2008 SJDM Conference Master Schedule
The Chicago Hilton, Chicago, IL
November 14-17, 2008

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14

Psychonomics J/DM Sessions (See p. 5 of this program and the Psychonomics program for details)
Brunswick Society Meetings

5:00-7:00 pm  Welcome Reception / Early Registration  University of Chicago Gleacher Center (See p. 6)
7:00-9:00 pm  Executive Board Dinner  Brasserie Jo, 59 W. Hubbard St

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15

7:30-8:30 am  Registration and Continental Breakfast  Northwest Hall (lower level)
8:30 -10:00 am  Paper Session #1  Northwest 2, 3, and 4 (lower level)
10:00 -10:30 am  Morning Coffee Break  Northwest Hall
10:30-12:00 am  Paper Session #2  Northwest 2, 3, and 4
12:00-1:30 pm  Women in SJDM Networking Event  Depaul Club, 11th floor, 1 E. Jackson Blvd.
12:00-1:30 pm  Lunch Break (on your own)
1:30-2:30 pm  Keynote Address: Stephen Stigler  Boulevard A/B/C (second floor)
2:45-4:15 pm  Paper Session #3  Northwest 2, 3, and 4
4:15-4:45 pm  Afternoon Coffee Break  Northwest Hall
4:45-6:15 pm  Paper Session #4  Northwest 2, 3, and 4
6:15-8:15 pm  Graduate Student Social Event  Normandie lounge (second floor)

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 16

8:30-10:30 pm  Poster Session #1 w/ Continental Breakfast  Northwest Hall
10:30-12:00 pm  Paper Session #5  Northwest 2 and 4
10:30-12:00 pm  Special Symposium: Medical Decision Making  Northwest 3
12:00-1:30 pm  Lunch Break (on your own)
1:30-2:30 pm  Paper Session #6  Northwest 2, 3, and 4
2:45-4:15 pm  Paper Session #7  Northwest 2, 3, and 4
4:15-4:45 pm  Afternoon Coffee Break  Northwest Hall
4:45-5:15 pm  Einhorn Award  Boulevard A/B/C (second floor)
5:15-7:15 pm  Poster Session #2 & Cash Bar  Northwest Hall
9:00pm-2:00am  SJDM Evening Social Event  Buddy Guy's Legends, 754 S. Wabash

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17

8:00-8:45  Business Meeting w/ Continental Breakfast  Boulevard A/B/C
8:45-10:15  Paper Session #8  Northwest 2, 3, and 4
10:15-10:30  Morning Coffee Break  Northwest Hall
10:30-12:00  Paper Session #9  Northwest 2, 3, and 4
12:00-1:30  Presidential Luncheon  Waldorf Room (third floor)

Student Poster Awards by Eric Stone
Presidential Address by Michael Birnbaum
## 2008 SJDM Conference Paper Session – SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SESSION #1</th>
<th>Track A NorthWest 2</th>
<th>Track B NorthWest 3</th>
<th>Track C NorthWest 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Symposium: How Choice Context Alters Relative Preferences for Want and Should Options</strong></td>
<td><strong>Behavioral and experimental economics</strong></td>
<td><strong>Choice models</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:30</td>
<td>Khan - Guilt as Motivation: Role of Guilt in…</td>
<td>Bartels - Psychological Connectedness and Tempor…</td>
<td>Risen - The Free-Choice Paradigm…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:50</td>
<td>Milkman - Highbrow Films Gather Dust…</td>
<td>Kareev - Do the weak stand a chance? Distribution…</td>
<td>Johnson - Decision making under time press:…</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## SESSION #2 Consumer decision making

### Behavioral and experimental economics

### Decision analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session Name</th>
<th>Track A NorthWest 2</th>
<th>Track B NorthWest 3</th>
<th>Track C NorthWest 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>Consumer decision making</td>
<td>Dana - Paying People to Look at the Consequences…</td>
<td>Page - Are prediction markets well calibrated…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:50</td>
<td>Lee - Money Muddles Thinking: The Effects…</td>
<td>Rottenstreich - Providing Multiple Rather than…</td>
<td>Bernasconi - The Analytic Hierarchy Process…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>Hardisty - A Dirty Word or a Dirty World?…</td>
<td>Tontrup - The Cultural Perception of Procedural…</td>
<td>Mukherjee - A Context Dependent Model…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>Kyung - Reconstructing History: How Constr…</td>
<td>Simonsohn - The &quot;Uncertainty Effect&quot;: In fact the…</td>
<td>Katsikopoulos - Ecological Rationality With…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### KEYNOTE 1:30

**KEYNOTE ADDRESS: Stephen Stigler – Boulevard A/B/C room**

### SESSION #3 Consumer decision making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session Name</th>
<th>Track A NorthWest 2</th>
<th>Track B NorthWest 3</th>
<th>Track C NorthWest 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:45</td>
<td>Scheibehenne - Can there ever be too many…</td>
<td>Pachur - Testing process models of risky choice</td>
<td>See detailed description , page 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:05</td>
<td>Mochon - Single option aversion: When the…</td>
<td>Regenwetter - Transitivity of Preferences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:45</td>
<td>White - Choice Deferral Can Arise from…</td>
<td>Erev - Quantitative predictions in social science…</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SESSION #4 Consumer Decision Making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session Name</th>
<th>Track A NorthWest 2</th>
<th>Track B NorthWest 3</th>
<th>Track C NorthWest 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4:45</td>
<td>Pham - On the ordinality of affect as a …</td>
<td>Wisdom - Promoting Healthy Choices: Information…</td>
<td>DeKay - The Cost of Payoff and Probability…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:05</td>
<td>Reutskaja - Economic decision making under…</td>
<td>Wansink - Constrained Volition and Healthier…</td>
<td>Li - How multiple anchors affect judgment…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:45</td>
<td>Fu - How adaptive is consumer sequential…</td>
<td>Zinman - Put Your Money Where Your Butt Is…</td>
<td>Hadar - The impact of experience on info…</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2008 SJDM Conference Paper Session – SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSTERS</th>
<th>POSTER SESSION #1 W/CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST – Northwest Hall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:30</td>
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</table>

SESSION #5

**Consumer decision making**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>Levav - Seeking Freedom Through Variety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:50</td>
<td>Liersch - In Defaults We Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>Hsee - Will a Rose Smell as Sweet by Another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>Bertini - The Impact of Add-On Features on...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Special Symposium: Application and Innovation:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>Basu - A time trade-off method for eliciting...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:50</td>
<td>Arkes - Race-based bias in physician decision...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>Djulbegovic - Acceptable regret: an extension of...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>Elke Weber - Discussant</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Heuristics and biases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>Marevis - Strategy Selection by Default...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:50</td>
<td>Glöckner - Base-rate respect by intuition...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>Gaismaier - The smart potential behind probability...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>Swift - Correspondence Bias in Performance Evaluation...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SESSION #6

**Risk**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:30</td>
<td>Vohs - On the Nature of Risk Aversion: Self-regulation...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:50</td>
<td>Tinsley - Should I stay or should I go? How prior...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:10</td>
<td>Brase - Do pictures promote nested-set or frequency...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Medical decision making**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:30</td>
<td>Vlaev - The Price of Pain and the Value of...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:50</td>
<td>Williams - Leading ourselves into temptation...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:10</td>
<td>Szrek - The relationship between the number of...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Organizational decision making**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:30</td>
<td>Gong - When Fate is at Play--Group Cooperation...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:50</td>
<td>Ting - The Effect of Goal Accessibility on Escalation...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:10</td>
<td>Boyle - The Role of Group Conflict in Reducing...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SESSION #7

**Law and ethics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:45</td>
<td>Cushman - Accidental outcomes guide punishment...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:05</td>
<td>Croson - Do As I Say, Not As I do: How the Form...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:25</td>
<td>Mead - Too Tired to Tell the Truth: Self-Control...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:45</td>
<td>Caruso - When Facing a Moral Dilemma is Worse...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Medical decision making**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:45</td>
<td>Lange - A memory theoretic account of hypothesis...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:05</td>
<td>Schwartz - Trading life and health for other goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:25</td>
<td>Lacey - A Ranking Method for Detecting Scale...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:45</td>
<td>Mills - Reducing risk taking in adolescence...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Wisdom of crowds**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:45</td>
<td>Chou - Group versus individual rationality attain...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:05</td>
<td>Soll - When Smaller Crowds are Better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:25</td>
<td>Reimer - When no one is as smart as all of us...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:45</td>
<td>Herzog - The wisdom of many within one mind...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EINHORN AWARD PRESENTATION – Boulevard A/B/C room

POSTERS

5:15-7:15

POSTER SESSION #2 W/CASH BAR AND COMPUTING DEMO TABLE – Northwest Hall

2008 SJDM Conference Paper Session – MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SESSION #8</th>
<th>Law and ethics</th>
<th>Biological substrates of decision making</th>
<th>Subjective probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:45</td>
<td>Baron - The role of probability of detection in...</td>
<td>Kugler - The Role of Incidental Emotions in...</td>
<td>Le Mens - Experience Sampling Information about...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:05</td>
<td>Krosch - Predicting choice and conflict in morally...</td>
<td>Baumeister - Lemonade and Bounded Rationality...</td>
<td>Lan - Ambiguity aversion and the violation of...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:25</td>
<td>Converse - Reciprocity is not Give and Take...</td>
<td>Busemeyer - Neural Correlates of Behavioral...</td>
<td>Haran - 100% certain but not so sure: calibration...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:45</td>
<td>Lagnado - Race and the dynamics of juror decision...</td>
<td>Hedgecock - An MEG study of Neurological...</td>
<td>Hau - The description–experience gap: Beyond...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SESSION #9

**Emotion and affect**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>Barkan - Hot State Choice and Impact Biased Advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:50</td>
<td>Connolly - Decision entrapment by myopic regret...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>Kausel - The Influence of Self- and Other-Justification...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>Teigen - Cold feet: Regret between decisions and...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Individual difference measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>Nygren - Development and validation of the decision...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:50</td>
<td>Lenton - To Maximize or Not: On Maximization...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>Figuer - Development of Adaptive Risky Decis...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>Finucane - What Needs to be Explained to Account...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Subjective probability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Title</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>Kusev - Memory-biased preferences: How...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:50</td>
<td>Pleskact - A Dynamic, Stochastic, and Computation...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:10</td>
<td>Juslin - The Bounded Rationality of Weighting ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>Windschitl - Wishful Thinking: How Desire for...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LUNCHEON

12:00-1:30

PRESIDENTIAL LUNCHEON AND ADDRESS – Waldorf Room
2008 SJDM Conference

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13

12:00-5:00pm  **24th Annual Meeting of the Brunswik Society**  
Room to be announced, Chicago Hilton


6:00-7:30 pm  Psychonomic Society Poster Session  
Northwest Hall

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14

8:30 am-5:00 pm  **24th Annual Meeting of the Brunswik Society**  
Room to be announced, Chicago Hilton

**Psychonomic Sessions (Chicago Hilton):**

- 8:00-9:40 am  Judgment and Decision Making I  
  International Ballroom South
- 10:20 am-12:00pm  Judgment and Decision Making II  
  Williford Room
- 12:00-1:30 pm  Psychonomic Society Poster Session  
  Northwest Hall
- 4:10-5:30 pm  Judgment and Decision Making III  
  Continental Ballroom
- 5:30-7:00 pm  Psychonomic Society Poster Session  
  Northwest Hall

5:00-7:00 pm  **Welcome Reception & Early Registration**  
University of Chicago Gleacher Center

Please join us at the Welcome Reception at the University of Chicago Gleacher Center at **450 North Cityfront Plaza Drive**. The reception will feature appetizers and a cash bar. This event will also provide an opportunity for early conference registration so that you can avoid the lines Saturday morning. The reception is generously sponsored by the Center for Decision Research at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.

The Gleacher Center is about 1.4 miles north of the hotel; walkers should walk north on Michigan Ave, cross the Chicago River, and turn right on East North Water St or East Upper Illinois Ave and then go 1.5 blocks to North Cityfront Plaza Drive.

7:00-9:00 pm  **Executive Board Dinner**

Members of the executive board, JDM officers, and program chairs for this year and next year are invited to a working dinner off-site. Contact Alan Schwartz (alansz@uic.edu) for further details.
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15

12:00-1:30 pm  Psychonomic Society Poster Session  Northwest Hall

12:00-1:30 pm  Women in SJDM Networking Event  Depaul Club
11th floor, Depaul Center
1 E. Jackson Blvd.

All (women and men) are welcome to attend the sixth annual Women in SJDM event, focused on promoting the advancement of women faculty and graduate students in SJDM. The event will focus on networking and be held on the 11th floor of the DePaul Center at 1 E. Jackson Blvd, within walking distance from the conference hotel (follow S Michigan Ave north, then take a left on Van Buren Street. The entrance to the DePaul Center is on Van Buren, just before State Street.). Box lunches will be provided; early registration guarantees that you will be provided with one. For more information about this event, please contact Wändi Bruine de Bruin (wandi@cmu.edu).

1:30-2:30 pm  Keynote: Stephen Stigler  Boulevard A/B/C

"The Five Most Consequential Ideas in the History of Statistics"

Five ideas are identified as the most consequential in the history of statistics. All had origins that predate the 20th century; all have enduring contemporary relevance; all are basic yet sufficiently subtle that they can puzzle and perplex some of the best minds even today. And, no, Bayes Theorem is not in the list.

6:00-7:30 pm  Psychonomic Society Poster Session  Northwest Hall

6:15-8:15 pm  Graduate Student Social  Normandie lounge (second floor)

This informal event will provide student members of SJDM an opportunity to imbibe and network with the future stars of the field. But wait, there’s more: SJDM is buying the first round of drinks! For more information contact Julie Downs (downs@cmu.edu).

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 16

10:30-12:00 pm  Special Symposium: Application and Innovation: Lessons from Medical Decision Making  Northwest 3

This special symposium, supported by the National Science Foundation Decision, Risk, and Management Sciences program, brings three members of the Society for Medical Decision Making to the SJDM annual meeting to report on cutting-edge applications of decision science in medicine. The presenters are joined by SJDM discussant Elke Weber. A sister symposium by SJDM members is being held at the annual meeting of the Society for Medical Decision Making in October.

4:45-5:15 pm  Einhorn Award Presentation  Boulevard A/B/C

Dan Ariely will announce the winner of the 2008 Hillel Einhorn award on behalf of the award committee and make a brief presentation. The winner will make a presentation of the research paper for which he/she won the award.
2008 SJDM Conference

5:15-7:15 pm  **JDM Computing Demo (at Poster Session)**  
Northwest Hall

Organizers and participants of the Symposium on Computer techniques in decision research will be providing demonstrations of software during the Poster Session.

9:00pm–2:00am  **SJDM Social Event**

As is tradition, SJDM will be sponsoring a party close to the conference hotel. Come join us at Buddy Guy's Legends, a classic Chicago blues club, about 5 minutes by foot from the Hilton, for good conversation, live blues, drinks, and dancing. Some limited food will also be provided. We'll have a free drink ticket for the first 250 people to arrive at the venue. SJDM acknowledges generous support provided by The Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center.

Buddy Guy's Legends  
http://buddyguys.com  
754 S. Wabash  
Chicago, IL, 60605  
312-427-0333  
(On map at right, hotel is A and Legends is B)

**MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17**

8:00-8:45 am  **Business Meeting & Breakfast**  
Boulevard A/B/C

All members of SJDM are invited to attend the business meeting (just see if we feed you breakfast if you skip the meeting). Remember, every vote counts.

12:00-1:30 pm  **Presidential Luncheon**  
Waldorf Room

The presidential luncheon will feature a presentation of the student poster awards by Joe Johnson. President Michael Birnbaum will give a talk. Incoming president Dan Ariely will take the oath of office.
(1A) Symposium: How Choice Context Alters Relative Preferences for Want and Should Options

Organizer: Milkman, Katherine (Harvard University)

This symposium presents research on ways in which the context of a choice can alter people’s likelihood of selecting a “should” option (e.g., a healthy food or highbrow film) over a “want” option (e.g., an unhealthy food or lowbrow film). This is a particularly important research topic because it has significant implications for social welfare in such diverse areas as weight control, retirement savings, and educational attainment. One paper in this symposium examines the way guilt affects people’s likelihood of justifying one want choice with the consumption of a should good. A second examines the impact in the field of the time separating a choice from its realization on whether people prefer should or want options, offering evidence that people may learn to limit the impact of time delay on their choices. A third paper extends past research on the impact of joint versus separate evaluation on preferences for want versus should options by focusing on this phenomenon in the domain of incentives. A final paper demonstrates that the number of product attributes people consider when choosing between want and should options influences choice and that this effect is moderated by the type of cognitive processing subjects engage in.

