrast effect, in which people use their motivated expectation as a reference point to evaluate reality. We further propose that ownership status determines the relative weight of the two processes. We tested our model in three studies about volume, size, and product quality judgments.

**Categorical Cue Weighting**
Shah, Anuj K. (Princeton University); Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (Princeton University)

Equal weighting heuristics are known to be accurate, effort-reducing strategies. But other simple weighting principles are relatively understudied. Here, we test the hypothesis that decision-makers might partition cues into different categories of information and subsequently weight these partitions equally (rather than weighting individual cues equally). In a series of studies, we show how this behavior can occur spontaneously and how partition-level labels can change the weighting of identical pieces of information. Finally, we discuss how this relates to other effort-reduction strategies and heuristics.

**Torture and Judgments of Guilt**
Gray, Kurt (Harvard University); Wegner, Daniel M (Harvard University)

Although torture can establish guilt through confession, how are judgments of guilt made when suspects don’t confess? Perhaps perceived guilt is based inappropriately upon how much pain suspects suffered during torture. Dissonance suggests that those complicit with torture will see pain as evidence of guilt, while moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009) suggests that those distant from torture will see pain as evidence of innocence. Participant evaluations of a confederate tortured in the lab supported these predictions. These results help explain the torture debate: unlike the distant public, those involved with torture (e.g., government) perceive victims to be guilty.

**The More, the Merrier: The Perverse Effect of Additional Victims on Moral Judgment**
Haran, Uriel (Carnegie Mellon University); Cain, Daylian M. (Yale University)

Murdering ten is worse than murdering two; all else being equal, the worse the outcome of an act, the harsher the judgment should be against the agent. However, people’s judgments sometimes display the opposite pattern. Two lab studies demonstrate that as the number of victims increased, each victim was incorrectly perceived to be suffering less, even when the actual suffering was held constant across victims and all were harmed at once. This discounting of individual harm sometimes was so great that participants perceived hurting many victims as less harmful overall than the same act against only one or few victims.

(6C) Choice Models and Methodology

**The “Nothing to Gain/Nothing to Lose” Effect - Similarity Judgments in Strategic, Risky and Intertemporal Choice**
Leland, Jonathan (NSF)

Anomalies under uncertainty are commonly accounted for by weakening the independence axiom. Intertemporal choice anomalies are attributed to non-exponential discounting while irrationality in games results from “other-regarding” preferences. Each of these explanations is domain-dependent. This paper shows that anomalies across domains will all result from a decision process involving similarity judgments and, specifically from one implication of the model termed the “nothing to gain/nothing to lose” effect. It explains 4-fold risk preferences in risky choice, hyperbolicity in intertemporal choice, and makes a variety of novel predictions in games. Results confirming the game predictions are presented.

**Choice Variability Versus Structural Inconsistency of Preferences**
Regenwetter, Michel (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Davis-Stober, Clintin (University of Missouri at Columbia)

Rational choice theory makes the structural consistency assumption that every decision maker’s binary strict preference among choice alternatives forms a strict weak order. Using new quantitative interdisciplinary methodologies we dissociate variability of choices from structural inconsistency of preferences. We show that laboratory choice behavior among stimuli of a classical “intransitivity” paradigm is, in fact, consistent with variable, but transitive, strict weak order preferences. We find that decision makers act in accordance with a restrictive mathematical model that, for the behavioral sciences, is extraordinarily parsimonious.

**Verbatim and Gist Cues Produce Opposite Relations Between Risk Perception and Risk Taking: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach**
Pardo, Seth T. (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University); Mills, Brit A. (Cornell University); Shreck, Erica (Cornell University); Estrada, Steven M. (Cornell University)

Fuzzy-trace theory predicts that analytical (verbatim) thinking produces positive (reflective) correlations between perceived risk and behavior and favors risk taking. Qualitative (gist) thinking elicits bottom-line (avoidant) attitudes toward risk producing negative (protective) correlations. Two verbatim and three gist measures were used to test predictions about these opposing relations by manipulating retrieval cues. Two gist principles (absolute, relative) were used to test whether finer-grained risk distinctions led to riskier behavior. Results confirmed our predictions. Verbatim measures correlated positively with behavior and intentions; gist measures negatively correlated; absolute-only endorsement correlated with the least risk and relative only with the most risk.
Online Experiments for Judgment and Decision Making
Horton, John (Harvard University); Zeckhauser, Richard (Harvard University); Chen, Daniel (University of Chicago)

Established online labor markets offer a promising venue for running experiments in judgment and decision making. Subjects from diverse populations can be recruited swiftly, and at modest expense. Moreover, subjects are not experiment-savvy. We discuss how to pay subjects, design online material, gain IRB approval, meet requirements for causal inference, and implement classic studies: paired surveys, real-effort tasks, and canonical games. We address possible threats to identification, including randomization failures, SUTVA violations and non-random attrition. Results from completed studies using online subjects are presented. “Sweet spot” research topics -- ideal for online experimentation – are identified.

(7A) Consumer Behavior and Incentives

Disposal Biases: Why Sellers of Used Goods May Not Choose the Highest Bidder
Isaac, Mathew S. (Kellogg, Northwestern University); Brough, Aaron R. (Kellogg, Northwestern University)

Sellers of used goods are often faced with a choice between multiple buyers. A common assumption is that rational sellers will base their decision on the buyers’ willingness to pay and select the highest bidder. However, we identify a non-monetary source of utility that can influence the behavior of individuals who are considering product disposal. Specifically, we propose the existence of “post-transactional utility,” wherein sellers derive value from the belief that following a transaction, buyers will utilize products in a manner consistent with the sellers’ preferences. Three experiments demonstrate that decision-makers sacrifice financial gains in exchange for post-transactional utility.

Mental Accounting in the Context of Poverty
Hall, Crystal C. (University of Washington); Shafir, Eldar (Princeton University)

While the mental accounting literature has contributed to the understanding of consumer behavior, no work to date has examined these phenomena with respect to low-income consumers. Using adaptations from classic demonstrations of topical mental accounting, we show that low-income individuals do not reliably replicate findings regarding savings preference. When considering spending time to travel in order to save a certain amount of money, low-income participants do not consistently show a preference for saving on proportionally larger sums of money. We demonstrate this through both adapted versions of previously studied stimuli and through a novel, within-subjects design.

Private Payment versus Public Praise: Effects of reward type on energy conservation
Handgraaf, Michel (University of Amsterdam & CRED, Columbia University); Van Lidth de Jeude, Margriet (University of Amsterdam)

Financial rewards may have negative side-effects. These may be overcome if more socially relevant rewards are used. We did a field experiment in which we used monetary vs. non-material and private vs. public rewards to stimulate energy saving. We measured energy consumption for a total of 13 weeks. As expected, public rewards worked better than private ones and non-material rewards worked better than monetary rewards. Differences persisted for 8 weeks after we stopped our manipulations. These are important results: they add to theorizing about the effectiveness of rewards and show that focusing on privately earned monetary rewards may be counterproductive.

Will there be blood? Incentives and substitution effects in pro-social behavior
Lacetera, Nicola (Case Western Reserve University); Macis, Mario (University of Michigan); Slonim, Robert (University of Sydney)

We examine 14,029 Red Cross blood drives with many offering material incentives. Regressions indicate that offering incentives significantly increases donations while not affecting the proportion of bad quality donations. Higher valued items also resulted in greater donations. These findings are corroborated by a small-scale field experiment showing that offering $5 and $20 gift cards significantly increased donations while not increasing the proportion of bad quality donors. While our results contrast with Titmuss’ (1971) concerns, the blood donation environment today may no longer be perceived as a purely non-market pro-social activity and so could be less susceptible to crowding effects.

