

Society for Judgment and Decision Making The 2007 28th Annual Conference



The Westin Long Beach, Long Beach, CA November 16-19, 2007 Preliminary Program (October 25, 2007)

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2007 Program Committee: George Wu (Chair), Melissa Finucane, Craig McKenzie, Ellen Peters, Rebecca Ratner, Yuval Rottenstreich, Alan Schwartz, and Gal Zauberan. Special thanks to Julie Downs who was instrumental in helping develop the conference program.

2007 SJDM Conference Master Schedule
The Westin Long Beach, Long Beach, CA
November 16-19, 2007

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16

Psychonomics J/DM Sessions (See page 4 of this program and the Psychonomics program for details)

Brunswik Society Meetings (See page 4 of this program for details)

5:00-7:00 pm **JDM Welcome Reception / Early Registration** Tokyo/Vancouver rooms, Westin Hotel, Third Level
 7:00-9:00 pm **Executive Board Dinner** Utopia Restaurant, 445 East 1st Street

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17

7:30-8:30 am **Registration** and Continental Breakfast Centennial Foyer, Westin Hotel, Third Level
 8:30-10:00 am **Paper Session #1** Centennial Ballroom, Salons A, C, and D
 10:00-10:30 am Morning Coffee Break Centennial Foyer
 10:30-12:00 am **Paper Session #2** Centennial Ballroom, Salons A, C, and D
 12:00-1:30 pm Lunch Break (on your own)
 1:30-2:30 pm **Keynote Address: Michael Shermer** Centennial Ballroom, Salon B
 2:45-4:15 pm **Paper Session #3** Centennial Ballroom, Salons A, C, and D
 4:15-4:45 pm Afternoon Coffee Break Centennial Foyer
 4:45-6:15 pm **Paper Session #4** Centennial Ballroom, Salons A, C, and D
 6:15-8:15 pm Graduate Student Social Event Centennial Foyer

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 18

8:30-10:30 pm **Poster Session #1** w/ Continental Breakfast Long Beach Convention Center, Grand Ballroom*
 10:30-12:00 pm **Paper Session #5** Centennial Ballroom, Westin Hotel, Salons B, C, and D
 (Note: Track A is in Salon B instead of Salon A)
 12:00-1:30 pm **Women in SJDM Networking Event** Centennial Ballroom, Salon A
 12:00-1:30 pm Lunch Break (on your own)
 1:30-2:30 pm **Keynote Address: Peter Ubel** Centennial Ballroom, Salon B
 2:45-4:15 pm **Paper Session #6** Centennial Ballroom, Salons A, C, and D
 4:15-4:45 pm Afternoon Coffee Break Centennial Foyer
 4:45-5:15 pm **Einhorn Award** Centennial Ballroom, Salon B
 5:15-7:15 pm **Poster Session #2** & Cash Bar Long Beach Convention Center, Grand Ballroom*
 9:00 pm-2:00 am SJDM Evening Social Event Cohiba Nightclub & Lounge
 110 E. Broadway, Long Beach, CA. 90802

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19

8:00-8:45 **Business Meeting** w/ Continental Breakfast Centennial Ballroom, Salon B
 8:45-10:15 **Paper Session #7** Centennial Ballroom, Salons A, C, and D
 10:15-10:30 Morning Coffee Break Centennial Foyer
 10:30-12:00 **Paper Session #8** Centennial Ballroom, Salons A, C, and D
 12:00-1:30 **Presidential Luncheon** Centennial Ballroom, Salon B
Student Poster Awards
Presidential Address by Jonathan Baron

* Directions to Convention Center: Exit hotel and make a right heading down Ocean Blvd. At the second stop light (Promenade walkway), cross Ocean Blvd and follow the Promenade to the Convention Center.