Constituent papers:

Guilt as Motivation: Role of Guilt in Choice Justification
Khan, Uzma (Stanford University); Dhar, Ravi (Yale University); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago)

Guilt plays an important role in choices and self-control. Past research has treated guilt as an emotion assuming that people feel guilty when primed with guilt-related concepts and this feeling prevents further indulgence (Zemack-Rugar et al., 2007). Contrary to an affective view, we suggest a motivational view of guilt and show that guilt-primes can lead to more indulgent/want choices (Study 1 & 3) and reduced experience of guilt (Study 2). We explain that guilt-primes create a motivation to feel un-guilty, which in-turn promotes interpretation of mundane choices as virtuous. These virtuous/should choices then serve as guilt-reducing justifications for further indulgence.

Highbrow Films Gather Dust: A Study of Dynamic Inconsistency and Online DVD Rentals
Milkman, Katherine L. (Harvard University); Rogers, Todd (Harvard University); Bazerman, Max H. (Harvard University)

We analyze the decisions of online DVD rental customers in the field. We find that people are more likely to rent DVDs in one order and return them in the reverse order when should DVDs are rented before want DVDs. This effect is sizable in magnitude, with a 2% increase in the probability of a reversal in preferences (from a baseline of 12%) ensuing if the first of two sequentially rented movies has more should characteristics than the second. The same renters also hold should DVDs longer than wants. As customers gain experience with online DVD rentals, these effects decrease.

Joint Evaluation: When Practical Incentives Win
Cryder, Cynthia E. (Carnegie Mellon University); Mullen, Elizabeth E. (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)

One common dilemma is choosing between what we want and what we should choose. In three studies, we observe that when incentives are offered in isolation, hedonically appealing “want” incentives like lotteries and chocolate are more motivating than practical "should" incentives like sure cash payments. When incentives are offered in a direct choice (i.e., jointly), however, the preference reverses and "should" options are preferred. The findings provide important information for optimizing incentive schemes and add new support to the conclusion that decisions about single options promote maximization of short-term utility whereas decisions about several options promote maximization of long-term utility.

The Dual Role of Option Attributes in Choice: Inducing Justification versus Providing Excuses
Sela, Aner (Stanford University); Berger, Jonah (University of Pennsylvania)

Can the number of product attributes people are exposed to influence the type of option they choose, and if so, how? Four studies demonstrate the dual role of attributes in decision-making. When people process effortfully, more attributes increases conflict and difficulty, promoting greater reliance on justifications for choice. This, in turn, leads people to select options that are easier to justify (e.g., virtues and utilitarian necessities). When people process heuristically, however, increased number of attributes can have the opposite effect. Multiple attributes may be perceived as indicators of utility, which in turn serves as an excuse to choose vices.
(1B) Behavioral and experimental economics

**Psychological Connectedness and Temporal Discounting**
Bartels, Daniel M. (Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago); Rips, Lance J. (Department of Psychology, Northwestern University)

We explore Parfit’s (1984) explanation of temporal discounting: You might prefer receiving $100 tomorrow to receiving $100 in a decade because you are more closely connected psychologically to your tomorrow’s self than to your self a decade later. Studies 1-2 predict discounting from people’s own rated connectedness over time (following Frederick, 2003). In Studies 3-5, participants make decisions about the timing of benefits or costs for fictional characters who undergo large changes at different points in life. All five studies reveal that people prefer benefits to occur prior to large changes and prefer costs to occur after these changes.

**Do the weak stand a chance? Distribution of resources in competitive environments**
Avrahami, Judith (Hebrew University); Kareev, Yaakov (Hebrew University)

When two agents of unequal strength compete, the stronger is expected to always win. This expectation is true, however, only if the evaluation of performance is flawless. Indeed, a game-theoretic analysis (Hart, 2008) reveals that, if the agents' evaluation is based on a small sample of their performance – as is often the case in everyday life – the weaker agent’s chance of winning can reach half the ratio of the weak- to the strong-agent's strength. The results of an experiment that modeled this situation (N=144), indicate that participants were sensitive to their relative strengths and distributed their resources optimally.

**Intentions, Plans, and the Subtle Psychology of Voter Turnout**
Goldstein, Daniel G. (London Business School); Imai, Kosuke (Princeton University); Göritz, Anja S. (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany); Gollwitzer, Peter M. (New York University)

Can being asked about a decision change the decision made? Surveys and polls proceed as if this were not the case, though theories of mere-measurement effects and implementation intentions predict otherwise. We conducted large-scale, randomized experiments during the two national elections to estimate the voter turnout effects of two surprisingly simple treatments: asking people if they intend to vote, and asking people how they intend to vote. Using Bayesian methods, we estimate the increase in turnout when treatments are administered immediately, or months before, an election, and when voters have one or many days on which to vote.

**Patience Auctions: Novel Mechanisms for Eliciting Discount Rates and the Impact of Time vs. Money Framing**
Olivola, Christopher Y. (Princeton University); Wang, Stephanie W. (California Institute of Technology)

We introduce, test, and compare two novel auction-based experimental methods for eliciting discount rates. In these “patience auctions”, participants bid the smallest sum they would prefer receiving in the future -or- the longest time they would prefer waiting for a reward, rather than receive a smaller, immediate payoff. The winning bidder receives the delayed reward; all other bidders receive the smaller, immediate payoff. These auctions offer a few important advantages over other methods of elicitation. In addition, we compare how discount rates vary depending on whether the auction focuses participants’ attention on the temporal or monetary dimension of delayed rewards.

(1C) Choice models

**The Free-Choice Paradigm: Does Choice Affect or Reflect Preferences?**
Risen, Jane (University of Chicago); Chen, Keith (Yale University)

Since Brehm’s (1956) initial free-choice experiment, psychologists have claimed that choices affect preferences. However, the free-choice paradigm fails to consider an assumption that guides economists, namely, that choices reveal underlying preferences. It is unclear whether the “spreading of alternatives” is a result of attitude change following choice or is, in part, a reflection of an underlying preference revealed by the choice. In two studies, we disentangle the effects of dissonance and revealed preferences. The results suggest that psychologists ought to re-visit the free-choice methodology, and perhaps reassess some of the conclusions that have been drawn from it.

**Decision making under time pressure: Implications for dual systems and strategy-switching**
Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University); DeCaro, Daniel (Miami University); Koop, Gregory (Miami University)

Many recent theories assume a dichotomy between deliberate and automatic processes; others suggest humans possess a repertoire of strategies, applied under the appropriate conditions. Both these approaches lead to predictions that, as conditions change, people should switch the way they tackle a decision problem. We critically investigate this hypothesis and extend previous work by including a fine-grained manipulation of time pressure and set size. Using process- and outcome-based measures, we do not see evidence for a discrete switch as these variables change. We present a framework that accounts for our results by considering behavioral changes in a more continuous manner.
Violations of Upper and Lower Internality with Non-Monetary Gambles
Markle, Alex (NYU); Rottenstreich, Yuval (NYU); Galak, Jeff (NYU)

Most models of decision-making under risk hold that individuals evaluate uncertain prospects by taking a weighted sum of the values of the prospect’s possible outcomes. One implication is that the valuation of a prospect will always fall between the values of its highest and lowest possible outcomes. An even chance to win either a trip to Hawaii or a Nintendo Wii should be less attractive than the better, and more attractive than the worse of the two prizes. We document violations of this “internality” requirement that lead to valuations both below the worst outcome as well as above the best outcome.

“Experience” Theory: Comparing Preferences for Risky Experiences and Monetary Gambles
Martin, Jolie M. (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School)

Our understanding of risk-seeking is based primarily on responses to monetary gambles, but decision-makers commonly confront choices between experiences, such as which restaurant – or dentist – to visit. We show that individuals are risk-seeking for positive experiences and risk-averse for negative experiences – while the reverse is true for monetary gambles, where we replicate standard risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses. We demonstrate that because people adopt extreme points for experiences – reflected in utility curves that are concave for negative and convex for positive experiences – they ironically treat most positive experiences as “losses” and most negative experiences as “gains.”

(2A) Consumer decision making

Waiting, Value Inference, and Intertemporal Choices
Dai, Xianchi (University of Chicago Graduate School of Business); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago Graduate School of Business)

This paper examines the effect of waiting on patience in intertemporal choice between a smaller-sooner reward and a larger-later reward. We propose that people infer from the wait experience that they value the rewards. Therefore, when waiting for a single reward (e.g., an apple) they become less patient. But, in the context of an intertemporal choice they become more patient, since the difference in between the value of the larger and smaller rewards increases (one vs. two apples). Across four studies we demonstrate that in intertemporal choice, wait increases patience by increasing the perceived value of the choice options.

Money Muddles Thinking: The Effects of Price Consideration on Preference Consistency
Lee, Leonard (Columbia University); Bertini, Marco (London Business School); Ariely, Dan (Duke University)

We study the possible role of price in impeding consistent (transitive) choice behavior. We argue that the hedonic representation of money is ill-defined in the minds of consumers, which in turn makes preferences less stable when price is an attribute in choice. The results of five experiments involving pairwise choices among ten t-shirts provide convergent support for this hypothesis. In addition, the effect is robust to different preference elicitation methods, persists even when participants are simply asked to consider how much a product might cost, but is attenuated when people think about opportunity cost in a well-defined manner.

A Dirty Word or a Dirty World? Attribute Framing, Politics, and Query Theory
Hardisty, David (Columbia); Johnson, Eric (Columbia); Weber, Elke (Columbia)

719 Americans chose between pairs of options in different product categories. One option offered a product at some price; the other offered the same product at a higher price that paid for reducing the carbon emissions caused by the product, labeled either a carbon tax or a carbon offset. This attribute label frame strongly impacted choices. The effect was greater for self-identified Republicans and Independents than for Democrats. Consistent with Query Theory, the combination of framing and political party affiliation determined the number and order of thoughts in support of the carbon reducing product, which in turn predicted choice behavior.

Reconstructing History: How Construal of Past Events Influences Judgments of Recency and Culpability
Kyung, Ellie (New York University); Menon, Geeta (University of Pennsylvania); Trope, Yaacov (New York University)

Given the reconstructive nature of memory for time, we examine how concrete and abstract mindsets during recall of negative events can influence temporal judgments and subsequent judgments of culpability. In a series of studies involving “blameworthy” news events (e.g., Dell battery recall), we demonstrate that: 1) Construal level systematically influences both objective (dates) and subjective (recency) temporal judgments in memory; 2) Construal level has a differential effect on temporal judgments depending on information availability (e.g. abstract mindsets are not always associated with greater temporal distance); and 3) Decreased perceived temporal distance from an event results in reduced judgments of culpability.

(2B) Behavioral and experimental economics

Paying People to Look at the Consequences of their Actions
Dana, Jason (University of Pennsylvania); Cain, Daylian (Yale University)
We examine ways to combat “strategic ignorance” - intentionally maintaining ignorance about the negative consequences of one’s actions. Building on prior experiments showing that people avoid information that might make them more generous in games, we offer players a subsidy to look at the consequences of their actions. We see a sharp increase both in consumption of information and frequency of socially beneficial vs. selfish choices. The subsidy thus returned a large social profit. Our results apply to increasing social welfare where directly subsidizing a desired behavior is difficult, such as paying people to be tested for sexually transmitted diseases.

Providing Multiple Rather than Single Units of a Good Eliminates the Endowment Effect
Burson, Katherine (University of Michigan); Faro, David (London Business School); Rottenstreich, Yuval (New York University)

We find that participants given one unit of a good (e.g. one chocolate) show an endowment effect, but that participants given multiple units (e.g., ten chocolates) do not. We suggest that holding multiple units minimizes attachment; previous authors argued that holding cash or exchange goods attenuates loss aversion by minimizing attachment or that market experience does so. Furthermore, giving participants a single, well-defined unit yields an endowment effect, no matter how inclusive the unit. Participants given one box of chocolates show an endowment effect, though the box contains ten chocolates, and participants given ten separate chocolates show no endowment effect.

The Cultural Perception of Procedural Legitimacy – Comparing Chinese and German Cooperativeness in Social Dilemmas
Tontrup, Stephan W. (Max Planck Institute for Research on Public Goods, Bonn); Guissmaier, Wolfgang (max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin)

The procedural legitimacy strengthens people’s willingness to cooperate in social dilemmas. In a public goods game, we manipulated procedural legitimacy by allowing subjects to vote on a set of rules or giving them the same set of rules exogenously. Assuming that perceived legitimacy depends on culture, we conducted the experiment in China, where the democratic majority rule should not have credit and in Germany. As hypothesized in Germany the average contributions to the public good were much higher in the voting than in the control condition (85.2% /58.5%). In harsh contrast we did not find an effect in China.

The "Uncertainty Effect": In Fact the Effect of Uncertainty
Simonsohn, Uri (UCSD)

The recently documented "Uncertainty Effect" (UE), the finding that sometimes a lottery is valued less than its worst outcome, contradicts all leading theories of decision making under uncertainty. This paper presents results from two experiments designed to tease apart three possible causes for it: (i) people having a direct distaste for uncertainty, (ii) the lottery's high value outcome diminishing the perceived value of its low value one, and (iii) participants misunderstanding the lottery description. Experiment 1 documents the UE in a design where the valuation of the low and high value outcomes are elicited jointly, eliminating the second explanation. Experiment 2 directly assesses participants' understanding of the lottery, finding that most participants understand it, and that the UE is not caused by the few who do not.

(2C) Decision analysis

Are prediction markets well calibrated decision tools?
Page, Lionel (University of Westminster); Clemen, Robert (Duke University)

Prediction markets have potential as management tools for decision making under uncertainty. They can be a powerful tool for extracting and aggregating private information. One of the major questions regarding prediction markets has naturally been the extent to which prices are accurate estimates of the underlying event probabilities. We show that prediction markets concerning a distant event in time should theoretically systematically present biases in their prices due to the conflict between their duration and the time discounting preferences of traders. We confirm this result using for the first time a very large dataset on long term prediction markets.

The Analytic Hierarchy Process and the Theory of Measurement
Bernasconi, Michele (Università dell'Insubria); Choirat, Christine (Universidad de Navarra); Seri, Raffaello (Università dell'Insubria)

The Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty 1977) is a decision-making procedure for establishing priorities in multi-criteria decision making. Underlying the AHP is the theory of ratio-scale measures developed by psychophysics Stevens (1951) in the middle of the last century. It is however well-known that Stevens' original model was flawed in various respects. We reconsider the AHP in light of the modern theory of measurement based on so called separable representations (Narens 1996). We provide various theoretical and empirical results on the extent to which the AHP is robust to the modern theory of psychological measurement.

A Context Dependent Model of Decision Making Under Risk
Mukherjee, Kanchan (INSEAD)
A context dependent valuation model of decision making under risk, where the valuation of a gamble depends not only on its own probabilities and outcomes but also on the other gambles in the choice set, is proposed. This descriptive model, motivated by the range-frequency theory (Parducci, 1965) uses fewer parameters than cumulative prospect theory and can account for a wide variety of behavioral anomalies. The model can also be used to derive conditions under which specific behavior patterns can be expected to occur and also predicts changes in behavior with changes in specific parameters of a decision situation.

**Ecological Rationality With and Without a Model of the Environment**
Katsikopoulos, Konstantinos (MIT and MPIB)

The theory of ecological rationality aims at uncovering conditions that determine the accuracy of decision rules. I study some concepts that explain the accuracy of linear and lexicographic rules, in fitting and prediction. First, I show that the concept of cumulative dominance has a broad explanatory power for the accuracy of the lexicographic rule. Second, I introduce “odd-cue” environments, where all cues, except one, imply the same decision (such environments are prevalent when there are a few cues). I connect odd-cue environments with the concept of linear cognitive ability, and derive conditions for the relative accuracy of linear and lexicographic rules.

**3A) Consumer decision making**

*Can there ever be Too Many Options? Re-Assessing the Effect of Choice Overload*
Scheibehenne, Benjamin (Indiana University); Greifeneder, Rainer (Mannheim University); Todd, Peter M. (Indiana University)

The effect of choice overload or too-much-choice predicts that having too many options to choose from decreases the motivation to choose or the satisfaction with the finally chosen option. While past research reports strong instances of the effect, in a series of five experiments in the lab and in the field the effect did not appear. A subsequent meta-analysis including 48 published and unpublished experiments indicates that the effect is less robust than previously thought as the mean effect size across all studies is zero. The implications of these findings are linked to decision making research and possible future directions.