(7B) Subjective Probability

A pairwise-contrast model of intuitive probabilistic inference
Li, Ye (Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago); Bartels, Daniel M. (Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago); Wu, George (Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago)

In two studies, we develop and test a formal model of likelihood judgment using pairwise comparisons between prospects (e.g., "Are the chances of this event greater than alternative 1, than alternative 2...?"), rather than Support Theory’s comparison between a prospect and an aggregate representation of alternatives (e.g., "Are the chances of this event greater than the chances of the rest of
the events? We find that our pairwise contrast model better accounts for behavior than Support Theory. In addition, we found that our model's advantage over competitors increases under conditions where intuition receives more weight in inference (e.g. time pressure).

Assessing Joint Probability Distributions with Isoprobability Contours
Abbas, Ali (University of Illinois); Budescu, David (Fordham University); Gu, Rola (University of Illinois); Marcus, Jamie (Fordham University); Krahan, Ibrahim (University of Illinois)

We propose a method to construct joint probability distributions using isoprobability contours: sets of points with the same joint cumulative probability. The approach reduces the joint probability assessment into a one-dimensional marginal probability assessment and some isoprobability contour assessments. We report the results of several experiments and simulations and discuss: (i) which contours to assess (trade-off between assessing the 10% contour which is longer but more difficult to reason about than a 90% contour); (ii) the number of contours to assess for a given accuracy, and (iii) the effects of learning on the monotonicity and repeatability of the contour assessments.

Perceiving Intentions Makes Streaks Seem Likely to Continue
Waytz, Adam (Harvard University); Caruso, Eugene (University of Chicago); Epley, Nicholas (University of Chicago)

Sometimes people believe a sequence of repeated events will continue (the “hot hand”), whereas other times they believe it will reverse (the “gambler’s fallacy”). The current research identifies a critical cue, the perceived intentionality of the agent generating the streak, to explain these contradictory intuitions. Two studies demonstrate that people are more likely to predict that streaks will continue (reverse) in contexts involving agents perceived to be intentional (unintentional). A second set of studies demonstrate that the perception that streaks will continue is strongest among individuals who are most naturally attuned to the presence of intentions in agents more generally.

Unpacking Unpacking: When Greater Detail Reduces Perceived Likelihood
Redden, Joseph (U. of Minnesota); Frederick, Shane (Yale)

This research examines how the level of detail used to describe an event affects its perceived likelihood, particularly when all of the constituent subclasses are obvious and readily summoned. In a series of studies involving the evaluation of gambles and sure things, people preferred a gamble more when it was described as a simpler collapsed event because they perceived it to be more likely. Process evidence implicates processing fluency as a critical moderator of the unpacking effect and shows that it may influence the subjective likelihood of an event, even in cases where the probability can be easily calculated.

(7C) Intertemporal and Medical Choice

Three reasons why discounting doesn’t work
Scholten, Marc (Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada); Read, Daniel (Durham Business School / Yale University)

In discounting models of intertemporal choice, people assign discounted values independently to all options, and then compare these discounted values. In two choice studies, we identify three anomalies to discounting models: The time difference, or interval, between delayed outcomes sometimes counts more and sometimes less as a whole than if it were divided into shorter subintervals (superadditivity and subadditivity, respectively), and whether it counts more or less depends on the money difference involved (inseparability). To account for these anomalies, we propose a tradeoff model, in which people directly compare the options along the time attribute and the money attribute.

I want it now!: Why discount rates for losses show reverse frame and reverse magnitude effects
Hardisty, David J. (Columbia University); Appelt, Kirstin C. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

In 4 studies, 580 US residents chose between immediate and future gains and losses. While participants discounted small gains more than large ones and discounted potential delays (default is now) more than potential accelerations (default is later), their responses for losses reversed or eliminated these classic effects. This is explained through a three-factor discounting model including uncertainty, resource slack, and present bias. Critically, present bias (wanting things now, ceteris paribus) translates into higher discounting of gains but lower discounting of losses. Participants’ thought listings confirmed the mediating role of present bias and revealed qualitatively different processes for evaluating future losses.

Burdening Patients with Doctors’ Conflicts of Interest
Sah, Sunita (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University); Cain, Daylian M. (Yale School of Management)

Disclosure is often advocated as a potential solution to conflicts of interest. We show in two experiments that disclosure of a doctor’s financial conflict of interest has contradictory effects that put the patient in an effective bind: Disclosure decreases trust in a doctor’s advice whilst simultaneously increasing the perceived pressure to comply with the doctor’s advice, in order to avoid
signaling distrust to the doctor. These two forces work in opposing directions and the stronger force determines whether the patient will reject the doctor’s advice. Thus, disclosure can place a burden on those it was supposed to protect.

Are patients too trusting? The unintended consequences of continuity of care
Schwartz, Janet (Duke University); Luce, Mary Frances (Duke University); Ariely, Dan (Duke University)

The judgment and decision making literature is rich with evidence that unavoidable errors and providers’ financial conflicts of interest present major obstacles to getting the best possible medical care. Second opinions are one of the most important, if not the only, tools to protect consumers from these pitfalls. Despite the advantages of second opinions, however, they are often underutilized. In a series of experiments we investigate the extent to which established relationships between patients and healthcare providers has the unintended consequence of driving people away from second opinions—often at the expense of their own financial and medical well-being.

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(8A) Heuristics

Ignoring invalid information just fine: Evidence from a Consumer Reports Oops
Simonsohn, Uri (Wharton)

Can people voluntarily ignore information? The hindsight bias, debriefing paradigm, anchoring-and-adjustment, and false-consensus, among other literatures, suggest a big NOT. Here I analyze data from a natural experiment involuntarily performed by Consumer Reports® who retracted a safety ranking for infant carseats. I find that the market for carseats responded markedly to the new ranking when first released. More excitingly, I also find that it almost instantly returned to baseline upon its retraction. I discuss possible explanations for this lab vs. field discrepancy in behavior.

The (lack of) Downstream Consequences of Anchoring
Smith, Andrew R. (University of Iowa); Windschitl, Paul D. (University of Iowa)

Numerous experiments have demonstrated that anchors influence estimates. Few studies, however, have examined whether anchoring effects extend beyond the judgments made while considering the anchor value. In three experiments, participants evaluated photographs after exposure to high or low anchors. Participants also picked their favorite photograph and indicated how much they liked the photographs. We found robust anchoring effects in participants’ photograph evaluations. However, these effects didn’t extend to their choice of favorite photograph or to how much they liked the photographs. Anchors can produce robust effects, but these effects are limited to the judgments made where the anchors are encountered.

Simple heuristics in the ultimatum game
Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel); Fischbacher, Urs (University of Konstanz); Bruhin, Adrian (University of Zürich)

Evidence at variance with maximization of self-interest in social games is typically explained in terms of social preferences models. They abandon the assumption of selfishness as the sole driver of behavior while retaining the rational choice framework, and entering psychological concepts such as inequality aversion into the utility function. As an alternative approach, we use the framework of fast and frugal decision trees. We demonstrate that they could describe—although not perfectly—people’s choices in our environment of mini-ultimatum games. In addition, the trees give rise to response time predictions. Testing these predictions, we found evidence for the postulated processes.