2007 SJDM Conference Paper Session

**(A) Individual Decision Making
Centennial Ballroom, Salon A**

**(B) Affective, Social, and Self-Judgments
Centennial Ballroom, Salon C**

**(C) Judgment
Centennial Ballroom, Salon D**

SATURDAY	SESSION #1	<u>Symposium: Decision under Climate Uncer...</u>	<u>Self-predictions</u>	<u>Weighing Information</u>
	8:30	See page 7 of the program for details	Massey-It's a Brand New Day: Motivated Reasoning...	Marks-The Ability to Disregard Knowledge: A Ment...
	8:50		Koehler-The Price of Good Intentions	Brenner-Preference, consensus and unpacking: Sup...
	9:10		White -Self-predictions of investment decisions ...	Alter-Effects of Fluency on Psychological Distan...
	9:30		Hanko-On once and future things: A temporal asym...	Shah-Easy does it: The role of fluency in cue we...
	SESSION #2	<u>Risky decision making</u>	<u>Understanding happiness and pain</u>	<u>Anchoring and Adjustment Processes</u>
	10:30	Levin-Tracking the Developmental Trajectory of R...	Hsee-Wealth, warmth and wellbeing	Kusev-The first-run effect: How temporal sequenc...
	10:50	Schneider-Fundamental Advantage of Dynamic Exp...	Nicolao-Happiness for Sale: Do Experiential or M...	Mochon-Big raccoons and small giraffes: Anchorin...
	11:10	Bleichrodt- A Tractable Method to Measure Utilit...	Miron-Shatz-Memories of yesterday's emotions: Be...	Critcher-Incidental environmental anchoring
	11:30	Ert-Loss Aversion in Decisions under Risk and th...	Olivola-The "Martyrdom Effect": When the Promise...	Liersch-When do implausible anchors influence ju...
SESSION #3	<u>Mental Accounting and Losses</u>	<u>Symposium: Dishonesty of "Honest" People</u>	<u>Risk Perception</u>	
	2:45	Johnson-The Silver Lining Effect: A Formal Analy...	Norton-Justifying and Rationalizing Questionable Pr...	Ayal-The "Perceived Diversity Heuristic": The Ef...
	3:05	Liu-Think Time (Not Money): Happiness Mindset Fo...	Gino-Slippery Slope and Misconduct: The Effect of...	Hogarth-Effects of mood and affect on everyday p...
	3:25	Van Putten-How sweet deals can turn sour: Inacti...	Weber-Psychological Mechanisms Underlying Dec...	Rai-A small price to pay: Introducing small los...
	3:45	Moran-Issue frames in negotiations: Bearing a lo...	Mazar-Temporal Influences on Cheating Behavior...	Downs-Perceived Risk & Contextualized Knowledg...
SESSION #4	<u>Consumer Decision Making</u>	<u>Affective Forecasting</u>	<u>Symposium: Judgments/Decisions-Humanit...</u>	
	4:45	Martin-Choosing and Rejecting Uncertainty: Prefe...	Walsh-My Imagination or Your Feelings? Judging t...	Van Boven-Who to Help? Immediacy Bias in Judgm...
	5:05	Maciejovsky-Compatibility Effects in the Aggrega...	Dunn-On Emotional Innumeracy: Predicted and Actu...	Small-Reference-Dependent Sympathy
	5:25	Dawson- Motivating Discounts: Price-Induced Moti...	Williams-The influence of the future on judgment...	Cuddy-No Right to be Mad: Denying Anger and Help...
	5:45	Huang-Trade-offs in the Dark: Exemplar-Based Lea...	Caruso-Damned If You Do, But Not If You Did: How...	Ritov-Who is the victim? Identifiability effect in different...
SUNDAY	SESSION #5	<u>Conflict and Choice (Note: in Salon B)</u>	<u>Affect and Judgment</u>	<u>Perceptions involving time</u>
	10:30	Steffel-Inferences from Decision Difficulty: Fal...	Evans-When You're Feeling Blue, Less Is True: Th...	Bilgin-Looming Losses in Future Time Perception
	10:50	Botti-Dazed and Confused by Choice: How Underest...	Chang-Affect As A Decision System Of The Present	Zauberman-Subjective Time Perception & Tempora...
	11:10	Willemsen-Comprehension checks as a necessary condi...	Huber-Seeing Red (or Blue): Anger More Than Sadn...	LeBoeuf-Perceptions Of The Length Of Future Time...
	11:30	Pocheptsova-When Less is More: The Effect of Pro...	Zhang-Physical Contact, Emotional Responses, and...	Ji-Culture and judgment based on time
	SESSION #6	<u>Behavioral economics</u>	<u>Socially-influenced preferences</u>	<u>Individual Differences</u>
	2:45	Summers-Unraveling the Disposition Effect: The r...	Arora-Trade-offs Between Economic and Social Goa...	Parker-Do maximizers make better decisions than ...
	3:05	Brown-Limited Strategic Thinking in the Field: ...	Fox-Mistaken Identity: Social Identity as a Spec...	Rick-The Pain of Paying Varies Across Situations...
	3:25	Schwartz-The psychology of benefits decisions: A...	Maimaran-The Bold/Timid Divide in Consumer Cho...	Peters-Numeracy and intuitive number sense in de...
	3:45	Thaler-Choice Architecture	DeCaro-Motivation in Judgment and Choice: Strate...	Figner-Affective versus deliberative processing ...
MONDAY	SESSION #7	<u>Decision Strategies</u>	<u>Self-control and Self-regulation</u>	<u>Likelihood Judgments</u>
	8:45	Phillips-Testing unconscious thought: Is distrac...	Myrseth-Activating Self-Control: Isolated versus...	Vosgerau-Outcome Dependency of Subjective Prob...
	9:05	Keren-Decisions by Coin Toss and the Limits of R...	Bruyneel-To Have One's Mind Set on it: Mindsets ...	Hart-Locus of control as a factor in gambler's f...
	9:25	Chance-Decision Amnesia: Motivated Forgetting of...	Shu-Myopic Procrastination of Positive Experienc...	Ungemach-Within-Subject Preference Reversals...
	9:45	Ulkumen-The Effect of Manipulating Category ...	Mead-I won't think about you unless I need you: ...	Erev-On the Determinants of the Psychological We...
SESSION #8	<u>Choice sets and choices</u>	<u>Trust</u>	<u>Multiple Opinions</u>	
10:30	Tal-Making a Difference: Expectation-Driven Sepa...	Gaissmaier-The comparative advantage of procedur...	Yaniv-The cost and benefit of independent opinio...	
10:50	Gao-The Influence of Decision-Making Order on Co...	John-Searching for Privacy in all the Wrong Plac...	Häubl-Ironic Effects of Personalized Product Rec...	
11:10	Sela-Decision Quicksands: Assortment Size, Justi...	Pham-Trusting Or Not Trusting One's Feelings In ...	Mannes-Are we wise about the "wisdom of crowds"?	
11:30	Galak-Not in my backyard: The influence of arbit...	Gneezy-Don't Get Mad, Get Even: Consumers' Re...	Broomell-Why are Experts Correlated? Decompos...	