*Single option aversion: When the illusion of choice reduces deferral*
Mochon, Daniel (MIT)

Recent work in decision making has shown that increasing the number of options can make people worse off. Choice sets that are too large (Iyengar and Lepper 2000), or with options that are too similar (Dhar 1997; Tversky and Shafir 1992) create conflict that leads to choice deferral. In the current work we examine the other side of the spectrum, and show that having too few choices can lead decision makers to undervalue otherwise attractive alternatives. We find that merely adding options to the choice set (even illusory ones) can increase the choice share of previously available and rejected ones.

*Alternatives, Attributes, Epistemic Motivations and Choice: When and to Whom More Information is Harmful?*
Amit, Adi (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Sagiv, Lilach (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

People make decisions more easily and confidently choosing from few (rather than many) alternatives (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Expanding this research we examine how difficulty and confidence with a decision are affected by (a) the number of alternatives; (b) the number of attributes describing each alternative; and (c) individual differences in epistemic motivations. Two studies revealed that participants with high (but not low) Need-for-Cognitive-Closure experienced greater alternatives and attributes overload (difficulty, regret and reduced confidence). In an additional study, manipulating conservation (vs. openness) increased the susceptibility to overload: participants in the "conservation" condition experienced greater alternatives and attributes overload.

*Choice Deferral Can Arise from Absolute Evaluation or Relative Comparison*
White, Chris M. (University of Lausanne); Reisen, Nils (University of Lausanne); Hoffrage, Ulrich (University of Lausanne)

When choosing among several options, previous research suggests that people may defer choice for either of two reasons: because none of the options is good enough, or because they are not certain which is the best. A different kind of processing is needed to reach each of these outcomes: absolute evaluations and relative comparisons, respectively. These observations form the basis of the Two-Stage, Two-Threshold model of choice deferral. Two experiments are reported in which each of these types of processing was encouraged in two conditions. The effects of three independent variables differed between the conditions as predicted by the model.

**3B) Behavioral and experimental economics**

*Testing process models of risky choice*
Pachur, Thorsten (University of Basel); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel)

We address recent empirical challenges to the priority heuristic (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006)—a process model of risky choice—by deriving process predictions both from the heuristic and from Neo-Bernoullian models of risky choice (e.g., cumulative prospect theory). We tested these predictions using a processing tracing methodology, Mousetrap. Multiple process tests reveal a varied picture, with partial support for both models but also with a number of patterns inconsistent with them. Key patterns
in the process measures contradicting both models seem to be more in line with a heuristic that embodies similarity-based
efficiency processes.

Transitivity of Preferences
Regenwetter, Michel (UIUC); Dana, Jason (U Penn); Davis-Stober, Clintin (UIUC)

In counterpoint to Tversky’s seminal (Psychological Review, 1969) “Intransitivity of Preferences,” we reconsider his data as well
as those from more than 20 other papers on “intransitive” decision makers. We challenge the standard operationalizations of
transitive preferences and discuss pervasive methodological problems in the collection, modeling and analysis of relevant empirical
data. We argue that “stochastic transitivity” should be abandoned as a model of preference transitivity. We show that the data from
many of the available studies designed to elicit intransitive choice are consistent with variable strict linear order preferences.

In Pursuit of Procedural Utility: The Role of Autonomy in Felt Utility During Decision Making
DeCaro, Daniel A. (Department of Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056); Johnson, Joseph G. (Department of
Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056)

Contemporary preferential choice models (e.g., prospect theory; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) are based on a consequentialist
notion of utility, wherein utility is solely a function of expected outcomes. However, recent research provides circumstantial
evidence that decision makers also derive utility from the processes generating outcomes – procedural utility. We present two
studies quantifying procedural utility within the context of a ubiquitous human need – self-determination (Deci & Ryan, 2000).
Contrary to dominant speculation, individuals derive utility from decision procedures in ways that qualify major truisms in
contemporary decision science, including prospect theory’s notion that losses loom larger than gains.

Quantitative predictions in social science, and the choice prediction competition
Erev, Ido (Technion); Ert, Eyal (Harvard); Roth, Alvin (Harvard)

Behavioral decision research is in a position to reduce the gap between the exact and the social sciences. That is, the analysis of
social problems as decision tasks allows quantitative prediction of behavior. The main goal of the current project is to clarify and
further this claim. We organized three open choice prediction competitions (see http://tx.technion.ac.il/~eyalert/Estset.html). The
competitions focused on three related choice tasks: One shot decisions from description (like the situations analyzed by Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979), one shot decisions from experience, and repeated decisions from experience. The predictions submission
deadline is September 1st 2008.

(3C) Symposium: Computer techniques in decision research: Surveying recent advances and advice for potential developers
Organizer: Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University)

This symposium will provide an introduction to various computing techniques useful for JDM researchers, in order to foster a
computational community in our field. Many individuals, especially graduate students, have expressed strong interest in such a
session tailored specifically to decision scientists. It goes beyond the traditional presentation format to survey useful technologies,
offer hands-on tutorials, and provide a forum for interested researchers to learn more about existing free software as well as advice
from developers about creating their own. Software descriptions and mock-ups will be available online and announced prior to the
conference. During the symposium developers will briefly demonstrate the software, allow those with laptops to explore their
software’s functionality, and answer questions about design and application. Due to overwhelming response from developers and
symposium time constraints, only a subset of those technologies featured online can be covered during the symposium. These were
be selected by the organizer, based on voting from website visitors. Symposium presenters will be available collectively at a table
during the Sunday evening poster session for interested individuals to receive additional informal contact. The following projects
will be presented:

Constituent papers (15 min each):

Introduction: Designing your own experiments, possibilities and pitfalls
Jonathan E. Westfall, University of Toledo

Running an experiment utilizing a computer can be a grueling process that may deter many from attempting to collect data in this
manner. However, ignoring this research collection opportunity may also cause the researcher to miss out on a less time- and
manpower-intensive way to collect quality data from willing participants. New technology available allows researchers can create
and run their own computer based experiments with only basic programming knowledge, on a budget substantially less than
commercially available survey or experiment delivery systems.

Creating interactive and dynamic choice experiments
Jan Crow, Kansas State University
This demonstration may be useful for those who are interested in moving beyond commercial online survey instruments. This example demonstrates creating web pages on the fly. The demo linked here shows one of the three experimental conditions in a product customization task. It includes three levels of randomization: 1) placement of participants to conditions, 2) order of web pages, and 3) content within a web page. The program dynamically generates content based on user activity.

**Sequential risk-taking tasks**
Timothy J. Pleskac, Michigan State University

Cognitively, we know that how people evaluate rewards, learn from experience, and select a response influence risk taking. Self-report scales and/or hypothetical gambles do not provide an efficient means to measure these processes. I will review software composed of sequential risk-taking tasks to study risk taking behavior in a controlled laboratory setting. These tasks, the Angling Risk Task (ART) and Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), are correlated with real-world risky behaviors. Furthermore, I will also review software that decomposes behavior in these tasks via cognitive parameters of the Bayesian Sequential Risk Taking Model (Pleskac, 2008; Wallsten et al., 2005) into indices of individual differences in reward evaluation, experience-based learning, and response selection.

**Process-tracing environments: Recent advances**
Joseph G. Johnson & Greg Reese, Miami University

This talk will survey recent advances in software that provides a means to conduct process-tracing of mouse movements. For example, our own software offers extended functionality such as sophisticated randomization, time limits and running total displays, floating "tooltips" to effectively expand the content within a cell, the ability to sort by individual features, and more. It also allows for survey trials with continuously-scaled responses and benefits from input files using a simple XML structure. We will also include treatment of MouselabWeb, which runs online using standard browser technology, and analytic advances such as the use of icon graphs and DecisionTracer software for strategy classification.

**Flashlight**
Michael Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Ryan O. Murphy, Florian Hutzler

A flashlight enables us to see a part of the world in the dark. Our application 'Flashlight' uses this metaphor and shows the participant (and later the researcher in the analysis) a part of a stimulus. When the participant moves the mouse to inspect a stimulus on his computer, Flashlight uncovers the area underneath the mouse cursor while recording the mouse position. With this method we are trying to mimic the data collected in an eye-tracker in an online application.

**Open forum of all developers**
Eduard Brandstätter, Hasan Cakmak, Eric Johnson, Gary McClelland, Ren? Riedl, Friedrich Roithmayr, David Weiss, Martijn Willemsen, and above presenters

The final fifteen minutes of the symposium, as well as overflow time into the following session break, will consist of an open forum where participants can pose both general and specific questions to any of the developers on the panel. All developers will have functional demonstrations of their software on hand; participants are encouraged to bring laptops with demo versions retrieved from http://www.sjdm.org/computing.html.

**(4A) Consumer decision making**

**On the ordinality of affect as a heuristic for value**
Pham, Michel Tuan (Columbia U); Toubia, Olivier (Columbia U); Lin, Claire (Columbia U)

We propose that, compared to the cognitive system, the affective system assesses value in a more ordinal (rather than cardinal) fashion. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find across three studies that affective ratings of value, such as the attractiveness of potential dates or the pleasantness of feelings elicited by magazine pictures have more ordinal distributions than more cognitive ratings of the same targets such as the intelligence of the potential dates or the quality of the pictures. Process-tracing findings further show that affective judgments are more likely to be made in a self-generated order and increase memory for ordinal information.

**Economic decision making under conditions of extreme time pressure and option overload: an eye-tracking study**
Reutskaja, Elena  (IESE Business School); Pulst-Korenberg, Johannes (Caltech); Nagel, Rosemarie (UPF); Camerer, Colin F. (Caltech); Rangel, Antonio (Caltech)

We study the computational processes underlying choices among familiar snacks under extreme time pressure (< =3 sec) and option overload (4-, 9-, or 16-item sets) using the eye-tracking data. Surprisingly, we find that average choice efficiencies are large (about 80%), suggesting that subjects are able to make good decisions even under severe time pressure. Choices are well-described by a sequential search model in which subjects randomly fixate on items to measure their values as long as they have time and
choose the best item they have seen. Decision process also exhibits significant display-driven biases that can be exploited by sellers.

*Choice by Iterative Elimination*
Masatlioglu, Yusufcan (University of Michigan); Nakajima, Daisuke (University of Michigan)

Motivated by real life decision problems, we model a boundedly rational choice procedure, called choice by iterative elimination, where an alternative might not be compared by all available alternatives. Our decision maker continues her limited search until she finds an alternative which is optimal within its consideration set. We study properties of this procure and provide a full characterization. While our behavioral postulates enable the model to accommodate seemingly irrational behavior, such as the Attraction Effect and \`less is more\'' phenomena, they permits choice cycles. Moreover, we also identify preferences from a boundedly rational behavior to make welfare analysis possible.

*How adaptive is consumer sequential search?*
Fu, Wai-Tat (University of Illinois)

An experiment was conducted to study how consumers adapt to uptrend and downtrend market conditions in a generalized secretary problem. Compared to the optimal model, the amount of search in the full-information condition was closer to the optimal than the rank-only condition. Participants searched too much in downturn and too little in uptrend with rank-only information. When the set size was unknown, participants searched more with full information but less with rank-only information. In general, participants were highly adaptive to changing market conditions by adopting different decision rules. A behavioral decision model was proposed to account for the observed pattern.

**(4B) Symposium: Behavioral Economics and Health**

Organizers: John, Leslie (Carnegie Mellon University); Wisdom, Jessica (Carnegie Mellon University)

Individual behavior plays a central role in the disease burden faced by society. Many major health problems are exacerbated by unhealthy behaviors. Modifiable behaviors such as tobacco use, obesity, and alcohol abuse account for nearly one third of all deaths in the United States. Reducing morbidity and mortality may depend as much on motivating changes in human behavior as on developing new treatments. Behavioral economics is emerging as a key discipline in modifying behaviors that are potentially harmful to health. In contrast, conventional economics does not provide satisfactory policy solutions to problems caused by self-harmful behavior because it is premised on a rational choice perspective, and assumes that individuals make optimal decisions given their information, resources, and preferences. The main policy tools suggested by conventional economics - providing information or changing prices - only partially address these problems because they fail to exploit what is known about human motivation and behavior change. In this series of papers, we present work using behavioral economic approaches that have recognized the importance of present-biased preferences, loss aversion, regret, over-optimism and defaults in designing interventions to improve health. These papers present innovative ways in which behavioral economics can inform policy and reduce self-destructive behaviors.

**Constituent papers:**

*Promoting Healthy Choices: Information vs. Convenience*
Wisdom, Jessica (Carnegie Mellon University); Downs, Julie (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)

Although recent legislation has been enacted to require fast-food restaurants to display calorie information on menus, the consequences of posting such information remain unclear. We address the effects of providing information and test the efficacy of an alternative approach that makes ordering healthier foods slightly more convenient. Fast-food customers were given menus that varied by: 1) provision of general calorie recommendations, 2) provision of specific calorie information, and 3) whether high- or low-calorie items were more easily accessible. Results suggest that a strictly informational approach may be less effective than subtle guidance in enticing fast-food customers towards healthier meals.

*Constrained Volition and Healthier School Lunches*
Wansink, Brian (Cornell University); Just, David R. (Cornell University); Payne, Collin (Cornell University)

School lunch programs are criticized for not encouraging students to make nutritious food choices. Building from a behavioral economic perspective, we suggest that small restrictions to school lunch payment systems could subtly lead students to choose healthier food. A controlled field study showed that students using a restricted (versus unrestricted) debit card ordered healthier food and ate fewer calories. They also altered their evaluation of the food and discounted the money remaining on their card.
Prepaid lunch cards restricted to healthier foods might dramatically improve school lunch food choices without unduly restricting perceived choice or diminishing cafeteria revenue.

_A randomized controlled trial of financial incentives for weight loss_
Volpp, Kevin (University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine); John, Leslie (Carnegie Mellon University); Troxel, Andrea (University of Pennsylvania); Norton, Laurie (Philadelphia VA Medical Center); Fassbender, Jennifer (University of Pennsylvania); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)

In a weight loss intervention designed to leverage decision errors, participants were given a goal of losing 1 pound per week for 16 weeks and were randomized to either usual care or financial incentives. One incentive condition used deposit contracts in which participants put their own money at risk which they would lose if they failed to lose weight; the other was a lottery-based incentive scheme. Results were analyzed using intention-to-treat; subjects in both incentive conditions lost clinically and statistically significantly more weight than controls. Behavioral economics concepts could have a major impact in reducing the incidence of obesity-related illnesses.

_Put Your Money Where Your Butt Is: A Commitment Savings Account for Smoking Cessation_
Gine, Xavier (World Bank); Karlan, Dean (Innovations for Poverty Action); Zinman, Jonathan (Innovations for Poverty Action)

We designed and tested a voluntary commitment product to help smokers quit smoking in the Philippines. Individuals who sign a CARES contract deposit money into a savings account and agree to let the bank forfeit their entire balance to charity if they fail a urine test for nicotine and cotinine six months later. Subjects offered CARES were 3 percentage points more likely to pass the test than the control group after 6 months, and again in surprise visits after 12 months.

(4C) _Heuristics and biases_

_The Cost of Payoff and Probability Distortions in Risky Monetary Gambles_
DeKay, Michael L. (The Ohio State University); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest University); Sorenson, Clare M. (The Ohio State University)

Evaluations of unambiguous payoffs and probabilities are often distorted in the direction of current preferences, with sizeable effects on final choices. In new studies involving risky gambles, making previous information visible throughout the task amplified distortions (Study 1) and eliminating intervening questions did not diminish effects on choice (Study 2). In Study 3, larger differences in payoffs and probabilities that were presented later in the information sequence overcame the effects of information distortion when they changed EV differences by 18–52% (median = 25%) of the gambles’ original EVs. These are the first estimates of the monetary costs of information distortion.

_How multiple anchors affect judgment: Evidence from the lab and eBay_
Li, Ye (University of Chicago GSB); Zhang, Yan (University of Chicago GSB); Zhu, Ting (University of Chicago GSB)

Anchoring research has largely ignored the effect of multiple anchors. We propose that presenting multiple anchors increases the salience of anchor plausibility, thus decreasing the weight of implausible anchors. This predicts diminishing marginal effects of extremity for single anchors, but reversals when adding a second anchor. Single extremely low anchors generated lower or equal judgments relative to less extreme ones. The reverse was true with the addition of a second, plausible anchor: extremely low anchors generated HIGHER judgments. Additional evidence is obtained from a natural experiment using Buy-It-Now auctions on eBay.