On the role of recognition and magnitude-comparison in binary decision tasks
Schweickart, Oliver (University of Alberta); Brown, Norman R. (University of Alberta); Lee, Peter J. (University of Alberta)

This study examines the processes underlying binary decisions when only one object in a pair is recognized. In two experiments, participants were asked (a) to decide which of two countries has the higher population (per capita GDP), and (b) to estimate the population (per capita GDP) of each country. RTs displayed a classic symbolic distance effect (Banks, 1977): RTs were inversely related to the difference between the subjective population sizes (per capita GDPs) of the compared countries. These findings disconfirm predictions made by simple non-compensatory decision models and indicate that a magnitude-comparison process plays a central role in the task.

(8B) Consumer Behavior

Thought for Food: Top-down Processes Moderate Sensory-Specific Satiation
Huh, Young Eun (Carnegie Mellon University); Morewedge, Carey K. (Carnegie Mellon University); Vosgerau, Joachim (Carnegie Mellon University)
It has been shown that consumption of a food leads to a decrease in liking of that food without diminishing liking of foods not consumed (i.e., sensory-specific satiety). The present research tested whether top-down processes alone can engender sensory-specific satiation. Across five studies, we found that people who imagined eating a large amount of food subsequently consumed less of that food than people who imagined eating a small amount of food, imagined eating another food, or imagined simply handling the food. The results provide strong evidence that cognitive top-down processes are an important determinant of satiation.

**Can Visual Images in Advertisements Curb Consumption?**
Zhu, Meng (Carnegie Mellon University); Billeter, Darron M (Brigham Young University); Inman, Jeffrey J (University of Pittsburgh)

Contrary to the common belief that visual images in advertisements generate positive influences on consumer demand, we argue that visual images can decrease sales of the advertised product due to reduced consumption volume. Four studies demonstrate that adding visual images can increase perceived product effectiveness in advertisements and lead to lower usage rates of the featured products. We show that this negative impact of visual images on consumption is driven by heuristic processing and is attenuated by cognitive deliberation. Further, we identify boundary conditions and provide evidence that perceived product effectiveness mediates the effect of visual images on consumption.

**Calorie Posting in New York City: The Effect of Point-of-Purchase Information on Food Choice**
Wisdom, Jessica (Carnegie Mellon University); Downs, Julie (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University); Wansink, Brian (Cornell University)

To examine the impact of legislation requiring prominent calorie labeling in fast-food restaurants, we collected receipts and surveys from customers in New York, before and after menus were labeled. Some customers received a recommendation for daily or per-meal caloric intake prior to ordering. Labeling lowered consumption at one location, where baseline intake was especially high, but the others trended (non-significantly) towards increased consumption. Recommendations didn’t reduce intake, but interacted with individual differences to bring outliers closer to mean consumption. Thus, providing calorie information in restaurants may lower intake for some, but does not appear to be a panacea for obesity.

**Are Fast Choices Driven by Value or Visual Saliency of the Options?**
Milosavljevic, Milica (California Institute of Technology); Navalpakkam, Vidhya (California Institute of Technology); Koch, Christof (California Institute of Technology); Rangel, Antonio (California Institute of Technology)

Imagine that you are in a hurry and have a few seconds to choose a food item. The available items vary both in subjective value - how much you like each – and in their visual saliency – brightness. How do the two factors affect your choice? Here, subjects made choices between pairs of food items with different subjective values while we manipulated visual saliency by changing the brightness of the items. The results indicate that visual saliency affects choices when the value of the two items is similar, but that value wins over when one of the options is highly preferred.

**Metacognition**

**Inferring Preferences From Mental Behavior**
Critcher, Clayton R. (Cornell University); Gilovich, Thomas (Cornell University)

Self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) posits that people understand their own preferences much as they understand others’, by interpreting the meaning of their behavior in light of the context in which it occurs. Three experiments tested whether people also rely on a ubiquitous, but unobservable “behavior,” their mindwandering, when making such inferences. Mindwandering to positive, concurrent events was assumed to reflect one’s boredom with an ongoing activity, whereas mindwandering to negative or past events was seen as uninformative. Participants appeared to rely spontaneously on mindwandering as a cue to their own preferences, but not when preference-unrelated causes of mindwandering were highlighted.

**When a choice is too easy: Meta-cognitive experiences of ease can increase choice deferral**
Zhang, Charles Y. Z. (University of Michigan); Norbert Schwarz (University of Michigan)

Past research has shown that the feeling of difficulty increases the likelihood of choice deferral. The present study shows that choice tasks that are “too easy” make people feel that they didn’t really have much of a choice and didn’t engage in the deliberation that characterizes making a choice. Either of these impressions may motivate people to defer choice and search for additional alternatives. Two studies show that less people defer choice when making comparisons that involve slight trade-offs (rather than no trade-offs) and when the dominant nature of the best alternative has to be inferred (rather than explicitly labeled).

**How Much Do I Know? When Abstraction Produces Overestimation**
Alter, Adam L. (New York University); Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (Princeton University); Zemla, Jeffrey C. (Rice University)

An illusion of explanatory depth (IOED) occurs when people believe they understand a concept more deeply than they actually do. Researchers have demonstrated this bias in judgment in a number of domains, but few have considered why IOEDs occur in the
first place. We suggest that IOEDs occur because people adopt an inappropriately abstract construal style when they assess how well they understand concrete concepts. As this mechanism predicts, participants experienced diminished IOEDs when they were induced to adopt a concrete construal mindset across five experiments. We examine how these findings might explain a range of social and metacognitive biases.

Complicating Choice
Schrift, Rom Y. (Columbia University); Netzer, Oded (Columbia University); Kivetz, Ran (Columbia University)

A great deal of research in decision-making and social-cognition has explored decision-makers’ attempts to simplify choices by bolstering their tentative choice candidate and/or denigrating the other alternatives. In the present research, we investigate a diametrically opposed process, whereby decision-makers complicate their decisions. We demonstrate that decision-makers overweight unimportant product attributes, and reverse their preference ordering in a manner that detracts from the leading alternative and intensifies the conflict in choice. We show how complicating behavior, once triggered, could lead to choice reversals. The results from six studies support a unifying effort compatibility principle, which accommodates both simplifying and complicating behavior.

(9A) Choice under Uncertainty

Individual Differences in Strategic Variability during Risky Choice
Venkatraman, Vinod (Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University); Payne, John W. (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University); Bettman, James R. (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University); Luce, Mary Frances (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University); Huettel, Scott A. (Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University)

Adaptive decision making involves the use of multiple strategies that vary across individuals, and shift with context. Using complex mixed gambles, we demonstrate a bias towards simplifying choices that maximize the overall probability of winning over choices that are consistent with more traditional economic models. More importantly, we show that the extent of this bias can be exaggerated or attenuated using subtle variations in the decision context. Individual differences in biases towards the simplifying strategy or choices correlated positively with satisficing trait and negatively with sadness trait. Finally, using fMRI, we demonstrate distinct neural predictors of strategic variability across individuals.

Probability Matching in Choice under Uncertainty: Intuition versus Deliberation
Koehler, Derek J. (Psychology, Waterloo); James, Greta (Psychology, Waterloo)

Probability matching has been characterized as “dumb” (reflecting operations of heuristic judgment) and as “smart” (adaptive in environments in which outcomes may follow patterns). In choices with monetary stakes, we find (a) probability matching persists even when it is not possible to identify or exploit outcome patterns; (b) many “probability matchers” rate an alternative strategy (maximizing) as superior when it is described to them; and (c) probability matchers score lower on the cognitive reflection test than do maximizers. Probability matching is evidently an intuitive response that can be, but often is not, overridden by deliberate consideration of alternative choice strategies.