_Heuristics in Context_
Wang, X.T. (University of South Dakota); Ziebarth, G. E. (University of South Dakota)

This study examined how some well-known choice heuristics and a newly developed minimum requirement (MR) heuristic predict actual choice behavior, and identified users’ a preference orders for these heuristics based on their evaluation data in the contexts of public and consumer choice. The results revealed a significant preference for reference-point dependent heuristics, particularly in the domain of public choice. Moreover, an analysis of the heuristics’ goodness of fit with the actual choices showed that in the public choice domain the MR heuristic had the best fit while in the consumer domain MAUT exhibited the best fit.

_The impact of experience on information, belief, and preferences in decision under uncertainty_
Hadar, Liat (UCLA Anderson School of Management); Fox, Craig R. (UCLA Anderson School of Management)

Previous research on experienced-based decisions has focused on the impact of overall experience on choice. In real life, however, people often have more experience with one alternative over another. In two studies we demonstrate that the less experience one has with one outcome distribution over another, the larger the sampling error and the judgment bias for the less experienced
outcome, which may lead to reversal in choice compared to equal-experience-based choice. Moreover, the less experience one has with one alternative over the other, the lower one’s willingness to bet on it, holding sampling error and judgment bias constant.

**SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 16**

(5A) Consumer decision making

*Seeking Freedom Through Variety*
Levav, Jonathan (Columbia University); Zhu, Juliet (Rui) (University of British Columbia)

Psychological reactance arises when an individual’s freedom is curtailed, evoking behaviors aimed at regaining freedom. In this paper we investigate an important source of reactance: physical confinement. We propose that asking individuals to make choices in (relative) physical confinement will evoke reactance. In three studies and one market demonstration, we show that a unique consequence of this reactance is that people seek variety in their choices as an expression of freedom (Kim and Drolet 2003).

*In Defaults We Trust*
Liersch, Michael J. (NYU (Stern)); McKenzie, Craig R. M. (UC, San Diego)

Recent research suggests that default effects are caused, in part, by people’s perception that defaults are implicit recommendations. Seen this way, trust may matter: People may be more likely to opt out of defaults if they do not trust the defaults’ source. Experimental results support this hypothesis: When a new company, ImaginationCo, was introduced to participants by an established company (e.g., Wal-Mart), participants adhered to defaults associated with ImaginationCo (e.g., “send me ImaginationCo coupons”) when trust in the established company was high, but not when it was low. Reputational influences on default effects should be considered when establishing defaults.

*Will a Rose Smell as Sweet by Another Name? Specification-Seeking in Decision-Making*
Hsee, Christopher K. (University of Chicago Graduate School of Business); Yang, Yang (Shanghai Jiao Tong University); Gu, Yangjie (Shanghai Jiao Tong University); Chen, Jie (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)

We offer a framework about when and how specifications (e.g., megapixels of a camera, number of airbags in a massage chair) influence consumer preferences and report five studies that test the framework. Studies 1-3 show that even when consumers can directly experience the relevant products and the specifications carry little or no new information, their preference is still influenced by specifications, including specifications that are self-generated and by definition spurious, and specifications that the respondents themselves deem uninformative. Studies 4 and 5 show that relative to choice, hedonic preference (liking) is more stable and less influenced by specifications.

*The Impact of Add-On Features on Consumer Product Evaluations*
Bertini, Marco (London Business School); Elie Ofek (Harvard Business School); Dan Ariely (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University)

The research presented in this paper provides evidence that “add-ons” sold to enhance a product can be more than just optional benefits. We argue that consumers draw inferences from the availability of add-ons, and that these inferences lead to changes in the perceived utility of the base good. We further argue that there are two types of enhancements, alignable and nonalignable, with opposing effects on evaluation. A set of experiments with five different product categories confirms this prediction. Our studies also show that the amount of product information available to consumers and expectations about product composition play important moderating roles.

(5B) Symposium: Application and Innovation: Lessons from Medical Decision Making: (Special Symposium by Members of the Society for Medical Decision Making)

Organizers: Alan Schwartz (University of Illinois), Sandy Schwartz (University of Pennsylvania)
Discussant: Elke Weber

The goal of this symposium is to present and discuss recent work in MDM that has not yet been widely disseminated in the basic JDM literature, including research developed specifically to meet the needs of health care decision making or studies that illustrate differences between health decision making and other decision domains. SJDM members are presenting a complementary symposium at this year’s annual meeting of SMDM. This symposium swap is supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-0817831/SES-0820329

Constituent papers:

*A time trade-off method for eliciting partner’s quality-of-life due to patient’s health states in prostate cancer*
Basu, Anirban (University of Chicago); Dale, William (University of Chicago); Elstein, Arthur (University of Illinois at Chicago);
Meltzer, David (University of Chicago)

Cost-effectiveness analyses may better reflect the full costs and benefits of medical interventions if they incorporate the effects of patients’ health on their family members. We developed and applied a time trade-off (TTO) technique to find significant impacts on the quality of life (QOL) of partners due to potential prostate cancer-related health states of the patients. The proposed TTO technique had good face, convergent, divergent and concurrent validities. We found evidence that the partners were not acting as proxies for the patient. The new time-trade-off method appears to produce valid measurements of the spillover effect on family member’s QOL.

Race-based bias in physician decision making
Arkes, Hal R. (Ohio State University); Dawson, Neal V. (MetroHealth Medical Center)

Using the Implicit Association Test as a measure of “implicit race preference,” Green and colleagues allege that in recommending therapy for patients presenting with symptoms suggesting acute coronary syndromes, physicians scoring in the “pro-white bias” range treated African-Americans unfavorably. However the data show that only physicians with the lowest levels of “bias” treated the races differently! Also, African-Americans are more likely than Whites to manifest symptoms mimicking coronary disease in the absence of significant coronary obstruction, thus making equivalent treatment recommendations a questionable standard. We suggest Green’s results do not support the conclusion of biased treatment choices unfavorable to African-Americans.

Acceptable regret: an extension of basic decision-making concept to medical and clinical research arena
Djulbegovic, Benjamin (Moffitt Cancer Center, Univ South Florida); Hozo, Iztok (Indiana U)

All major theories of choice agree that rational decision-making requires integration of benefits (gains) and harms (losses) of the agents actions and consequences. The differences between these theories mostly arise from the proposed way how exactly decision-makers should relate benefit and harms of a particular decision. We have developed the concept of acceptable regret based on observations that under some circumstances, loss of benefits, or inflicted harms due to wrong decision-making can be tolerated. Here, we summarize findings hitherto buried in several publications on how acceptable regret can be applied in clinical decision making as well as in clinical research.

(5C) Heuristics and biases

Strategy Selection by Default: Recognition-based Inference in Federal and State Elections
Marewski, Julian N. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany); Gaissmaier, Wolfgang (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany); Schooler, Lael J. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany); Goldstein, Daniel G. (London Business School, London, UK); Gigerenzer, Gerd (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany)

The recognition heuristic is a simple rule of thumb for two-alternative choice decisions. Reaction time and fMRI data suggest that it might be used by default. We (a) propose the conditions under which the default is overruled. We (b) generalize the heuristic to situations with multiple alternatives, proposing a mechanism of how people form consideration sets, that is, how they single out alternatives from a multitude that are worth further information search. In 6 studies, we (c) show that the heuristic predicts people’s inferences—including voters’ forecasts of 3 political elections—better than each of 6 more complex alternative models.

Base-rate respect by intuition: Approximating rational choices in base-rate tasks with multiple cues
Glöckner, Andreas (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Dickert, Stephan (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

Barbey and Sloman (2007) argue that decision tasks with base-rates and specific information might sometimes be solved well by intuitive processes. The research paradigms from probabilistic inference and base-rate tasks were combined to investigate whether individuals use and adjust their intuition in base rate tasks with multiple cues and repeated feedback. Allowing for intuitive decision making and providing information in a simple matrix format we observed a time-stable accuracy rate of 86% and a high correlation between choice proportions and posterior likelihoods. Participants’ choices approximated rationality according to Bayes’ theorem.

The smart potential behind probability matching
Gaissmaier, Wolfgang (Max-Planck-Institute for Human Development); Schooler, Lael J. (Max-Planck-Institute for Human Development)

Probability matching is a classic choice anomaly often assumed to be a cognitive shortcut. In contrast, recent literature suggests that it is not a strategy per se, but rather another outcome of misperceiving randomness. People search for patterns even in random sequences, which results in probability matching at the outcome level. We demonstrate that at least for participants high in working memory capacity, indeed a potentially smart pattern search strategy underlies probability matching. These probability matchers
have a higher chance of finding a pattern if one exists. We therefore conclude that there is a smart potential behind probability matching.

**Correspondence Bias in Performance Evaluation and the Benefits of Having Been Graded Leniently**

Moore, Don A (Carnegie Mellon University); Swift, Samuel A (Carnegie Mellon University); Sharek, Zachariah S. (Carnegie Mellon University); Gino, Francesca (Carnegie Mellon University)

We hypothesize that the correspondence bias will lead university admissions decisions to favor students coming from institutions with lenient grading because those students will have their high grades mistaken for evidence of high ability. In three studies using both laboratory experiments and actual admissions decisions, we show that those who obtain high scores simply due to lenient grading or to an easy task are favored in selection. These results have implications for research on attribution, because they provide a more stringent test of the correspondence bias and allow for a more precise measure of its size.

(6A) Risk

**On the Nature of Risk Aversion: Self-Regulatory Resource Depletion and Risk**

Vohs, Kathleen (University of Minnesota); Amir, On (University of California, San Diego); Dhar, Ravi (Yale University)

Risky decisions have been studied in almost all of the social sciences, yet scientists are less sure what underlies risk-related preferences. The current work indicates that the revealed preference for risk can be conceptualized as a temptation moderated by executive control processes; accordingly when executive override is hindered, the preference for risk should be stronger. Across five experiments, we found that self-regulatory resource depletion led to a preference for riskier options and that this was due mainly to the temptation of the upside of the outcome.

**Should I stay or should I go? How prior events influence subsequent decision making under risk**

Tinsley, Catherine H. (Georgetown University); Dillon, Robin L. (Georgetown University); Cronin, Matthew (George Mason University)

We explore how near-miss experiences in a natural disaster context (hurricanes that had some probability of catastrophic damage, but by chance did not) influence people’s assessment of future risk (hurricane warnings) and their future decision making (evacuate or not). We distinguish two types of near-misses that highlight opposing features of the prior experience and hence lead to opposite assessments of future risk and opposite decisions. We examine the robustness of our effects sampling both from the general population and from New Orleans residents. We also look at the role of counterfactual thought and how near-miss events influence future, unrelated gambles.

**Do pictures promote nested-set or frequency representations in judgments under uncertainty?**

Brase, Gary L. (Kansas State University)

Ecological rationality proponents claim that pictorial representations help tap into the frequency coding mechanisms of the mind, whereas nested sets proponents argue that pictorial representations simply help one to appreciate general subset relationships. A series of experiments used Bayesian reasoning problems with different pictorial representations (Venn circles, iconic symbols, and Venn circles with dots) to better understand influences on performance across these representation types. Results with various static and interactive picture representations indicate a consistent advantage for iconic representations over other types of pictures, supporting frequency representation as an important factor independent of nested-set appreciation.

(6B) Medical decision making

**The Price of Pain and the Value of Suffering**

Vlaev, Ivo (Department of Psychology, University College London); Seymour, Ben (Institute of Neurology, University College London); Dolan, Ray (Institute of Neurology, University College London); Chater, Nick (Department of Psychology, University College London)

Estimating the financial value of pain informs the market price of analgesics, the cost-effectiveness of clinical treatments, compensation for injury, and the response to public hazards. Such costs are assumed to reflect a stable trade-off between relief of discomfort and money. Using an auction-based health market experiment, we show the price people pay for relief of pain is determined by the local context of the market, established either by recent pain intensities, or immediately disposable income, but not overall wealth. Such unstable valuation suggests that the dynamic behaviour of health markets is not predictable from the static behaviour of individuals.

**Leading ourselves into temptation: Memory for visceral sensations and self-change efforts**

Williams, Elanor F. (Cornell University); Dunning, David (Cornell University)

Self-change efforts are difficult and usually fail. In particular, people know that visceral temptation interferes with self-change, but they overestimate their ability to overcome it and expose themselves to temptation instead of avoiding it. We demonstrate that even
when people have been directly exposed to a temptation in the past, only those currently experiencing it are able to make an optimal choice. This illustrates why unhealthy behaviors are perpetuated, and suggests why people repeat past mistakes: although people have experienced a physiological state, they are unable to access that experience and use it to avoid making an error in choice.

The relationship between the number of choices and variety: the case of Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Plans
Szek, Helena (University of Porto, CETE Research Center); Bundorf, M. Kate (Stanford University, School of Medicine)

We consider how the relationship between satisfaction with a chosen option and the number of options in a choice set changes when the variety in the choice set is altered. We expect both the costs and benefits of choice to rise with an increase in variety. We recruited people over 65 to choose a hypothetical prescription drug plan. We find some evidence that increased variety shifts the inverse U-shaped relationship between choice satisfaction and number of choices. Additionally, seniors highly value having choice in this context, and we find little evidence of choice overload within the range we examine.

(6C) Organizational decision making

When Fate is at Play--Group Cooperation in Stochastic Prisoner’s Dilemmas
Gong, Min (University of Pennsylvania); Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania); Kunreuther, Howard (University of Pennsylvania)

Previous research has shown a ‘discontinuity effect’: groups are less cooperative than individuals (Insko et al, 1987). We replicated the discontinuity effect in the deterministic prisoner’s dilemma, but we found that groups were more cooperative than individuals in a stochastic version of the game. The major factors that underlie the usual discontinuity effect, greed and fear, were reduced in the stochastic environment. Three social norms (being smart, being kind, and conditional cooperation) jointly determined both the non-cooperative and cooperative behavior of groups in both deterministic and stochastic games. The deterministic and stochastic games tended to evoke different norms.

The Effect of Goal Accessibility on Escalation of Commitment
Ting, Hsuchi (University of Maryland); Wallsten, Thomas (University of Maryland)

Escalation of commitment is a phenomenon where individuals persist in a failing course of action. However, recent research has shown conditions under which mounting sunk costs and repeated failures cause individuals to disengage rather than to escalate, thus casting doubt on a strong link between negative feedback and commitment escalation. We incorporate a goal-based explanation to reconcile the conflicting evidence. Results showed that the negative feedback could lead to either higher or lower degree of commitment escalation, independent of the magnitude of sunk costs, depending on the cognitive accessibility of the goal.

The Role of Group Conflict in Reducing Information Distortion
Boyle, Peter J. (Central Washington University); Russo, J. Edward (Cornell University); Hanlon, Dennis (Memorial University)

In decisions a tentatively preferred or “leading” alternative tends to develop early and spontaneously. Then new information is typically interpreted as too supportive of that leader. In an attempt to eliminate this information distortion (ID), a binary choice was made by groups. Groups that reached an early consensus about which alternative was the tentative leader exhibited greater ID than did individuals, while groups that experienced sustained conflict distorted information less than individuals. ID prior to agreement was essentially zero, confirming the value of conflict derived from opposing views to higher quality group decisions.

(7A) Law and ethics

Accidental outcomes guide punishment in a “trembling hand” game
Cushman, Fiery (Harvard University); Dreber, Anna (Harvard University); Wang, Ying (Harvard University); Costa, Jay (Harvard University)

How do we judge accidentally selfish or generous behavior: by intent, or outcome? We explore this question in a two-player economic game. Player 1 allocates $10 between herself and Player 2 by choosing to roll one of three die, probabilistically weighted towards either selfish, even-split, or generous allocations. P1’s choice of die reveals her intentions to P2. However, any die can yield selfish, even, or generous outcomes. P2 responds by punishing or rewarding P1. Strikingly, P2’s responses are strongly guided by the accidental outcomes of P1’s roll. This game provides new insight into the social preferences for fairness and retribution.

Do As I Say, Not As I do: How the Form of Advice Affects Judgment
Gino, Francesca (Carnegie Mellon University); Shang, Jen (Yue) (Indiana University); Croson, Rachel (University of Texas at Dallas)

We rely on others’ advice to make judgments. Studies on advice taking have used two forms of advice: “telling,” how the target should judge, and “showing,” what the advisor judged. In this paper, we present two national phone surveys and two laboratory
studies that compare the impact of telling and showing on judgment. We show greater receptivity to advice when it is in the form of telling than in the form of showing. Our analyses demonstrate a moderated mediating role of informativeness of the advice and trustworthiness of the advisor in the relationship between advice type and advice use.

Too Tired to Tell the Truth: Self-Control Resource Depletion and Dishonest Behavior
Mead, Nicole (Florida State University); Alquist, Jessica (Florida State University); Ariely, Dan (Duke University)

Why are people (dis)honest? Economists argue that people consciously cheat when the benefits outweigh the costs; others proffer that people’s desire to be a prosocial and cooperative member of society curtails cheating. We suggest that contemplation of cheating is accompanied by a motivational conflict between the desire to profit and the desire to be prosocial, and that self-control is needed to resolve this conflict. In two experiments, participants depleted of their self-control resources cheated to a greater extent than non-depleted participants. An additional study showed that refraining from cheating consumed self-control resources. Thus, self-control may govern whether people act (dis)honestly.

When Facing a Moral Dilemma is Worse than Having Faced One
Caruso, Eugene M. (Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago); Bartels, Daniel M. (Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago)

People’s affective reactions tend to be more extreme for future events than for past events, and their moral judgments are often influenced by such affective reactions. Because of the emotional conflict associated with choosing between two unattractive courses of action, we predicted that actors facing a moral dilemma in the future would be judged more severely than those who had already faced the same moral dilemma in the past, regardless of the course of action chosen. In four studies involving difficult tradeoff decisions, future decisions elicited more negative emotion and more extreme moral evaluations than equivalent past decisions.

(7B) Medical decision making

A Memory Theoretic Account of Hypothesis Generation & Information Search
Thomas, Rick P. (University of Oklahoma); Lange, Nick D. (University of Oklahoma); Dougherty, Michael R. (University of Maryland)

Critical predictions of a recent computational theory of hypothesis generation, evaluation, and testing, HyGene (Thomas et al., 2008), were tested empirically. HyGene’s Hypothesis Guided Search principle claims that hypotheses maintained in working memory guide information search in hypothesis-testing situations. The model predicts a preference for positive-test search strategies when only one hypothesis is under consideration, but diagnostic search when multiple hypotheses are considered. Empirical results confirming this prediction and additional simulations of several hypothesis-testing strategies illustrate how the HyGene cognitive architecture can be used to investigate the influence of cognitive constraints on hypothesis testing and information search.

Trading life and health for other goals
Schwartz, Alan (UIC); Hazen, Gordon (Northwestern); Leifer, Ariel (UIC); Heckerling, Paul (UIC)

Purpose: To measure willingness to trade life or health for non-medical goals. Method: In three studies, outpatients provided goals and performed time-tradeoffs and paired comparisons involving goal achievement, life expectancy, and health. Results: Participants reported considerable willingness to trade life years for goal achievement. In paired comparisons, life expectancy, disability, and goal achievement each had significant main effects. Participants preferred a moderately impaired health state with goal achievement to several less impaired states without. Conclusions: People express willingness to trade off quantity of life and quality of health for their non-medical goals. Standard assessments may not incorporate this compensatory relationship.

A Ranking Method for Detecting Scale Recalibration in Quality of Life Judgments
Lacey, Heather P. (Bryant University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University); Ubel, Peter A. (University of Michigan & VA Ann Arbor Healthcare System)

We used a ranking method (Lacey, et al., 2008) to identify scale recalibration in Quality of Life (QoL) judgments. Participants estimated QoL for either diabetes or obesity, along with 24 other adverse conditions. For both conditions, we found a discrepancy between the ratings of participants who had experienced that condition, and those who had not. However, the source of that discrepancy differed for diabetes and obesity. The ranking method revealed that scale recalibration contributed to the rating discrepancy for obesity, but not for diabetes. This study demonstrates the vulnerability of single-rating measures to scale recalibration, and offers a methodological remedy.

Reducing risk taking in adolescence: Differential effects of verbatim-based versus gist-based interventions on behavioral intentions
Mills, Britain A. (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University); Estrada, Steven M. (Cornell University)
The present study used fuzzy-trace theory to compare three interventions’ effects on adolescent sexual risk taking in a randomized control design. As predicted, a gist-based intervention was most successful in lowering sexual intentions, and the effect endured 12 months after the initial assessment. Also as predicted, a verbatim-analytic intervention was most successful in improving prophylactic intentions. By demonstrating that the decision domain (categorical either-or decisions to have sex versus moderating degrees of risk through prophylaxis) is selectively sensitive to changes in corresponding processing modes, the present results offer insights into how future interventions can be tailored to minimize adolescent risk.

(7C) Wisdom of crowds

Group versus individual rationality attainment: A comparison using the two-person beauty contest game
Chou, Eileen (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Phillips, Kathy (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); McConnell, Maggie (HSS, California Institute of Technology); Nagel, Rosemarie (Department of Economics, Universi

Are three heads more rational than one? If yes, then why? This paper demonstrates that groups not only outperform individuals in attaining rationality, they also perform indistinguishably from the “truth wins” norm. In addition, we found that both intergroup and intragroup competitions are essential in deciding groups’ superiority over individuals; the desire to defend one’s image and identity within the group elicits higher cognitive effort, while the desire to outperform other groups elicits more strategic behaviors. We validated the robustness of our findings with 24 experimental sessions across 3 subject pools. Indeed, three heads are more rational than one.

When Smaller Crowds are Better
Soll, Jack B. (Duke University); Larrick, Rick P. (Duke University); Al Mannes (Duke University)

Although averaging opinions is highly effective, more opinions are not always better. We examine “the wisdom of small crowds” from empirical, behavioral, and analytical perspectives. First, an empirical analysis of economists’ forecasts shows that a small crowd strategy based on recent performance outperforms the whole crowd. Next, we show experimentally that people prefer single experts to averaging all experts. If given the chance, however, they opt for a small, hand-picked crowd. Finally, we use simulation to show that averaging the top 30-50% of the whole crowd is effective across a wide range of environments.

When no one is as smart as all of us: How naive groups can solve the hidden-profile task
Reimer, Torsten (University of Maryland); Reimer, Andrea (University Park); Hoffrage, Ulrich (University of Lausanne)

A group’s potential to outperform individual deciders is especially apparent if the knowledge of group members is distributed asymmetrically like in hidden-profile tasks. In previous research, groups typically failed to solve this task. We summarize the results of several simulation studies and experiments, in which we identified conditions that enabled groups to detect hidden profiles. We observed that groups can solve this task under the following conditions: (1) Groups enter discussions without preconceived opinions (naive groups); and (2) the information on the choice alternatives is presented in the form of common cues, which facilitates the application of a cue-based heuristic.

The wisdom of many within one mind: Making better judgments with dialectical bootstrapping
Herzog, Stefan M. (University of Basel); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel)

Averaging quantitative estimates of people consistently outperforms the accuracy of the typical individual estimate because random error (noise) is, and systematic error (bias) tends to be cancelled. We propose applying the power of averaging to estimates generated by a single person. One can reduce overall bias by averaging a person’s first estimate with a second one that harks back to somewhat contradicting, yet valid knowledge. We derive conditions under which this “dialectical bootstrapping” fosters accuracy, and empirically demonstrate that it improves accuracy beyond mere reliability gains. The wisdom of many can be in part emulated by a single mind.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17

(8A) Law and ethics

The role of probability of detection in judgments of punishment
Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania); Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew University)

Nine experiments, one involving Israeli judges, the rest on the Web, examined the effect of probability of detection of an offense on punishment judgments. When cases differing in probability were separated, subjects largely ignored probability. When cases were presented jointly, many subjects took probability into account, especially when a probe question called attention to it. Some subjects thought it unfair to consider probability, but more subjects thought probability was relevant because of the need for deterrence. Neglect of probability is more often an result of the tendency to neglect secondary effects than of ideological commitment to "just deserts.”
Predicting choice and conflict in morally challenging decisions: The role of option characteristics and competing decision modes
Krosch, Amy R. (Columbia University); Fligner, Bernd (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

To explore potential causes of reported post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) in Canadian peacekeepers, we employed realistic, morally challenging military scenarios, each with two conflicting choice options. In addition to respondents’ choices, we collected ratings of choice options, decision-modes employed, and physiological arousal. Decision modes and choice ratings predicted choice. Respondents who used modes that predicted opposing choices reported significantly more decision difficulty and post-choice worry than those who used only one mode, or choice-congruous modes. Since post-decision conflict rumination is linked to PTSD, our results provide entry points for the design of potential PTSD prevention strategies.

Reciprocity is not Give and Take: Asymmetric Reciprocity to Positive and Negative Acts
Converse, Benjamin A. (University of Chicago); Keysar, Boaz (University of Chicago); Epley, Nicholas (University of Chicago); Wang, Jinnwen (Northwestern University)

Social exchange has no well-defined “value.” It relies on the norm of reciprocity, in which giving and taking are assumed to be mirror images. In five experiments, we demonstrate that they produce fundamentally different patterns of reciprocity. Holding constant the objective outcomes of initial acts, we demonstrate that people reciprocate in like measure to giving but reciprocate more selfishly to taking. Additionally, giving is perceived as more generous than objectively identical acts of taking, taking escalates, and the asymmetry in reciprocity is not due to gaining versus losing resources. The meaning of social exchange, then, determines the value of resources.

Race and the dynamics of juror decision making
Lagnado, David (Psychology, University College London); Thomas, Cheryl (Law, University College London); Yu, Erica (Psychology, University College London); Balmer, Nigel (Law, University College London)

This study investigates how jurors’ prior biases are modulated by evidence presented in court. White and ethnic minority participants were randomly allocated to watch one of two versions of a criminal trial, where the only difference was the race of the defendant (either White or Black). Juror judgments were tracked throughout the trial. Findings showed that initial verdicts differed according to the race of juror and race of defendant, but verdicts converged as more evidence was presented, and then diverged again in final verdicts. This suggests that while jurors are sensitive to evidence, initial biases can persist in final verdicts.

(8B) Biological substrates of decision making
The Role of Incidental Emotions in Decision Making Under Risk
Kugler, Tamar (University of Arizona); Ordóñez, Lisa D. (University of Arizona); Connolly, Terry (University of Arizona)

This paper examines the role of three emotions – fear, anger, and happiness - in risk-related decision-making. 2 laboratory experiments induce incidental emotions and then measure real, incentive-compatible choices between high-risk a low-risk alternatives. In experiment 1 risk is created by nature, and in experiment 2 the source of risk is in human control (the choice of another participant). We find that while fearful participants are more risk-averse than angry or happy participants when risk comes from nature, this result is reversed when risk results from actions of another person: angry and happy participants are less risk-seeking than fearful participants.

Lemonade and Bounded Rationality: Limited Resources Affect Reasoning and Judgment
Baumeister, Roy F. (Florida State University); Masicampo, E.J. (Florida State University)

Blood glucose is brain fuel. It can be depleted by acts of self-control, leaving less available for logical reasoning. Our experiment used the so-called attraction effect, in which judgments are irrationally swayed by a decoy option. The decoy effect was strongest when participants had expended willpower (and thus blood glucose) on a prior, irrelevant act of self-control. Drinking a glass of lemonade with sugar restored rationality and eliminated the attraction effect. Lemonade made with diet sweetener had no effect. Thus, rational, effortful decision making depends on having high levels of glucose.

Neural Correlates of Behavioral Differences between Descriptive and Experiential Choice
Jessup, Ryan K. (Indiana University); Busemeyer, Jerome R. (Indiana University); Brown, Joshua W. (Indiana University)

Recently, Jessup, Bishara, and Busemeyer (in press) observed in a repeated choice task with full descriptive information that the reception of feedback engendered behavior consistent with experiential choice whereas lack of feedback produced behavior consistent with a descriptive choice paradigm; consequently, feedback alone sufficed to drive the behavioral difference between the two paradigms. Using fMRI and the same task, we examined whether neural regions involved during choice would be differentially recruited by descriptive and experiential tasks. The results indicated that, during the decision phase, cingulate cells had a significantly different pattern of activity between the two (feedback or none) conditions.

An MEG study of Neurological Difference in Decoy and Non-Decoy Choice Sets
Hedgcock, William (University of Iowa); Crowe, David (University of Minnesota); Georgopoulos, Apostolos (University of Minnesota)

This study uses magnetoencephalography (MEG) to record brain activity while subjects choose from choice sets that either include or do not include a dominated option (a “decoy”). This technology allowed us to measure brain activity at millisecond resolution while decisions were being made. We find brain activity differences for decisions with a decoy earlier than 750 milliseconds, suggesting the cognitive differences occur prior to prolonged deliberation. Further, we are able to predict subject choices correctly more than seventy-five percent of the time using only brain activation data. These findings may further refine existing explanations for this decision bias.

(8C) Subjective probability

Experience Sampling Information about Foregone Payoffs
Le Mens, Gael (Stanford University); Denrell, Jerker (Stanford University)

This paper studies the effect of information about foregone payoffs on the evolution of beliefs and choices. We show that when information about foregone payoffs is available for some of the alternatives and not the others, individuals will learn to prefer alternatives with information about foregone payoffs. The reason is that information about foregone payoffs can help correct mistaken negative beliefs about the value of an alternative, which otherwise could have led decision makers to abandon that alternative. An experiment confirms the predictions of our model and illustrates the effect of information about foregone payoffs on the selection of alternatives.

Ambiguity aversion and the violation of Savage’s postulate 4
Lan, Cherng-Horng (University College London); Harvey, Nigel (University College London)

Savage’s (1954) Postulate 4 states that a person’s willingness to bet on one of two events is independent of the prize at stake. Three studies demonstrate that P4 does not hold in Ellsberg’s (1961) two-color problem. Instead, people’s inclination to avoid an ambiguous event is correlated with the “psychological importance” of the prize (Ellsberg, 2001), which is related to the psychological interval implied by the S-shape value function between two potential monetary outcomes in a decision and which is liable to the contrast between the prize in the previous decision and the prize in the current decision.

100% certain but not so sure: calibration of probability judgments in measuring overconfidence
Haran, Uriel J. (Carnegie Mellon University); Moore, Don A. (Carnegie Mellon University)

Previous research has emphasized the robustness of the overconfidence phenomenon, measured as the excessive certainty in the accuracy of one’s beliefs. The present study demonstrates that people’s confidence in their beliefs is significantly reduced: a) when elicited from participants’ behavior, measured by their gamble preferences, rather than their subjective probability of accuracy; b) when measured by matching it against gambles on outcomes of a die roll, compared with matching it against probabilistic gambles. These results suggest that people’s probability estimates, in particular their reported estimates, are not a reliable measure of their confidence in the accuracy of their beliefs.

The description–experience gap: Beyond sampling error and recency
Hau, Robin (University of Basel); Pleskac, Timothy J. (Michigan State University); Ralph Hertwig (University of Basel)

In decisions from experience, we represent real-world decisions by not fully informing DMs about their options. Instead, they sample inconsequentially from an option to form an impression before making a decision. Previous studies using this paradigm find underweighting of rare events compared to decisions made from description. By gradually modifying both the experience and the description tasks, we identify the cognitive processes underlying this description–experience gap. Neither sampling error due to small samples, nor payoff variability, nor recency can account for all of the gap and we conclude that it is caused by differential processing of described and experienced information.

(9A) Emotion and affect

Hot State Choice and Impact Biased Advice
Barkan, Rachel (Glazer School of Business, Ben-Gurion University); Shani, Yaniv (Glazer School of Business, Ben-Gurion University); Danziger, Shai (Glazer School of Business, Ben-Gurion University)

A choice-advice discrepancy demonstrates that when uncertain, choosers search for information to make sure they missed an opportunity, but advise friends to avoid similar search. Two experiments support a dual process hypothesis. Choice follows a hot state of curiosity and doubt, whereas advice is offered on the basis of an impact bias, exaggerating future regret. A third experiment demonstrates that by focusing attention on the feeling of doubt the impact bias can be used to reverse advice. Interestingly, focusing choosers’ attention on the feeling of doubt paradoxically utilizes the hot state to reverse choice.

Decision entrapment by myopic regret avoidance
Outcome regret is experienced when one learns of a better outcome one would have received by choosing another alternative. This regret can be avoided by declining such feedback, but at a cost in task learning. This constitutes the myopic regret avoidance trap: rejecting feedback to avoid short-term outcome regret increases long-term regret. We demonstrated this in two experiments in which participants made repeated choices among gambles. The pattern reversed when participants were sensitized to self-blame (unjustified decision) regret in two subsequent experiments. The two regret components thus drive opposite behaviors, one entrapping, the other decision enhancing.