Loss aversion and the comparative nature of affective reactions
Rubaltelli, Enrico (University of Padova); Rumiati, Rino (University of Padova); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)

In Study 1, people were presented with a sure gain [loss] of €100 versus a bet offering a .5 chance of gaining [losing] €200. In Study 2, people were presented with .98 chance to win [lose] €100 versus the same .5 bets. In both frames, there was a significant interaction for each dependent variable (P < .03). In JE, participants had more positive affective reactions toward the sure gain than toward the .5 bet and more negative affective reactions toward the sure loss than toward the bet (P < .01). In SE, the difference was not significant.

Graininess, Similarity and Decision Making
Chakravarti, Amitav (New York University); Fang, Christina (New York University); Shapira, Zur (New York University)

We explore the link between the graininess of one’s mental model and judgments of similarity, as subjects are asked to detect change, and make investment decisions on new technologies. The graininess of one’s mental model refers to the number of categories that one uses in judgment and decision making (Pettigrew, 1958). We hypothesized and show experimentally that the coarse-grained category structure is likely to lead to more similar judgment. As a result, they reacted less to change, and were less willing to invest in new technologies.

(9B) Dual Processes

People’s Intuitions About Intuitive Insight and Intuitive Choice
Inbar, Yoel (Harvard University); Cone, Jeremy (Cornell University); Gilovich, Thomas (Cornell University)
How do people balance intuition and reason when making decisions? We report five studies indicating that features of the decision problem cue people to follow intuition or reason when making their choice. Features associated with rational processing incline people to decide on the basis of reason; those associated with intuitive processing incline people to decide intuitively. Thus, choices seen as objectively evaluable (Study 1), complex (Study 2), sequential (Studies 3 and 4) and precise (Study 5) elicit a preference for choosing rationally. This framework accurately predicts people’s actual choices in variants of both the ratio-bias and ambiguity-aversion paradigms.

Mechanisms of Superior Judgment: Ironic Effects of Cognitive Control
Cokely, Edward T. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

How is cognitive control used to regulate and produce superior judgment and decision making? Theoretically, the leading framework (dual systems) indicates that cognitive control is used either for rule based processing (e.g., logic) or for monitoring and correcting error-prone intuitions. In three experiments, I examine some surprising judgments to reveal an alternative mode of cognitive control (i.e., early selection). Paradoxically, and in contrast to dual systems theory, controlled cognition was associated with a greater reliance on heuristics for judgments in stock profit and purchasing power estimation tasks. Modes of cognitive control, individual differences, and implications for theory will be discussed.

An Empirical Comparison of Intuitive versus Analytic Judgment Processes
Tennant, Raegan J. (Chicago Booth); Hastie, Reid (Chicago Booth)

Distinctions between intuitive versus analytic thought processes are central to judgment frameworks. Experimental comparisons between intuitive versus analytic, unreflective versus reasoned, and unconscious versus conscious judgments suggest reliable differences between processes and outcomes in these modes of thinking. The present research uses a multiple-cue judgment task to capture judgment policies when participants evaluate faces, consumer products, and other objects. Comparisons of four modes of thought are made with reference to cue utilization, reliability, and other properties of judgment policies. Our goal is to provide a systematic description of the similarities and differences between judgments rendered in different modes of thinking.

Reflecting on dilemmas: individual differences in judgments about difficult situations
Hardman, David (London Metropolitan University)

Two studies tested the hypothesis that reflective thinking is associated with normative responding on judgments and decisions. For Study 1, 346 UK students completed Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and several moral dilemma problems. In Study 2, 172 participants were recruited via online social networking sites and by written adverts in London Metropolitan University. Their responses on the ultimatum game were compared with their scores on the CRT, the SAT, and Lipkus et al’s (2001) numeracy scale. The main finding was that highly reflective individuals were more normative on moral dilemmas but less normative on the economic dilemma.

(9C) Choice Set

The Rejectable Choice Set: How Seemingly Irrelevant No-Choice Options Affect Decisions
Parker, Jeffrey R. (Columbia University); Schrift, Rom Y. (Columbia University)

This article investigates how decision processes and preferences change when a no-choice option is added to the choice-set. We argue that even if such no-choice options are undesirable, their mere presence in the choice set may force decision-makers to determine not only which alternative is best, but also which are acceptable. Accordingly, this change in judgment criteria is shown to increase the importance of attributes that are (1) compatible with an evaluative judgment (i.e., enriched attributes), and (2) closer to decision-makers’ minimum threshold requirements. We demonstrate that such change in preferences often lead to choice reversals and violations of regularity.

Pseudo-Inefficacy: When Awareness of Those We Cannot Help Demotivates Us From Aiding Those We Can Help
Slovic, Paul (Decision Research and University of Oregon); Vastfjall, Daniel (Decision Research); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research)

What motivates people to provide life-saving assistance to people in danger? Findings from two published and one new study document a curious tendency that has important implications for pro-social or humanitarian behavior. In situations where someone could provide money or clean water to aid people facing death from starvation or disease, awareness of others who would not be helped appears to inhibit action. People help others, in part, to make themselves feel good. We propose that knowledge of those “out of reach” triggers negative feelings that counter the good feelings from helping, thus demotivating action.

The cost of changing your mind: Reversed decisions increase regret
Kirkebøen, Geir (University of Oslo); Vasaasen, Erik (University of Oslo); Teigen, Karl Halvor (University of Oslo)

Many decisions involve a time interval between a decision is made and the outcome is revealed. In this pre-outcome period one can often change one’s mind. In three studies we explored participants’ regret in the process of making such reversible decisions. The
outcomes were designed such that it was always possible to imagine a more profitable outcome. In all three studies those who actually changed their decision reported markedly stronger post-outcome regret, also when they achieved better outcomes, than those who did not change their mind. Changing your mind seems to have a cost even for positive outcomes.

Comparison Process at Retrieval (CPR): A memory theoretic account of relative judgment
Fan, Jeni (University of Oklahoma); Thomas, Rick (University of Oklahoma)

We present a model of judgment, Comparison Process at Retrieval (CPR), developed from a memory-theoretic perspective. CPR postulates that the referent in comparative judgment is formed at the time of judgment through a cued-recall process. The model accommodates existing theories and findings that emphasize the effects of ecological structure on judgment. CPR predicts, however, that judgment can be dissociated from ecological structure due to memory retrieval dynamics operating at the time of judgment. We empirically verify some of the model’s novel predictions and discuss the importance of merging memory theory with research in judgment and choice.
Session #1 w/ Continental Breakfast (Sunday, 8:30-10:30am, Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C; attached to Sheraton through walkway)

(1) Your feeling vs. mine: The cognitive meanings of emotion matter
Wang, Long (Northwestern University); Murnighan, J Keith (Northwestern University)

(2) Losing a dime with a satisfied mind: Positive affect accounts for age-related differences in sequential decision making
von Helversen, Bettina (University of Basel); Mata, Rui (Stanford University)

(3) The role of affect in predicting support for climate change initiatives
Hart, Philip S. (Cornell University); Stedman, Richard (Cornell University); McComas, Katherine (Cornell University)

(4) Money, pleasure and pain: How is risky choice affected by what is at stake?
Pachur, Thorsten (University of Basel, Cognitive and Decision Sciences); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel, Cognitive and Decision Sciences)