The Influence of Self- and Other-Justification on the Decoy Effect
Kausel, Edgar (University of Arizona); Reb, Jochen (Singapore Management University); Connolly, Terry (University of Arizona)

We explore the moderating influence of anticipated justification on the decoy effect, predicting opposite moderating effects for self- versus other-justification. In two experiments, participants were presented with job choice sets or candidate choice sets. Results revealed that expecting to have to justify a decision to others amplified the decoy effect when people were evaluating hypothetical candidates. However, expecting to have to justify a decision to oneself made the decoy effect disappear. The latter finding is consistent with recent research suggesting that anticipatory regret leads to more careful decision processing.

Cold feet: Regret between decisions and outcomes
Teigen, Karl H. (University of Oslo); Kirkeboen, Geir (University of Oslo)

Many real-life decisions involve a time interval between a decision is made and the consequences are revealed. Nearly all regret studies focus on post-outcome regret, but we argue that regret also occur frequently in the pre-outcome period. In two scenario studies, participants were asked to imagine their regret after agreeing to perform an inconvenient task. In both, more regret was reported before than after the event, even when they imagined a “worst case” outcome. In a third study, participants described a difficult choice from their own life. Again, regret was perceived as higher in the pre-outcome period than afterwards.

(9B) Individual difference measures
Development and validation of the decision making styles inventory
Nygren, Thomas (Ohio State University); White, Rebecca (University of Chicago); Edwards, Michael (Ohio State University)

Theoretical and applied distinctions between the use of intuitive, analytical and regret-driven decision styles have gained prominence in recent years. A reliable self-report measure, the Decision Making Styles Inventory, consists of three subscales, representing "analytical," "intuitive" and "regret-avoidant" decision styles. We present the development and validation of the full form of this scale, including factorial invariance analysis of scale responses from an online sample of adults. Correlations between the DMI subscales and other existing scales are highlighted, as are results from behavioral validation studies. Short-form versions of this scale, developed using item response theory analysis, are provided.

To Maximize or Not: On Maximization Consistency Across Choice Domains
Lenton, Alison (University of Edinburgh); Henderson, Ross (University of Edinburgh); McKay, Alison (University of Edinburgh)

Schwartz et al.’s (2002) Maximization Scale assesses individual differences in the tendency to maximize versus satisfice when making decisions: Maximizers desire the best option and, as a result, engage in exhaustive processing of the options, whereas satisficers seek the good enough option and, thus, engage in less exhaustive processing of the options. This trait-like conceptualization ignores the possibility that some domains may encourage maximization and others discourage it. The present study examined the generalizability of maximization tendencies across choice domains. In brief, while the results lend support to the trait approach, they simultaneously indicate that maximization tendencies are context sensitive.

Development of Adaptive Risky Decision Making: Risk Sensitivity in Judgment and Choice
Figner, Bernd (Columbia University); Schaub, Simone (University of Zurich)

We investigated the development of children's adaptiveness in risky decision making in 5-, 6-, 8- and 10-year-old children and adults (N = 129). All age groups chose advantageously between two risky options (differing in outcome variability) in a board game that varied expected value and aspiration level. Choice advantageousness, as well as sophistication of judgments and information-use, increased with age. However, choice and judgment patterns came closest to normative probabilities in 6-year-olds, followed by adults. Results point to remarkably sophisticated risk sensitivity and choice strategies in children in a mathematically complex task, long before the underlying probabilities can be calculated.

What Needs to be Explained to Account for the Effects of Multiple Cognitive Variables on Decision-Making Competence?
Finucane, Melissa L. (East-West Center, Honolulu HI); Gullion, Christina (The Center for Health Research, Kaiser Permanente, OR)
Scores on tests of cognitive ability and decision style often correlate positively with resistance to decision-making biases. In contrast to a complete independence model in which each cognitive variable has a separate and distinct influence on decision performance, we hypothesize that the number of influences is in fact less than the number of variables exhibiting differences. We test this hypothesis using structural equation modeling of data from a sample of 611 adults (25-97 years) administered multiple decision tasks and cognitive tests. Results suggest that three statistically distinct types of cognitive variables (Gc, Memory, Decision Style) are operating on DMC.

(9C) Subjective probability

Memory-biased preferences: How accessibility affects judgments and decision-making prospects
Kusev, Petko (City University London); Ayton, Peter (City University London); van Schaik, Paul (University of Teesside)

In five experiments we studied the extent to which theories of judgment, decision-making and memory can predict people's preferences. Applying Prospect Theory and Support Theory to these data we find that (a) the weighting function required to model decisions with 'high-accessible' features in memory differs from the function required to model choices between monetary gambles and (b) the accessibility (Fox & Levav, 2000; Kahneman, 2003; Koriat, 2001) of events in memory affects choices between options, influencing participants' decisions about, but not their judgments of, these options. This result indicates a failure of the descriptive invariance axiom of Expected Utility Theory.

A Dynamic, Stochastic, and Computational Theory of Choice, Response Time, and Confidence
Pleskact, Timothy J. (Michigan State University); Busemeyer, Jerome R. (Indiana University)

We present a single diffusion process account of choice and confidence judgments. The model uses a standard random-walk/diffusion process to account for choice and decision time, but to make a confidence judgment we assume evidence continues to accumulate after a choice is made. Judges then interrupt the process to select a response based on the accumulated evidence. The 2-stage diffusion model, when compared to competing models, is shown to give a better account of the interrelationships between choice, decision and confidence time, and confidence. Finally, the model makes new predictions regarding the source of over/underconfidence.

The Bounded Rationality of Weighting and Adding Probabilities
Juslin, Peter (Department of psychology, Uppsala University); Nilsson, Håkan (Department of psychology, Uppsala University); Winman, Anders (Department of psychology, Uppsala University)

This study present Monte Carlo simulations demonstrating that; (i) when reasoning is based on approximate knowledge of constituent probabilities, probabilities computed by additive probability integration are often as close to or closer to the objectively correct probabilities than probabilities based on the rules of probability theory; (ii) when a demand for integration of multiple error prone probabilities is included in classic decision making problems, the rule to use additive integration often outperform the rule postulated by probability theory. Hence, in noisy environments, as is the case in most real-life environments, people are best of with weighted additive integration of probabilities.

Wishful Thinking: How Desire for an Outcome Influences Prediction and Subjective Likelihood
Windschitl, Paul D. (University of Iowa); Smith, Andrew R. (University of Iowa); Rose, Jason P. (University of Iowa); Krizan, Zlatan (Iowa State University)

Does a desire for an outcome cause people to perceive the likelihood of the outcome as higher than they otherwise would? The experimental paradigm that has most frequently been used to study this question is the classic marked-card paradigm, in which people are more likely to predict desired rather than undesired outcomes for stochastic events (card draws). We will present a set of studies that clarifies the reasons for the biased predictions in that paradigm, tests whether wishfully biased predictions are made about nonstochastic events, and examines the relationship between optimistic predictions and optimistically biased evaluations of likelihood.
POSTER TITLES LISTED BY SESSION

Session #1 w/ Continental Breakfast (Sunday, 8:30-10:30am, Northwest Hall)

(1) Motivated Bias in Affective Forecasting
Buechel, Eva C. (Carnegie Mellon University); Morewedge, Carey K. (Carnegie Mellon University); Vosgerau, Joachim (Carnegie Mellon University)

(2) Sequential and aggregate choice procedures and their effect on choices, anticipated and actual satisfaction
Schurr, Amos (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Avrahami, Judith (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Kareev, Yaakov (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Ritov, Ilana (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

(3) Incidental affect and charitable behavior: Feeling good (hypothetically) increase donations, feeling bad (really) does
Västfjäll, Daniel (Decision Research); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)

(4) The Influence of Mood and Accountability on Students’ Evaluation of Teaching Performance
Gerlt, Jason, E. (University of Nebraska, Omaha); Dr. Scherer, Lisa, L. (University of Nebraska, Omaha)

(5) Personality, Emotional Processes, and Investment Decision-Making Behaviors under Different Market Conditions
Wranik, Tanja (University of Geneva, Switzerland); Hopfensitz, Astrid (University of Toulouse, France)

(6) Contaminating Charity: When Perceived Motives of Donors Affects Perceived Magnitude of Contributions
Johnson-Graham, Laura C. (University of Colorado Boulder); Pytetr, Jarratt (University of Colorado Boulder); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado Boulder)

(7) Affect-rich and affect-poor outcomes in decision by experience and decision by description
Lindvall, Johan (University of Gothenburg); Västfjäll, Daniel (University of Gothenburg)

(8) Hedonic Conflict and the Role of Justifications
Duyx, Bram (University of Amsterdam); Nijstad, Bernard A. (University of Amsterdam); Handgraaf, Michel J.J. (University of Amsterdam)

(9) Cause related marketing: The role of mental accounting, price and product type
Rubaltelli, Enrico (University of Padova); Baghi, Ilaria (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia); Tedeschi, Marcello (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia); Rumiati, Rino (University of Padova)

(10) Can A Smile Help You Go The Extra Mile? The Effect of Affective Forecasting Calibration and Mood on Goal-Setting
Easwar, Karthik (The Ohio State Univ); West, Patricia (The Ohio State Univ)

(11) The effect of mood states on variety seeking behavior: intrapersonal and interpersonal causes
Lin, Chien-Huang (National Central University, Taiwan); Lin, Hung-Chou (National Central University, Taiwan)

(12) Dealing with Missed Opportunities: Action vs. State Orientation Moderates Inaction Inertia
Van Putten, Marijke (K.U.Leuven, Belgium); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University, The Netherlands); Van Dijk, Eric (Leiden University, The Netherlands)

(13) When goal pursuit is unpleasant and depleting yet pleasant and replenishing
Choi, Jinhec (University of Chicago GSB); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago GSB)

(14) How to Approach a Decision to Avoid a Crippled Finish
McNeill, Ilona M. (University of Amsterdam); Nijstad, Bernard A. (University of Amsterdam); Handgraaf, Michel J. J. (University of Amsterdam); De Dreu, Carsten, K. W. (University of Amsterdam)

(15) Relative Measures of Trait Affectivity
Rose, Jason P. (University of Iowa); Krizan, Zlatan (Iowa State University)

(16) “Defocusing” Affective Forecasts – Shifting the Focus from Happiness
Walsh, Emma (City University); Ayton, Peter (City University)

(17) Automatic Optimism: The Affective Basis of Judgments about the Likelihood of Future Events
Lench, Heather C. (Texas A&M University)
(18) Valuation In Restricted Processing Times: An Exploration of the Endowment Effect
Ashby, Nathaniel J. S. (University of Oregon); Dickert, Stephan (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

(19) Identical Cousins? Differentiating Depression and Sadness
Ling, Kimberly (Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business); Moore, Don (Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business)

(20) The roles of impulsivity, sexual disinhibition, and sexual arousal on heat-of-the-moment decision making.
Macapagal, Kathryn R. (Indiana University & The Kinsey Institute); Fridberg, Daniel J. (Indiana University); Janssen, Erick (The Kinsey Institute); Finn, Peter R. (Indiana University); Heiman, Julia R. (The Kinsey Institute)

(21) Examining unintended consequences of risk communications that evoke fear – a Bi-national study
Bruine de Bruin, Wandi (Carnegie Mellon University); Fischhoff, Baruch (Carnegie Mellon University); Downs, Julie S. (Carnegie Mellon University); Florig, H. Keith (Carnegie Mellon University); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest University); Mandel, David R. (DePaul)

(22) Self-Efficacy: An Important Component in Decision Making under Time Pressure
DeDonno, Michael A (Case Western Reserve University); Demaree, Heath A (Case Western Reserve University)

(23) The Role of Attentional Mechanisms in Affective Information Processing Underlying Donations
Dickert, Stephan (Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research & University of Oregon)

(24) Immorality from Guilt in Ethical Decision Making: overdo and overcorrection
Wang, Long (Northwestern University)

(25) Are Failed Actions or Inactions Regretted More? The Critical Moderating Role of Perceived Opportunity
Karadogan, Figen (Ohio University); Markman, Keith D. (Ohio University)

(26) Risk perception and Affect: statistical formats and different interpretations
D'Addario, Marco (University of Milano-Bicocca); Manfroi, Alessandra (University of Milano-Bicocca); Sala, Valentina (University of Milano-Bicocca); Passerini, Gabriella (University of Milano-Bicocca); Bagassi, Maria (University of Milano-Bicocca); Macchi

(27) Proof and Doubt in Reasonable Doubt Instructions
Dhami, Mandeep (University of Cambridge); Katrin Mueller-Johnson (University of Cambridge); Samantha Lundigran (University of Cambridge)

(28) Sad and sensitive: The effects of sadness on advice seeking and taking
Ling, Kimberly (Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business); Gino, Francesca (University of North Carolina)

(29) The Role of Accuracy and Focus on Majority and Minority Influences in Simulated Financial Market
Andersson, Maria (University of Gothenburg, Department of Psychology); Hedesström, Martin (University of Gothenburg, Department of Psychology); Gärling, Tommy (University of Gothenburg, Department of Psychology)

(30) Examining the Relationship Between Loss Aversion and Time Discounting
Barkley-Levenson, Emily E. (UCLA Department of Psychology); Pottenger, Kai P. (UCLA Program in Neuroscience); Fox, Craig R. (UCLA Anderson School of Management & Dept of Psychology)

(31) Pricing Procedural Fairness
Dittrich, Dennis (University of Erfurt); Tontrup, Stephan (Max Planck Institute for Research in Collective Goods)

(32) The Influence of Choice Bracketing and Goals on The Intertemporal Substitution of Labor
Weinhardt, Justin M. (Ohio University); Vancouver, Jeff B. (Ohio University); González Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University); Harman, Jason L. (Ohio University)

(33) What motivates the Trust Game participant?
Kausel, Edgar (University of Arizona); Connolly, Terry (University of Arizona); Kugler, Tamar (University of Arizona)

(34) Giving Costly Advice
Choshen-Hillel, Shoham (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel); Yaniv, Ilan (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel)

(35) How to restore injustice? A study on altruistic punishment vs. altruistic compensation.
Leliveld, Marijke C. (Leiden University); Van Dijk, E. (Leiden University); Van Beest, I. (Leiden University)
(36) Experimental Study on Time Discounting and Risk Preference under Timing Risks
Komuro, Takumi (Hokkaido University); Kwaguchi, Tomonori (Hokkaido University); Kameda, Tatsuya (Hokkaido University)

(37) When is paying for something better than getting it free?
Colby, Helen (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)

(38) The Surprising Influencers: How the Inferred Attributes of the Observed Shape the Buying Intentions of the Observer
Shalev, Edith (NYU Stern); Morwitz, Vicki (NYU Stern)

(39) The effects of instability of stock markets in the decision making of individual investors.
Pascual-Ezama, David (Universidad Complutense de Madrid); Scandroglio, Barbara (Universidad Autonoma de Madrid); Gil-Gomez de Llano, Beatriz (Universidad Autonomia de Madrid)

(40) Motivations to Join Informal Finance Group: The Case of “ARISAN” in Rural Java
Takashino, Nina (Center for Experimental Research in Social Sciences, Hokkaido)

(41) Investment Decision-Making and Hindsight Bias
Monti, Marco (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Legrenzi, Paolo (IUAV University, Venice)

(42) An Investigation of Individual Differences in Expected Utility Violations From the Dual Process Perspective
Mukherjee, Kanchan (INSEAD)

(43) Less is Worse Than None, But Less Chance is Better Than No Chance -- A Stochastic Ultimatum Game Study
Gong, Min (University of Pennsylvania); Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania); Kunreuther, Howard (University of Pennsylvania)

(44) The Relationships among Weather, Mood and the Expectation of Stock Returns in China
Shaojun Xu (xushaojun@zju.edu.cn); Nenggan Zheng (suyanxu_2007@hotmail.com); Xuejun Jin (ceec_jxj@zju.edu.cn)

(45) Individual and Social Decision Making in Finance: The Role of Heuristics and Advice-Taking Strategy
Monti, Marco (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Gigenerzer, Gerd (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Berg, Nathan (University of Texas-Dallas)

(46) Effects of Framing and Threat on Cheating in Economic Games
Atanasov, Pavel (University of Pennsylvania); Dana, Jason (University of Pennsylvania)

(47) Comparison Process at Retrieval (CPR): A memory theoretic account of relative judgment.
Fan, Jeni (University of Oklahoma); Thomas, Rick P. (University of Oklahoma)

(48) How the other person's characteristics influence prosocial and proself proposers in the ultimatum and dictator games
Hardman, David (London Metropolitan University)

(49) How much for your honesty? The role of values and incentives in determining honest behavior
Tanner, Carmen (Department of Psychology, University of Zurich); Gibson, Rajna (Swiss Banking Institute, University of Zurich); Wagner, Alexander (Swiss Banking Institute, University of Zurich); Berkowitsch, Nicolas (Department of Psychology, University of Zurich)

(50) Generalized expectations and situational risk in the trust game
Evans, Anthony M. (Brown University); Krueger, Joachim I. (Brown University)

(51) How much do we care for others living in distant places and times?
Kishimoto, Atsuo (AIST, Japan); Tsuge, Takahiro (Konan University); Takeuchi, Kenji (Kobe University)

(52) Deciding Under the Influence: the Impact of Intoxication on Ultimatum Game Behavior
Krishnamurti, Tamar (Carnegie Mellon University); Carey Morewedge (Carnegie Mellon University); Dan Ariely (Duke University)

(53) Economics and Greed
Murnighan, J. Keith (Northwestern University); Wang, Long (Northwestern University)

(54) Peak Impact: Financial risk perception and the peak of the return distribution
Summers, Barbara (Leeds University Business School); Duxbury, Darren (Leeds University Business School)
(55) When Equality Trumps Reciprocity: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Xiao, Erte (Carnegie Mellon University); Bicchieri, Cristina (University of Pennsylvania)

(56) Nudging Cooperation in a Public Goods Game: When Self-Control Matters
Myrseth, Kristian Ove Richter (University of Chicago GSB); Conny Wollbrant (University of Gothenburg); Peter Martinsson (University of Gothenburg)

(57) Perceived Closeness to One's Future Self and Intertemporal Allocation Decisions
Milch, Kerry F. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University); Higgins, E. Tory (Columbia University)

(58) Choice in the eye of the beholder: Modeling intention with attention
Raab, Markus (German Sport University, Institute of Psychology); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University, Oxford, OH, Department of Psychology)

(59) Choice in the eye of the beholder: Modeling intention with attention
Raab, Markus (German Sport University, Institute of Psychology); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University, Oxford, OH, Department of Psychology)

(60) Identifying the cause of distal events
Young, Michael E. (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale); Nguyen, Nam (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale)

(61) Size Matters: Set Size and Accessibility Effects in Consideration Sets
Sinha, Jayati (University of Iowa); Nayakankuppam, Dhananjay (University of Iowa); Priester, Joseph R. (University of Southern California)

(62) Choosing how many options to choose from: Is there such a thing as a desired-set-size?
Hafenbraedl, Sebastian (HEC Lausanne); Hoffrage, Ulrich (HEC Lausanne)

(63) Making Repeated Choices: A Dual-Step Process
Luan, Shenghua (Singapore Management University); Yu, Shuli (Singapore Management University)

(64) MySimon Sez: Reducing Inaction Inertia via Online Shopping Agents
Andrews, Demetra (University of Houston)

(65) Effective Cost Based Choice
Zhang, Charles Y. Z. (University of Michigan); Schwarz, Norbert (University of Michigan)

(66) Fear of Contamination Goal and Life-stage Specific Biases
Huang, Julie Y. (Yale); Bargh, J.A. (Yale)

(67) Boundary conditions for selecting default values
Crow, Janis J. (Ohio State University)

(68) Modeling the joint effects of description and experience on impression formation and decision making.
Phillips, Nathaniel D. (Ohio University)

(69) Dueling Aspects of the Self as Determinants of Support for War
Finnel, Stephanie (University of Pennsylvania); Reed, Americus (University of Pennsylvania); Aquino, Karl (University of British Columbia); Thau, Stefan (London Business School)

(70) A Dynamic and Stochastic Choice Model for Risk Seeking Behavior
Harman, Jason L. (Ohio University); González Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University); Vancouver, Jeffrey B. (Ohio University); Weinhardt, Justin M. (Ohio University)

(71) Now or later? Query theory explains asymmetric discounting for both gains and losses
Appelt, Kirstin C. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

(72) Search in long-term semantic memory
Hills, Thomas (University of Basel); Todd, Peter (Indiana University); Jones, Michael (Indiana University)

(73) Relative and Absolute Decisions in Eyewitness Identification, Similarity, and Preference
Rush, Ryan (University of California, Riverside); Clark, Steven E (University of California, Riverside)

(74) Probative Value of Absolute and Relative Decision Rules
Breneman, Jesse S. (University of California, Riverside); Clark, Steven E. (University of California, Riverside)

(75) Incorporating Complexities into the Explanation of Decision Making: Strategies and Simulations
Decker, Nathaniel K. (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)

(76) Thinking About Uncertainty: Deliberation in the Uncertainty Effect
Chiu, Andrew G. (University of Chicago GSB); White, Rebecca J. (University of Chicago GSB); Wu, George (University of Chicago GSB)

(77) Using an expert when using the expert is harmful
Sutherland, Steven (SIU-Carbondale); young, Michael (SIU-Carbondale)

(78) Framing frames: An exploration of risk tolerance in broad and narrow choice brackets
Moher, Ester (University of Waterloo); Koehler, Derek J. (University of Waterloo)

(79) Correspondence Bias in Performance Evaluation and the Benefits of Having Been Graded Leniently
Moore, Don A (Carnegie Mellon University); Swift, Samuel A (Carnegie Mellon University); Sharek, Zachariah S. (Carnegie Mellon University); Gino, Francesca (Carnegie Mellon University)

(80) Recognition heuristic and knowledge based inference: Unified explanation with the familiarity for objects
Honda, Hidehito (Tokyo Institute of Technology); Yamagishi, Kimihiko (Tokyo Institute of Technology); Abe, Keiga (Aoyama Gakuin University)

(81) Adaptive Decision Making Across the Lifespan: An Examination of Risky Decision Making From Ages 5 to 85
Weller, Joshua (Decision Research); Levin, Irwin (U of Iowa); Denburg, Natalie (U of Iowa); Bossard, Elaine (U of Iowa)

(82) A single-trial delay discounting measure, and its association with impulsivity, demographics and behavior
Reimers, Stian (University College London)

(83) Individual differences in the impact of anecdotal evidence on medical treatment choice
Hulsey, Lukas (Wichita State University); Shaffer, Victoria A. (Wichita State University)

(84) Comparing individual and group level parameters of choice models
Broormell, Stephen B. (University of Illinois); Budescu, David V. (University of Illinois)

(85) The Role of Response Inhibition in Action Selection During Risky Decision Making
Wershbale, Avishai (Michigan State University); Pleskac, Timothy J. (Michigan State University)

(86) The value of waiting and receiving in intertemporal choice
Cokely, Edward T. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Stevens, Jeffery R. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Read, Daniel (Durham University); Frederick, Shane (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

(87) Creation and Deployment of a Computer-Based Decision Making Experiment: Making it Easy & Inexpensive
Westfall, Jonathan E. (The University of Toledo)

(88) Accountability and Willingness to Make Hard Calls
Han, Seunghee (Carnegie Mellon University); Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard Kennedy School)

(89) Actor-Observer Differences in Preference Inferences Based on Choices
Steffel, Mary (Princeton University); Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (Princeton University)

(90) Why do people take risks differently from leisure to work?: The role of regulatory focus and perspectives in the reflection effect
Hur, Taekyun (Korea Univ); Ahn, Sowon (Korea Univ); Namkoong, Jae Eun (Korea Univ); Park, Yulwoo (Korea Univ)

(91) Dating under the influence: the role of cognitive vs. hedonic judgments in risky behavior
Krishnamurti, Tamar (Carnegie Mellon University); Downs, Julie (Carnegie Mellon University)

(92) March Madness... or Is It? Training Effects on Predictions and Confidence
Cullen, Kristin L. (Auburn University); Lester, Houston F. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University); Svyantek, Daniel J. (Auburn University)

(93) Prospect Theory describes, but does not explain, Decisions from Experience
Ungemach, Christoph (University of Warwick); Stewart, Neil (University of Warwick)
(94) Learning to win: An analysis of retrospective evaluations and dynamic behavior in a multi-armed bandit problem
Yu, Erica C. (University College London); Lagnado, David A. (University College London); Chater, Nick (University College London)

(95) Moral Judgments and Cognitive Focus: A Mediation Model
Drwecki, Brian (University of Wisconsin-Madison); Kortenkamp, Katherine (University of Wisconsin-Madison); Moore, Colleen (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

(96) The construction of "good gestalt" in decision making
Ostermann, Tanja (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

(97) When Healthy Food Makes You Hungry
Finkelstein, Stacey R (University of Chicago, GSB); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago, GSB)

(98) The effect of low and high blood sugar level on Unconscious Thought
Bos, Maarten W. (Radboud University Nijmegen); Dijksterhuis, Ap (Radboud University Nijmegen); van Baaren, Rick B. (Radboud University Nijmegen)

(99) Inclusion versus Exclusion: The Effect of Perceived Uncertainty on Screening Strategies
Ganesh Pillai, Rajani (University of Central Florida); He, Xin (University of Central Florida); Echambadi, Raj (University of Central Florida)

(100) Online Purchase Decisions: How Much Influence on Information Display Do Consumers Desire?
Reisen, Nils (University of Lausanne, Faculty of Business and Economics); Hoffrage, Ulrich (University of Lausanne, Faculty of Business and Economics)

(101) Top 10 or Top 9?: The Influence of Category Floor Fluency on Consumer Preference
Isaac, Mathew S. (Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management)

(102) Privileging Innate Over Learned Ability in Perceptions of Achievement
Tsay, Chia-Jung (Harvard University); Banaji, Mahzarin (Harvard University)

(103) Pulling up or pushing down? Exploring pro-leader and anti-trailer information processing in multi-option consumer choices
Blanchard, Simon J. (Pennsylvania State University); Meloy, Margaret G. (Pennsylvania State University); Carlson, Kurt A. (Duke University)

(104) “Fifty-six percent of people believe Diet Pepsi tastes more like real cola”: Do numbers matter in product claims?
Sagara, Namika (University of Oregon, Decision Research); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research, University of Oregon)

(105) Vanilla or Mango: Existential Anxiety, Structure, and Novelty Seeking
Williams, Todd (Grand Valley State University); Usta, Murat (University of Alberta); Haubl, Gerald (University of Alberta); Schimel, Jeff (University of Alberta)

(106) Communicating Statistics: Are Common Language Effect Sizes Really Easier to Understand?
Dalal, Dev K. (Bowling Green State University); Nolan, Kevin P. (Bowling Green State University); Yankelevich, Maya (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University)

(107) Biases and Patterns in Consumers’ Estimates of Product Health and Safety Risks
Feng, Tianjun (Fudan University); Keller, L. Robin (Univ. of California, Irvine); Wang, Liangyan (Shanghai Jiaotong University)

(108) Taboo Trade-offs in Death Care Decisions
Davis, Derick F. (University of Colorado - Boulder); McGraw, A. Peter (University of Colorado - Boulder)

(109) When I’ll have what she’s having: Uncertainty moderates the effects of social influence on decision-making
Huh, Young Eun (Carnegie Mellon University); Vosgerau, Joachim (Carnegie Mellon University); Morewedge, Carey K. (Carnegie Mellon University)

(110) Pricing Out Environmental Outcomes Yields Lower Discount Rates
Hardisty, David (Columbia); Weber, Elke (Columbia)

(111) A Life Stage Model of Climate Change Related Perceptions and Attitudes
Soane, Emma (Kingston University); Rebecca Lunn (University of Strathclyde)
Session #2 with Cash Bar (Sunday, 5:15- 7:15pm, Northwest Hall)

(1) Cholera: Death and Decision-Making in the Victorian Era
Fortey, Nicholas (Graduate Student Oregon State University)

(2) The hot hand phenomenon as a cognitive adaptation to clumped resources
Wilke, Andreas (UCLA Anthropology); Barrett, H. Clark (UCLA Anthropology)

(3) MorialDM: A Computational Model of Moral Decision-Making
Dehghani, Morteza (Northwestern University); Tomai, Emmett (Northwestern University); Forbus, Ken (Northwestern University); Iliev, Rumen (Northwestern University); Klenk, Matthew (Northwestern University)

(4) Cross-Cultural Differences in Financial Risk Taking
Egan, Daniel (Barclays Wealth)

(5) Memories for Generated Emotional Information
Mojardin-H., Ambrocio (Universidad Autonoma de Sinaloa, MX); Velazquez-Cardenas, Jose (Universidad Autonoma de Sinaloa)

(6) Reverse engineering and its problems: Separating decision strategies based on their outcomes
Woike, Jan K. (HEC, University of Lausanne); Hoffrage, Ulrich (HEC, University of Lausanne); Hertwig, Ralph (Department of Psychology, University of Basle)

(7) Leadership of Risk Decision Making in a Complex Technology Organization
Flaming, Susan (Boeing Satellite Development Center)

(8) LIFE REALLY IS NASTY, BRUTISH, AND SHORT – AND NO ONE IS HAPPY ABOUT IT
Anik, Lalin (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School); Aknin, Lara B. (University of British Columbia); Dunn, Elizabeth W. (University of British Columbia)

(9) Decision Analysis Using Geographic Information Systems
Simon, Jay (University of California, Irvine); Keller, L. Robin (University of California, Irvine); Kirkwood, Craig (Arizona State University)

(10) Individual and collective intuition in managerial forecasting: Evidence from the music industry
Seifert, Matthias (University of Cambridge, Judge Business School)

Diecidue, Enrico (INSEAD); La-ornual, Dolchui (INSEAD)

(12) Decisions from experience: Sampling vs. observation of sampling
Haberstroh, Susanne (University of Osnabrück, Germany); Oeberst, Aileen (University of Osnabrück, Germany)

(13) Failing to Account for Gas Costs in Driving Decisions
Feiler, Daniel C. (Duke University); Soll, Jack B. (Duke University)

(14) Can Quick Closure to Judgment Ever Be Helpful?
Kajdasz, James (Ohio State University)

(15) The Simultaneous Use of Multiple Reference Points in Risky Decision Making
Koop, Gregory J (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G (Miami University)

(16) Surer but not Smarter: Cue Learning and Unconscious Thought
Yeomans, Mike (University of Waterloo); Koehler, Derek (University of Waterloo)

(17) Eating to Even: How Retail and Sunk Costs Influence the Consumption of Bulk Goods
Litvak, Paul M. (Carnegie Mellon University); Morewedge, Carey K. (Carnegie Mellon University)

(18) Money Matters in the Ultimatum Game: The Effects of Feedback and Framing on Proposer Offers
Bruce, Leonidas L. (Auburn University); Montano, Michael J. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University); Edwards, Bryan D. (Auburn University)

(19) The Positive Time Order Error and its Relationship with Memory
Waldum, Emily (University of North Carolina - Greensboro); Sahakyan, Lili (University of North Carolina - Greensboro)

(20) Criminal Minds: Take-the-Best in Expert-Novice Decision Making in Residential Burglary
Garcia-Retamero, Rocío (University of Granada (Spain)); Dhami, Mandep K. ((University of Cambridge, United Kingdom))

(21) Individual Differences on the Perception of Randomness
Gomez, Laura I. (University of Texas at El Paso); de Moor, Anke (University of Texas at El Paso); Morera, Osvaldo F. (University of Texas at El Paso)

(22) Evidence Use in Teacher Performance Evaluation
Templin, Sara (Georgia Center for Assessment, University of Georgia); Recesso, Art (Learning & Performance Support Laboratory, University of Ga’); Segall, Matt (University of Georgia); Cavanagh, Sarah (University of Georgia)

(23) Judging performance in gymnastics: Intuitive physics or movement-related knowledge?
Heinen, Thomas (German Sport University of Cologne); Pizzera, Alexandra (German Sport University of Cologne); Velentzas, Konstantinos (German Sport University of Cologne)

(24) Older adults and the adaptive use of strategies
Karlsson, Linnea (Max planck institute for human development); Cokely, Edward (Max planck institute for human development)

(25) Information search and cognitive representation in risky decision making: The Advantages first principle.
Huber, Odilo W. (University of Fribourg); Huber, Oswald (University of Fribourg); Bär, Arlette S. (University of Fribourg)

(26) Reinforcement learning capturing causal judgments
Karlsson, Linnea (Max planck institute for human development); Rieskamp, Jörg (Max planck institute for human development)

(27) Harnessing local endogenous evidence to global exogenous evidence
Hay, M. Cameron (Miami University); Weisner, Thomas S. (UCLA); Lieber, Eli (UCLA); Subramanian, Saskia (UCLA); Kravitz, Richard L. (UC-Davis); Duan, Naihua

(28) The quest for a theoretical understanding of decision aid neglect: Perspectives from identity theory and attribution theory
Sleesman, Dustin J. (Michigan State University)

(29) Two routes to inferring that others share your moral and nonmoral beliefs: Egocentric projection and the perceived objectivity of belief
Goodwin, Geoffrey P. (Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania); Bartels, Daniel M. (Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago)