(5) Positive Affect, Intertemporal Choice, and Levels of Thinking: Increasing Consumers' Willingness to Wait
Pyone, Jin Seok (Cornell University); Isen, Alice M. (Cornell University)

(6) The Credit Card Effect on Consumption and Saving
Schneider, Mark (U Conn); Schneider, Jeffrey (Duke University)

(7) Social values and affective motivations for cooperation: The psychological costs of inequity
Dickert, Stephan (Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods, Bonn); Beckenkamp, Martin (Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods, Bonn)

(8) Lateralized Message Framing
McCormick, Michael (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro); McElroy, Todd (Appalachian State University); Seta, John J. (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro)

(9) Take the best or take the emotionally best? The role of affective information on non compensatory choice
Trujillo, Carlos A. (Universidad de los Andes, School of Management)

(10) Expanding Beyond the Foundations of Decision Making: Perceived Differences in the Value of Resources
Ramirez, Patrick A. (University of Texas at Arlington); Levine, Daniel S. (University of Texas at Arlington)

(11) Does Green Really Help Being Green? The Role of Color in Processing Fluency
Seo, Joon Yong (University of Utah)

(12) The Link Between Early Visual Processing and the Endowment Effect: Evidence from Event-Related Potentials (ERP)
Ashby, Nathaniel J. S. (University of Oregon); Dickert, Stephan (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); McCollough, Andrew (University of Oregon); Vogel, Edward K. (University of Oregon)

(13) Don’t say no, just drop the ball: Managing reputation and relationships amidst competing demands
Juillerat, Tina (University of North Carolina)

(14) Everybody Remain Calm: How Anxiety Makes All Advice Look Like Good Advice
Gino, Francesca (University of North Carolina); Wood, Alison (Wharton School); Schweitzer, Maurice (Wharton School)

(15) Will you regret making me nervous? How stressful job interviews impact applicant truthfulness.
Kay, Virginia (UNC Chapel Hill); Gino, Francesca (UNC Chapel Hill)

(16) To broaden, or not to broaden: That is the question
Easwar, Karthikeya (The Ohio State Univ)

(17) Mood Effects on Comparative Judgment
Smarandescu, Laura (Iowa State University); Lacziak, Russell (Iowa State University); Rose, Randall (University of South
(18) Organizational Neuroscience: Shaping the Decision Landscape  
Becker, William J (University of Arizona); Cropanzano, Russell (University of Arizona)

(19) Is luck predictive of decision making?  
Burns, Bruce D. (University of Sydney); So, Emily (University of Sydney)

(20) If it worked for me it will work for everybody: Egocentrism in evaluating techniques and treatments  
Bruchmann, Kathryn I. G. (University of Iowa); Windschitl, Paul D. (University of Iowa); Lee, Seon (University of Iowa); McEvoy, Sean (Yale University School of Medicine)

(21) Prescriptive lay beliefs about the “how” of judgment and decision making  
Huber, Michaela (University of Colorado, Boulder); Park, Bernadette (University of Colorado, Boulder); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado, Boulder)

(22) Affect and motivational forces underlying charitable behavior: Psychophysiological data  
Vastfjall, Daniel (Decision Research); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)

(23) The Scope of Time: Insensitivity to the Magnitude of Future (but not Past) Harms  
Tennant, Raegan J. (Chicago Booth); Caruso, Eugene M. (Chicago Booth)

(24) The effects of observation and intervention on the judgment of causal and correlational relationships  
Kelley, Amanda M. (US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory); Athy, Jeremy R. (US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory)

(25) Causal structure in quasi-realistic risky decision situations  
Baer, Arlette S. (University of Fribourg, Department of Psychology); Huber, Odilo W. (University of Fribourg, Department of Psychology); Huber, Oswald (University of Fribourg, Department of Psychology)

(26) Terrorism, dread risk, and bicycle accidents  
Ayton, Peter (City University, London); Murray, Samantha (City University, London); Hampton, James (City University, London)

(27) Fear and Loathing in Hollywood  
Rosoff, Heather (University of Southern California, CREATE); John, Richard (University of Southern California, Dept of Psychology)

(28) Difference in Effective Feedback to Improve Risk Understanding in Driving between Ages  
Inaba, Midori (University of Electro-Communications); Tanaka, Kenji (University of Electro-Communications)

(29) The Boundaries of Loss Aversion in Decisions under Risk  
Ert, Eyal (Harvard); Erev, Ido (Technion)

(30) Preference Reversal in Risky Choices under Time Pressure  
Saqib, Najam (Ryerson University); Chan, Eugene (University of Toronto)

(31) Piecing together effort decisions: Results from a field experiment  
Liu, Heidi (Harvard University); Goette, Lorenz (University of Geneva)

(32) Experience Trajectories: How are risk strategies different when doing well or poorly?  
Decker, Nathaniel K. (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)

(33) Using virtual environments to tailor persuasive appeals: The role of gains and losses given prior decisions to seek or avoid risk  
Christensen, John (University of Southern California); Miller, Lynn Carol (University of Southern California); Appleby, Paul Robert (University of Southern California); Read, Stephen J. (University of Southern California); Corsbie-Massay, Charisse (University of Southern California)

(34) The social values analysis of understanding self-other differences in decision making  
Choi, YoonSun (Brandeis University); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest University)

(35) The bracketing breakdown: When and how problem and outcome framing mediates risk tolerance  
Moher, Ester (University of Waterloo); Koehler, Derek J. (University of Waterloo)
(36) Mood and Reward Sensitivity in Children, Adolescents, and Adults: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach
Estrada, Steven M. (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University); Mills, Britain A. (UT Houston School of Public Health); Pardo, Seth T. (Cornell University)

(37) The role of expertise in the risk assessment of dynamic weather information
Fu, Wai-Tat (University of Illinois); Park, Heewoong (University of Illinois)

(38) Actuarial Risk Assessment, Risk Communication and Involuntary Civil Commitment Decisions
Scurich, Nicholas (University of Southern California)

(39) How to Increase the Effectiveness of Health Risk Communication: Effects of Psychological Distance and Message Framing
Lee, Yun (University of Iowa)

(40) Longitudinal Effects of Media Messages on Risk Assessments of, Attitudes towards, and Behaviors Combating Climate Change
Bristow, R. Evan (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University)

(41) Lay Perceptions of Energy Consumption
Attari, Shahzeen Z. (Columbia University); DeKay, Michael L. (Ohio State University); Davidson, Cliff I. (Carnegie Mellon University); Bruine de Bruin, Wandi (Carnegie Mellon University)

(42) Risk Preferences in Surrogate Decision Making
Colby, Helen (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)

(43) Do the Disposition and House Money Effects Coexist? The differential impact of realized and unrealized gains and losses
Yao, Songyao (Leeds University Business School); Duxbury, Darren (Leeds University Business School); Hudson, Robert (Newcastle University Business School); Kevin, Kevin (Leeds University Business School)

(44) How Intermediate Options Reduce the Endowment Effect
Paolacci, Gabriele (University of Venice); Burson, Katherine (University of Michigan)

(45) Effect of Face-to-Face Interactions on Choice: The Role of Expressiveness
Liu, Maggie Wenjing (University of Toronto)

(46) A theory of self-control conflict: The pyrrhic motions of reason and passion
Wollbrant, Conny (University of Gothenburg); Myrseth, Kristian (ESMT European School of Management and Technology)

(47) Unintended consequences of fundraising tactics
Chance, Zoe (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael (Harvard Business School)

(48) Context Theory: A Procedural Approach to Individual Choice
Schneider, Mark (U Conn)

(49) The Influence of Attitude Strength on Consideration Set Size: Strong Liking Results in Smaller Consideration Sets
Sinha, Jayati (University of Iowa); Nayakankuppam, Dhananjay (University of Iowa); Priester, Joseph R. (University of southern California)

(50) I am what I do, not what I have: The centrality of experiential purchases to the self-concept
Carter, Travis J (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Gilovich, Thomas (Cornell University)

(51) Can regulatory orientation explain when the “too much choice” effect occurs?
Hafenbraedl, Sebastian (Université de Lausanne); Hoffrage, Ulrich (Université de Lausanne)

(52) Consumer Choice Modeling via TOPSIS
Bhatt, Suresh K. (University of Manitoba); Bhatnagar, Namita (University of Manitoba); Appadoo, S. S. (University of Manitoba)

(53) Categorical Thinking and Individuals’ Willingness to Pay for Combinations of Items in Different Price Tiers
Brough, Aaron R. (Kellogg, Northwestern University); Chernev, Alexander (Kellogg, Northwestern University)

(54) The Illusion of InAccuracy: When Preferences for Process are Ignored
Amit, Adi (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Sagiv, Lilach (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

(55) The Effect of Choice Overload and Individual Differences on the Enjoyment of Decision-making
Susa, Kyle J. (University of Texas at El Paso); Morales, Robert (University of Texas at El Paso); Morera, Osvaldo (University of
Texas at El Paso)

(56) False past experiences can shape current preferences
Wudarzewski, Amanda (University of Waterloo); Mantonakis, Antonia (Brock University); Clifasefi, Seema L. (University of Washington); Bernstein, Daniel M. (Kwantlen Polytechnic University); Loftus, Elizabeth F. (University of California, Irvine)

(57) Opportunity Cost Neglect and Consideration: The Role of Constraints
Spiller, Stephen A. (Duke University)

(58) The Effects of Regulatory Fit with a Goal and With a Goal-Object Benefit on Purchase Decisions
Brown, Vincent (University of London)

(59) Communicating statistics: The interpretation of common language effect sizes
Nolan, Kevin P. (Bowling Green State University); Dalal, Dev K. (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University); Yankelevich, Maya (Bowling Green State University)

(60) Naturals and Strivers: Quantifying the Costs of Preferences and Beliefs About Sources of Achievement
Brown, Vincent (University of London); Pocheptsova, Anastasiya (University of Maryland)

(61) Is What You Feel What They See? The Relationship between Fluency and Identity Signaling
Matherly, Ted (University of Maryland); Pocheptsova, Anastasiya (University of Maryland)

(62) The Big Cost of Small Problems
Brigden, Neil (University of Alberta); Haubl, Gerald (University of Alberta)

(63) Does a larger coupon feel more valuable? How Medium Size Affects Perceived Value
Yang, Adelle (Shanghai Jiaotong University); Hsee, Christopher (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)

(64) Predicting inferences and confidence in inferences: Recognition heuristic vs. its new rival, mean-variance model
Simonyan, Yvetta (London Business School); Goldstein, Daniel G. (London Business School)

(65) Subgoals Promote Monetary Savings Behavior
Colby, Helen (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)

(66) Culture and Dynamic Decision Making: Testing a Model in Five Countries
Güss, C. Dominik (University of North Florida); Tuason, M. Teresa (University of North Florida); Desrosier, Rebecca (University of North Florida)

(67) Earthly sins and heavenly rewards: The effect of religious beliefs on end-of-life decisions
Ward, Adrian F. (Harvard University); Wegner, Daniel M. (Harvard University)

(68) Do East-Asians and Westerners Think Alike? Evidence from Probability Judgment
Wu, Shali (Tsinghua University); Wu, George (Chicago Booth); Keysar, Boaz (University of Chicago)

(69) Discussion of Shared and Unshared Information in Decision Making Groups: A Cultural Perspective
Feng, Y. N. (The University of Leeds); Bown, N. J. (The University of Leeds); Allinson, C. W. (The University of Leeds); Maule, A. J. (The University of Leeds)

(70) The Norm of Self-Sacrifice
Sachdeva, Sonya (Northwestern University); Iliev, Rumen (Northwestern University); Medin, Douglas (Northwestern University)

(71) Cheaters Never Win? Affective Consequences of Unethical Behavior
Nicole Ruedy (University of Pennsylvania); Maurice Schweitzer (University of Pennsylvania)

(72) When Cash Matters: The Effect of Fungibility on Honesty
Smith, Joshua (The Ohio State University); Nygren, Thomas (The Ohio State University)

(73) Finding balance on the moral scale: The effect of forgiveness on dishonest behavior
Ayal, Shahar (Duke University); Dan Ariely (Duke University)

(74) Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: Self-Preservation through Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting
Shu, Lisa (Harvard University); Bazerman, Max (Harvard University)
(75) Preferences for Equality vs. Efficiency
Carabelli, Evan (University of Pennsylvania); Dana, Jason (University of Pennsylvania)

(76) The Effect of Attribute Framing on Justice Judgments
Gamliel, Eyal (Ruppin Academic Center); Peer, Eyal (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

(77) Influences on the Ethical Reasoning of Tax Practitioners: Preliminary Results on Profile, Context and Socialisation
Doyle, Elaine (Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick); Frecknall Hughes, Jane (The Open University Business School); Summers, Barbara (Leeds University Business School)

(78) Cheap saints or blatant sinners? The cost of lying for (almost) nothing
Shalvi, Shaul (University of Amsterdam); Handgraaf, Michiel J. J. (University of Amsterdam); de Dreu, Carsten K.W. (University of Amsterdam)

(79) Telling tales: The effect of narrative creation on decision-making with data
Krumme, Coco (MIT)

(80) The Effects of Mastery on Subjective Utility
Scopelliti, Irene (Bocconi University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)

(81) Sex Differences in the Effects of Anger on Financial Risk-Taking
Litvak, Paul M. (Carnegie Mellon University); Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard University)

(82) It’s more money that I have, but I have to go one more: Risky decision making in: 'Deal or No Deal'
Laroque, Ninekema (University of North Florida); Desrosier, Rebecca (University of North Florida); Güss, C. Dominik (University of North Florida)

(83) Effects of Identity on Surgical Risk-Taking: Attitudes, Risk Perceptions and Intentions
Pardo, Seth T. (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University)

(84) Understanding How Mental Accounting Guides Choices Between Work and Home
Paddock, E. Layne (Singapore Management University); Rothbard, Nancy (University of Pennsylvania)

(85) The Influence of Goals on Dynamic Decision Making
Weinhardt, Justin (Ohio University); Vancouver, Jeff (Ohio University); Gonzalez Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University); Harman, Jason (Ohio University)

(86) Thinking of others’ behavior makes you more generous: The imaginary peer effect
Wang, Yitong (University of California, Irvine); Keller, L. Robin (University of California, Irvine)

(87) Executive functions at work: The impact of Individual Differences in Cognitive Control on Managerial Decision-Making
Laureiro Martinez, Daniella (Bocconi University); Brusoni, Stefano (Bocconi University); Canessa, Nicola (San Raffaele University); Cappa, Stefano (San Raffaele University); Zollo, Maurizio (Bocconi University); Alemanno, Federica