(30) A Factor Analysis of Gambling, Risk, and Framing: A Fuzzy-trace Theory Approach
Estrada, Steven M (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie F (Cornell University); DeMarinis, Jessica A (Cornell University); Myers, Regina M (Cornell University); Stanisz, Janine, M (Cornell University)

(31) Sound decisions: Ambient noise frequency affects risky-choice framing
Gallagher, Patrick (Duke University)

(32) The Effect of Feedback Timing on Pre-Performance Optimism
Kettle, Keri (University of Alberta); Häubl, Gerald (University of Alberta)

(33) Informed and (Mostly) Unbiased: Knowledge Negates Effects of Detailed Disjunctions
Kramer, Karen M. (University of Kansas School of Medicine - Wichita)

(34) Paying for Someone Else’s Mistake: How Bystander Negligence Influences Perpetrator Blame
Critcher, Clayton R. (Cornell University); Pizarro, David A. (Cornell University)

(35) Out Of The Bioethicists’ Box: How Do Lay People Value Life?
Li, Meng (Rutgers University); Vietri, Jeffery (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)

(36) Statistical judgments incorporate variance data when presented in a supportive context
Obrecht, Natalie (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)

(37) Are people less willing to play with their lives than with their money? How purpose and decision domain influence choices
Gavaruzzi, Teresa (DPSS - University of Padova); Rubaltelli, Enrico (DPSS - University of Padova); Manfrinati, Andrea (Faculty of Psychology - University of Valle d’Aosta); Lotto, Lorella (DPSS - University of Padova)
(38) Goals, Performance, and Satisfaction in Marathon Running
White, Rebecca (University of Chicago); Wu, George (University of Chicago); Markle, Alex (New York University); Sackett, Aaron (University of Chicago)

(39) Nationalistic duty and support of policies that are admittedly worse
Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania); Greene, Joshua (Harvard University); Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew University)

(40) What Dyads Think About When Controlling Risks
Mukherjee, Moumita (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)

(41) Reducing the influence of Cognitive Biases in Group Decision-Making: An Application of the Bayesian Truth Serum
Weiss, Rebecca (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Prelec, Drazen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

(42) Frames in Context: Comparing Technology-Mediated and Face-to-Face Group Decisions
Mukherjee, Moumita (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)

(43) The Illusion of Political Sophistication: Why and How Voters Experience an Illusion of Explanatory Depth
Alter, Adam L. (Princeton University); Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (Princeton University); Zemla, Jeffrey C. (Princeton University)

(44) Source Bias In Occupational Prestige Judgments
Daniels, Michael (Bowling Green State University); Nolan, Kevin (Bowling Green State University); Highhouse, Scott (Bowling Green State University)

(45) What we expect before we fail: Overly pessimistic expectations about how others see one's possible failure in the future
Kudo, Eriko (Tokyo Woman's Christian University)

(46) Learning order affects the use of cues in memory based multi-attribute decisions
Renkewitz, Frank (University of Erfurt); Jahn, Georg (University of Greifswald); Betsch, Cornelia (University of Erfurt)

(47) The effects of decision-making styles on anchoring and adjustment
de Moor, Anke (UTEP); Guillon-Gomez, Laura (UTEP); Morera, Osvaldo F. (UTEP)

(48) fMRI Study of Rational versus Irrational Choices on a Ratio Bias Task
Krawczyk, Daniel (University of Texas at Dallas); Levine, Daniel S. (University of Texas at Arlington); Ramirez, Patrick A. (University of Texas at Arlington); Togun, Ifeoluwa (University of Texas at Arlington); Robinson, Rebecca (University of Texas at Arlington)

(49) Individual Differences in Counterfactual Production
Jasper, J.D. (University of Toledo); Barry, Kyle (University of Toledo); Christman, Stephen D. (University of Toledo)

(50) Patient teenagers?: A comparison of the sexual behavior of virginity pledgers and matched non-pledgers
Rosenbaum, Janet E (Johns Hopkins STD Center)

(51) Withdrawn

(52) Asymmetry in Moral Blame and Perceived Causality for Actions and Omissions as External and Internal Causes
Meng, Christina (University of Wisconsin-Madison); Moore, Colleen (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

(53) Entrepreneurial over-entry? The perceived costs (and benefits) of entrepreneurial errors.
Sackett, Aaron M. (University of Chicago); Sheldon, Oliver J. (University of Chicago)

(54) ON THE DETERMINANTS OF THE CONJUNCTION FALLACY: PROBABILITY VS. CONFIRMATION
Tentori, katya (University of Trento); Crupi, Vincenzo (IUAV); Russo, Selena (University of Trento)

(55) Hindsight Bias Contributions to Overconfidence in Judgment Accuracy
Yates, J. Frank (University of Michigan); Dries, Elizabeth (University of Michigan); Jackson, Samuel R. (University of Michigan); Mattise, Nicole (University of Michigan)

(56) Anchoring Effects with Complete Information: Numeric Anchors Influence Answers to Math Equations
Smith, Andrew R. (University of Iowa); Windschitl, Paul D. (University of Iowa)

(57) Measures of Indecisiveness: Evidence of Convergent Validity
Chiu, Poyee (Rutgers, State University of New Jersey); Fagley, Nancy (Rutgers, State University of New Jersey)
(58) Individual Differences in Handedness: Comparing Adaptive Risky Decision Making in Children and Adults
Bossard, Elaine A. (University of Iowa); Levin, Irwin P. (University of Iowa); Jasper, John D. (University of Toledo); Christman, Stephen D. (University of Toledo)

(59) Pathological Gambling and Sensation Seeking: A Closer Look at the Subscales of the SSS-V
Littler, Erica E. (University of Georgia); Goodie, Adam S. (University of Georgia)

(60) Tendency to Seek Advice: An item and scale analysis
Pui, Shuang-Yueh (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University)

(61) Executive Functions in Decision Making
Del Missier, Fabio (University of Trieste); Mäntylä, Timo (Umeå University); Visentini, Mimi (University of Trieste)

(62) Social Value Orientation as a Moral Intuition: Decision-Making in the Dictator Game
Cornelissen, Gert (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona); Dewit, Siegfried (Catholic University Leuven, Belgium); Warlop, Luk (Catholic University Leuven, Belgium)

(63) Predicitng Moral Judgments and Folk Intuitions: Evidence from Metaphysics, Metaethics, and Theory-of-Mind
Feltz, Adam (Florida State University); Cokely, Edward T. (Max Planck Institute for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition)

(64) Effect of perceived social distributions on subjective well-being
Galesic, Mirta (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Rieskamp, Joerg (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Olsson, Henrik (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

(65) I'll Have What She's Having: The Nomological Net of Indecisiveness
Alexander, Katherine N. (Bowling Green State University); Daniels, Michael A. (Bowling Green State University); Diab, Dalia L. (Bowling Green State University); Pui, Shuang Y. (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University)

(66) Sequential decision making in a healthy and a clinical depressed sample
von Helversen, Bettina (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Wilke, Andreas (University of California, Los Angeles); Johnson, Tim (Stanford University); Schmid, Gabriele (Charité); Klapp, Burghard (Charité)

(67) Resolving ethical dilemmas: More evidence for between-subjects variability in moral principles selection/preferences
Blais, Ann-Renee (Defence R& D Canada Toronto); Thompson, Megan M. (Defence R& D Canada Toronto)

(68) When the role fits: Regulatory fit in negotiations
Appelt, Kirstin C. (Columbia University); Higgins, E. Tory (Columbia University)

(69) When competition breeds equality: Effects of appetitive versus aversive competition in negotiation
ten Velden, Femke S. (University of Amsterdam); Beersma, Bianca (University of Amsterdam); De Dreu, Carsten K. W. (University of Amsterdam)

(70) Correlates of a Scale of Numeracy
Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University); Pui, Shuang-Yueh (Bowling Green State University)

(71) Age differences in effects of the replayed images of one's own risky actions on self-understanding of those risks
Inaba, Midori (University of Electro-Communications); Tanaka, Kenji (University of Electro-Communications)

(72) Jekyll and Hyde Meet Task Switching: The Influence of Perceived Threat on Task Switching
Siegel, Eric (University of Maryland, College Park); Curtis, Ryan (University of Maryland, College Park); Dougherty, Michael (University of Maryland, College Park)

(73) Reexamining the white-male effect: The mediating role of cognitive skill in the judged probability
Dougherty, Michael (University of Maryland); Hanges, Paul (University of Maryland)

(74) Implicit race bias influences estimations of trustworthiness
Stanley, Damian (New York University); Sokol-Hessner, Peter (New York University); Perino, Michael (New York University); Banaji, Mahzarin (Harvard University); Phelps, Elizabeth (New York University)

(75) Individual Differences in Working Memory Capacity: How does cognitive load affect decision making?
Montañó, Michael J. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University)
(76) INFORMED DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE: WHAT IS IT AND DOES IT LEAD TO BETTER DECISIONS
Timmermans, Danielle (VU university Medical Center); Van den Berg, Matthijs (VU University Medical Center)

(77) Medical Decision Making for Today and for the Future: A Taxonomy of Shared Medical Decisions
Austin, Laurel C. (Copenhagen Business School)

(78) The "Understanding it Makes it Normal" Effect In Judgments of the Need for Psychological Treatment
Kim, Nancy S. (Northeastern University); LoSavio, Stefanie (Northeastern University)

(79) Framing the ward: communication biases in the medical domain
Lucchiarì, Claudio (University of Milan); Pravettoni, Gabriella (University of Milan)

(80) Medical residents fail to recognize relevant co morbidity while focusing on the principle diagnosis
Zwaan, Laura (EMGO Institute/ VUmc, Amsterdam); Timmermans, Danielle R.M. (EMGO Institute/ VUmc, Amsterdam); Thijs, Abel (Dept. of internal medicine, VU Medical Center, Amsterdam); Wagner, Cordula (EMGO Institute/ VUmc, Amsterdam and NIVEL, Utrecht)

(81) Zero-risk tolerance and "risk acceptance" of four different medical activities: delivery vs. treatment
Hirahara, Norimichi (Tokyo Institute of Technology); Yamagishi, Kimihiko (Tokyo Institute of Technology); Wada, Chihiro (Keio University)

(82) How clinicians use research findings to guide clinical practice: Statistical reasoning
Suarez, Marta T. (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen B. (Rutgers University)

(83) Memory is the harshest critic: How atypical memories influence serial judgment
Davis, Alexander L. (Carnegie Mellon University); Morewedged, Carey, K. (Carnegie Mellon University); Bruine de Bruin, Wandi (Carnegie Mellon University)

(84) Are Within-Subjects Designs "Transparent"?
Lambdin, Charles (Wichita State University); Shaffer, Victoria (Wichita State University)

(85) Evaluating an Indecisiveness Scale Using Two Psychometric Frameworks
Diab, Dalia L. (Bowling Green State University)

(86) Wrong but funny: The absurdity of moral violations
Warren, Caleb (UC Boulder); McGraw, A. Peter (UC Boulder)

(87) Do as I say not as I do: Factors influencing moral hypocrisy
Clark, Brian A. (Wake Forest University); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest University)

(88) In search for an "alibi". The role of justification in moral judgment
Manfrinati, Andrea (University of Valle d'Aosta); Rubaltelli, Enrico (University of Padova); Mazzocco, Ketti (University of Trento); Lotto, Lorella (University of Padova); Rumiati, Rino (University of Padova)

(89) The Role of Causality in Moral Dilemmas
Iliev, Rumen (Northwestern University); Sachdeva, Sonya (Northwestern University)

(90) Perceptual judgement by either an actor or an observer are more accurate than the movement itself
Hohmann, Tanja (German Sport University Cologne); Munzert, Jörn (University of Gießen)

(91) Loss aversion in contrastive explanations
Heussen, Daniel (City University, London); Belardi, Sophie (City University, London); Kusev, Petko (City University, London)

(92) Retrospective Bias in Everyday Decisions
Kramer, Adam D. I. (University of Oregon); Hodges, Sara D. (University of Oregon)

(93) Negotiating Trust: The Consequences of Cross-cultural Assumptions About Trust in Negotiation
Gunia, Brian (Northwestern University); Brett, Jeanne (Northwestern University); Kamdar, Dishan (Indian School of Business)
(95) Team Negotiation: Exploring the Consequences of Sub-Group Conflict
Halevy, Nir  (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem )

(96) Negotiating under changing circumstances: motivated interpersonal evaluations
Ramirez-Marin, Jimena Y  (University of Seville);  Steinel, Wolfgang (Leiden University); Medina, Francisco J.  (University of Seville)

(97) Avoiding Moral Temptation - People Pay to Walk Away
Shalvi, Shaul (University of Amsterdam); Handgraaf, Michel J. J.  (University of Amsterdam); De Dreu, Carsten K.W. (University of Amsterdam)

(98) The Crying of the Lamb: When and Why Sadness Expression Helps Claim Value in Negotiations
Sinaceur, Marwan  (INSEAD); Kopelman, Shirli (University of Michigan)

(99) When fair is unfair and when unfair is fair: halo effects in perceptions of organizational justice over time
Bashshur, Michael (Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Cojuharenco, Irina (Universidade Catolica Portuguesa)

(100) The Intersection of Cognitive, Affective, and Moral Influences: Couple Choice Surrounding Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
Hershberger, Patricia E. (University of Illinois at Chicago); Pierce, Penny F. (University of Michigan)

(101) Lay Beliefs About the Evaluation of Policies to Address Global Warming
Huber, Michaela  (University of Colorado, Boulder); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado, Boulder); Morris, Joshua A.  (University of Colorado, Boulder)

(102) Revenge versus Social Justice
Szymanska, Ewa (University of Pennsylvania); Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania); Kurzban, Robert (University of Pennsylvania)

(103) Regret from a process perspective
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Michael (University of Bergen); Böhm, Gisela (University of Bergen); Zeelenberg, Marcel (University of Tilburg)

(104) Understanding Risk: How Comparison Changes Probability Representation
Bloomfield, Amber N. (DePaul University); Choplin, Jessica M. (DePaul University)

(105) Cognitive Foundations of Risk Perception and Risk-Seeking Behavior
Hussey, Erika K. (University of Maryland); Dougherty, Michael R. (University of Maryland)

(106) Risky Behaviors and Attitudes about Risk in Soldiers
Kelley, Amanda M. (US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory); Dretsch, Michael (US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory); Killgore, William D. S. (Walter Reed Army Institute of Research); Athy, Jeremy  (US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory)

(107) Siting decisions - Siting conflicts
Szanto, Richard (Corvinus University of Budapest)

(108) Effect of age and gender on domain-specific risk taking: Risk perceptions and perceived-risk attitudes
Qian, Jing (Columbia U); Weber, Elke (Columbia U)

(109) Four Anomalies of Numerical Risk Perception
Mayes, Ryan S. (The Ohio State University); Arkes, Hal R. (The Ohio State University)

(110) Judgment and the Termination of Memory Search
Harbison, J. Isaiah (University of Maryland); Dougherty, Michael R. (University of Maryland)

(111) Perceptions of Uncertain and Unethical Environmental Risks
Kortenkamp, Katherine V. (University of Wisconsin, Madison); Moore, Colleen F. (University of Wisconsin, Madison)

(112) People Believe That They Are Prototypical, Not Above-Average
Roy, Michael (Elizabethtown College); Liersch, Michael (Stern (NYU))

(113) Framed Rationality: Universality of the Subjective Expected Utility Model
Lai, Shih-Kung (Department of Urban Planning, National Cheng Kung University); Tsai, Li-Hung (Department of Urban Planning, National Cheng Kung University)

(114) College Smokers' Estimates of their Probabilities of Remaining a Smoker in the Near Future
Lipkus, Isaac M (Duke University Medical Center); Shepperd, James (University of Florida, Gainesville)

(115) Influence of peer feedback on risk-taking
Mitchell, Suzanne H. (Oregon Health & Science University)

(116) Unpacking the Relationship Between Judgments and Working Memory
Tomlinson, Tracy, D. (University of Maryland); Harbison, Isaiah (University of Maryland); Sprenger, Amber (Johns Hopkins University); Dougherty, Michael, R. (University of Maryland)

(117) Decision making under time pressure: a prospect theory analysis
Young, Diana L. (University of Georgia); Goodie, Adam S. (University of Georgia)

(118) Teaching Brunswik's Lens Model
Rude, Dale E. (U of Houston); Epstein, David (U of Houston)

Demonstrations by the organizers and participants in the Computer techniques in decision research symposium will also be provided during this poster session.