(88) The Effect of Group Deliberation on the Endowment Effect
Blumenthal, Jeremy A. (Syracuse University College of Law)

(89) Social Acceptance Reduces Egocentric Perception of Fairness in Resource Allocation
Zhang, Liqing (Peking University); Baumeister, Roy (Florida State University)

(90) Punishment of Groups for the Actions of Group Members
Sorenson, Clare M. (The Ohio State University)

(91) Resisting the Temptation to Retaliate: Self-Control in Overcoming Barriers to Cooperation
Sheldon, Oliver J (University of Chicago); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago)

(92) Escalation of commitment and valuation
Ting, Hsuchi (University of Maryland, College Park); Wallsten, Thomas (University of Maryland, College Park)

(93) Clutch performance and clutch illusion
Barkan, Rachel (Glazer School of Business, Ben-Gurion University); Solomomov, Yosef (Glazer School of Business, Ben-Gurion University); Ariely, Dan (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University)
(94) You are What We Eat: Normative Influences on Individual Eating Behavior
Hunger, Jeffrey M. (California State University-Fullerton); Howland, Maryhope (University of Minnesota); Mann, Traci L. (University of Minnesota)

(95) Individual Differences and Susceptibility to Context Effects in an Organizational Recruitment Setting
Diab, Dalia L. (Bowling Green State University); Alexander, Katherine N. (Bowling Green State University); Daniels, Michael A. (Bowling Green State University); Pui, Shuang-Yueh (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University)

(96) Effects of Imperfect Information and Risk on Job Choice Behavior of Indecisives and Maximizers
Daniels, Michael A. (Bowling Green State University); Pui, Shuang-Yueh (Bowling Green State University); Diab, Dalia L. (Bowling Green State University); Alexander, Katherine N. (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University)

(97) The Effect of Multiple Views and Perspective Taking on Social Tuning
Skorinko, Jeannine (WPI); DiGiovanni, Craig (WPI); Whitchurch, Erin (University of Virginia); Sinclair, Stacey (University of Virginia)

(98) Me and You vs. The World: The Effects of Affiliative Motivation and Group Membership on Social Tuning
Spear, Sarah (WPI); Selkow, Maia (St. Olaf's College); Skorinko, Jeannine (WPI); Lun, Janetta (University of Maryland); Sinclair, Stacey (Princeton University)

(99) Information distortion in self-other decision making
Polman, Evan (Cornell University)

(100) Querying the Group Mind: Applying Query Theory to Group Discussions
Smith, Juliana A. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

(101) Influence of Social Norms and Transition Zones on Decision Making in Dyads
Mukherjee, Moumita (University of South Florida); Decker, Nathaniel K. (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)

(102) Social Influence Processes in Group Decision Errors
Tindale, R. Scott (Loyola University Chicago); Starkel, Rebecca (Loyola University Chicago); Jacobs, Elizabeth (Loyola University Chicago)

(103) Reasoning: Good decisions or justifiable decisions?
Mercier, Hugo (University of Pennsylvania)

(104) Take This Advice And Shove It: When And Why We Discount Advice
Gino, Francesca (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill); Moore, Don (Carnegie Mellon University)

(105) Expertise, Confidence, Cheap Talk and Persuasion
Sah, Sunita (Carnegie Mellon University); Moore, Don (Carnegie Mellon University); MacCoun, Robert (University of California, Berkeley)

(106) Two to Tango: The Effect of Collaborative Experience and Disagreement on Individual and Joint Estimates
Minson, Julia A. (Stanford University); Liberman, Varda (IDC, Herzliya, Israel); Ross, Lee (Stanford University)

(107) Multiple Biases: Plausibility and evidence for independent and additive effects
Babad, Elisha (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Peer, Eyal (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Benayoun, Yehonatan (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

(108) Group process decision making in informal groups
Kozlowski, Cathy (University of Phoenix)

(109) Modeling College Withdrawal Decisions
Pleskac, Timothy J. (Michigan State University); Keeney, Jessica (Michigan State University); Merritt, Stephanie M. (University of Missouri - St. Louis); Schmitt, Neal (Michigan State University); Oswald, Frederick L. (Rice University)

(110) Using very inaccurate experts to improve performance
Sutherland, Steven (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale); Young, Michael (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale)
(111) The Decision Making Styles Inventory: Analysis of factor structure and factorial invariance
White, Rebecca (University of Chicago); Nygren, Thomas (Ohio State University)

(112) My Loss Versus Your Gain: The Effects of Attribution and Individual Differences
Rim, Hye Bin (Ohio State University); Nygren, Thomas E. (Ohio State University)

(113) Time Perception and Strength of Handedness
Westfall, Jonathan E. (Columbia University); Jasper, J.D. (The University of Toledo)

(114) Leadership Decision Making
Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard University); Inbar, Yoel (Harvard University); Teplitz, Paul (Harvard University); Kustoff, Jessica J. (Harvard University); Litvak, Paul M. (Carnegie Mellon)

(115) The Sunk Cost Fallacy and Decision Making Styles
Fernandez, Norma P. (University of Texas at El Paso); Morera, Osvaldo F. (University of Texas at El Paso); Guillen-Gomez, Laura (University of Texas at El Paso)

(116) An Examination of Real-World Predictions from Experience or Description
Lester, Houston F. (Auburn University); Cullen, Kristin L. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University); Svyantek, Daniel J. (Auburn University)

(117) For the love of the game: Motivation for pathological gambling
Fortune, Erica E. (UGA); Goodie, Adam S. (UGA)

(118) Axing the Taxman: The Psychology of Tax Aversion
Sussman, Abigail B. (Princeton University); Olivola, Christopher Y. (University College London)

**Session #2 with Cash Bar** (Sunday, 5:00 - 7:00pm, Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C; attached to Sheraton through walkway)

(1) The Misery-is-not-Miserly Effect in Intertemporal Choice
Gandhi, Viral J. (Harvard University); Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

(2) Neural and behavioral correlates of value for lone anticipated rewards exhibit steeper delay discounting than binary preferences predict
Monterosso, John (University of Southern California); Luo, Shan (University of Southern California); Ainslie, George (Coatesville VA Medical Center)

(3) Predicting Health-Related Risk Behaviors with Delay Discounting and Time Perspective Measures
Daugherty, James R. (Kansas State University); Brase, Gary L. (Kansas State University)

(4) Leveraging a theory of slack: How resource scarcity affects borrowing behavior
Shah, Anuj K. (Princeton University); Shafir, Eldar (Princeton University); Mullainathan, Sendhil (Harvard University)

(5) When waiting increases weapon efficacy: A video game to study delay discounting
Young, Michael (Southern Illinois U. at Carbondale); Webb, Tara (Southern Illinois U. at Carbondale); Jacobs, Eric (Southern Illinois U. at Carbondale)

(6) Owing it to yourself: Testing a duty-based argument for retirement saving
Bryan, Christopher J. (Stanford University); Ersner-Hershfield, Hal (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Ross, Lee (Stanford University)

(7) Do individual differences in working memory affect delay discounting decisions?
Acuff, Roy (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana (Auburn University); Mattson, Richard (Auburn University)

(8) The Long View: Measuring discount rates at large delays and across domains
Thompson, Katherine J. (Columbia University); Hardisty, David J. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

(9) Instant Wins versus Sweepstakes: Attitudes toward Delayed Promotions
Laurent, Gilles (HEC); Prokopec, Sonja (ESSEC); Onculer, Ayse (ESSEC)
(10) Temporal Focalism
Chan, Steven (New York University); Kruger, Justin (New York University)

(11) Ambiguity Aversion in Risk and Delay
Weber, Bethany (Iowa State University); Tan, Wah Pheow (Temasek Polytechnic)

(12) Is Time Money? Decision making across time and money
Sussman, Abigail B. (Princeton University); Shafir, Eldar B. (Princeton University)

(13) Everyday time travel: The effect of tense on judgment
Kane, Joanne (Princeton University); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado, Boulder); McGraw, A. Peter (University of Colorado, Boulder)

(14) Temporal Distance and Intentions toward Socially (Un)Desirable Behaviors
Choi, Soe Yoon (Rutgers University); Park, Hee Sun (Michigan State University)

(15) Educating drivers on the time saving bias reduces likelihood of speeding
Peer, Eyal (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Gamliel, Eyal (Ruppin Academic Center); Babad, Elisha (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

(16) It’s the Thought that Will Count: Future Behavior is Seen as More Intentional than Past Behavior
Burns, Zachary C. (Chicago Booth); Bartels, Daniel M. (Chicago Booth); Caruso, Eugene M. (Chicago Booth)

(17) The Effect of Age in Decision Making
Qian, Jing (Columbia University); Johnson, Eric (Columbia University); Weber, Elke (Columbia University)

(18) The rules of aging: Aging favors rule-based processing in categorization and multiple-cue judgment
Mata, Rui (Stanford University); von Helversen, Bettina (University of Basel); Karlsson, Linnea (Max Planck Institute Human Development)

(19) Optimistic Predictions in a Gambler’s Fallacy Task: Comparing Children and Adults
Bossard, Elaine A. (University of Iowa); Levin, Irwin P. (University of Iowa); Hart, Stephanie S. (University of Houston - Clear Lake)

(20) Cognitive adaptations for resource search: Explaining hot hands and fallacious gamblers
Wilke, Andreas (Department of Psychology, Clarkson University); Barrett, H. Clark (UCLA Anthropology); Todd, Peter M. (Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University)

(21) Examining Adolescent Sexual Risk Taking from a Decision Making Perspective
Young, Diana L. (University of Georgia); Goodie, Adam S. (University of Georgia)

(22) Exploring possible connections between adolescents’ epistemological understandings, argumentation and decision making skills
Iordanou, Kalypso (University of Cyprus); Constantinou, Constantinos (University of Cyprus)

(23) Deep rationality, behavioral economics, and mating decisions
Kenrick, Douglas T. (Arizona State University); Li, Yexin Jessica (Arizona State University); Li, Norman P. (Singapore Management University); Sundie, Jill M. (University of Houston & University of Texas at San Antonio)

(24) Sequential decision mechanisms in human mate choice
Todd, Peter M. (Indiana University); Beckage, Nicole (Indiana University)

(25) How humans cognitively manage too much mate choice
Lenton, Alison P. (University of Edinburgh); Francesconi, Marco (University of Essex)

(26) Let’s get serious: Communicating commitment in romantic relationships
Ackerman, Joshua M. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Griskevicius, Vladas (University of Minnesota); Li, Norman P. (Singapore Management University)

(27) Humans copy social information in mate choice decisions
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(28) Exploring the influence of pictographic representations of statistical information
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(29) Are Pictures the Voice of Numbers in a Medical Decision Making Task?
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(30) Effect of false positive screening results and psychosocial factors on compliance with repeat lung cancer screening
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(31) The impact of expertise level in judgment analysis: A comparison between Fast and Frugal and Logistic Regression models
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(32) The Effect of Testimonials in Patient Decision Aids: The Role of Numeracy, Literacy and Decision Making Style
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(33) Predicting Clinical Outcomes the Fast and Frugal Way
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(34) Laypeople’s Views on Decision Making in the Health Professions
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(35) Accuracy of Various Algorithms for Diagnosing from a Disease by Finding Sensitivity Matrix
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(36) A Natural History Model to Estimate the Potential Impact of Human Papillomavirus Vaccination to Reduce Cervical Cancer Disparities between US Females
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(37) Integrating Context in Clinical Thinking: Themes and Categories Activated During the Patient Encounter
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(38) Pictures Speak Louder than Numbers: On Communicating Risks to Non-Native Language Speakers
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(39) One decision at a time or the whole path at once? When the way information is provided affects prostate cancer decision making
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(40) A Memory Theoretic Account of Information Search: Effects of Base Rates and Sampling Biases
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(41) An Examination of Individual Differences in Working Memory Capacity Effects on the Encoding and Retrieval of Information under Cognitive Load
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(42) The ecological rationality of betting on speed of retrieval in memory-based decision making
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(43) The Relations Among the Iowa Gambling Task, Real-World Decision Outcomes and Working Memory
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|      | Haberstroh, Susanne (University of Osnabrück, Germany); Oeberst, Aileen (University of Osnabrück, Germany) |

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| (51) | Levels of Theory-of-Mind Reasoning in Competitive Games |
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| (55) | Impact of evidence format on judgments of probability and verdict: Accounting for the “Wells Effect” |
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| (56) | Soundness conditions for prescriptive decision analysis |
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| (57) | Decision Analysis by Proxy for the Rational Terrorist |
|      | John, Richard (University of Southern California, Dept of Psychology); Rosoff, Heather (University of Southern California, CREATE) |

| (58) | Response time methodology for testing between stochastic models of decision making |
|      | Fific, Mario (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Rieskamp, Jörg (University of Basel) |

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|      | Anik, Lalin (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School) |

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|      | Yeomans, Mike (University of Chicago); Soll, Jack (Duke University); Koehler, Derek (University of Waterloo) |

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(64) **Modeling Decision Making and Cognitive Performance in the Dynamic Stock-Flow Task**  
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(65) **Descriptions, Experiences, and Memories: The Effects of Presentation and Representation on Choice**  
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(68) **Forming Consistent Stories During Decision Making by Reinterpreting or Discounting Evidence: An Agent-Based Model**  
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(69) **The Complexities of Selective Information Exposure**  
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(72) **Can Nervous Nelly Negotiate? How Anxiety Causes Negotiators to Exit Early and Make Steep Concessions**  
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(73) **Is emphasizing losses (vs. gains) better in negotiations with multiple issues?**  
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(76) **Strategic negotiation behaviors, self-inference, and the perception of negotiation outcomes**  
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(77) **Distinct neural correlates for the processing of magnitude, probability and uncertainty of potential monetary gains and losses**  
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(79) **Individual Differences in Social Comparison and Decision Making**  
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(80) **Policy Bundling to Overcome Loss Aversion: A Method for Improving Legislative Outcomes**  
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(81) **Biases Present in State Standard Setting Methods**  
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(90) The Role of Mental Representation in Experienced-based Choice  
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(91) One man's trash is another man's treasure: Context dependency in decision making under risk  
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(92) Misperception of randomness decreases prediction accuracy  
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(93) Conditions leading to biases in favor of self-selected hypotheses  
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(102) Probability weighting in risky choice: Affect and probability format
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(104) Regret in interpersonal and self contexts: US-Japan comparison
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(105) Modeling foregone payoffs in a sequential choice task
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(106) The role of feedback-induced anticipated regret in avoiding subsequent risks
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(109) Egocentric predictions about other people's emotional states: When we don't project our own emotional experiences to others.
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(110) Continuous vs. binary: On the compensatory strategies of judgments
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(117) Does competition foster trust? The role of tournament incentives
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