2007 SJDM Conference Special Events

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15

12:00-5:00pm **23rd Annual Meeting of the Brunswik Society** Barcelona/Casablanca rooms, Westin Hotel

<http://www.brunswik.org/annualmeetings/meet23.html>

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16

8:30 am-5:00 pm **23rd Annual Meeting of the Brunswik Society** Barcelona/Casablanca rooms, Westin Hotel

Psychonomic Sessions (Hyatt Regency): <http://www.psychonomic.org/Program07pdfs.html>

8:00-10:00 am Models of Choice and Decision Making Beacon A

10:20 am-12:00pm Judgments and Reasoning Beacon A

1:30-3:30 pm Judgment and Decision Making Beacon A

5:00-7:00 pm **Welcome Reception & Early Registration** Centennial Foyer, Westin Hotel, Third Level

Please join us at the Welcome Reception in the Centennial Foyer, Westin Hotel, Third Level. The reception will feature appetizers and a cash bar. This event will also provide an opportunity for early conference registration so that you can avoid the lines Saturday morning.

The reception is generously co-sponsored by:

University of California, Irvine

Operations & Decision Technologies, The Paul Merage School of Business (<http://www.merage.uci.edu/>)

Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences (<http://www.imbs.uci.edu/>)

Decision Analysis Journal (<http://da.pubs.informs.org/>)

7:00-9:00 pm **Executive Board Dinner**

Members of the executive board, JDM officers, and program chairs for this year and next year are invited to a working dinner off-site at Utopia Restaurant, 445 East 1st. Street (corner of Linden Ave. & 1st. Street), (562) 432-6888. Contact George Wu (wu@chicagosb.edu) for further details.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17

12:00-1:30 pm **Psychonomic Poster Session** Long Beach Convention Center, Grand Ballroom

<http://www.psychonomic.org/PosSatNoon07.pdf>

1:30-2:30 pm **Keynote: Michael Shermer (Publisher of Skeptic magazine)** Centennial Ballroom, Salon B

Dr. Michael Shermer is the Founding Publisher of *Skeptic* magazine (www.skeptic.com), the Executive Director of the Skeptics Society, a monthly columnist for *Scientific American*, the host of the Skeptics Distinguished Science Lecture Series at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), and the co-host and producer of the 13-hour Family Channel television series, *Exploring the Unknown*.

Dr. Shermer is the author of *Why Darwin Matters: Evolution and the Case Against Intelligent Design*, as well as the recently published *Science Friction: Where the Known Meets the Unknown*, about how the mind works and how thinking goes wrong. His book *The Science of Good and Evil: Why People Cheat, Gossip, Share Care, and Follow the Golden Rule*, is on the evolutionary origins of morality and how to be good without God. He wrote a biography, *In Darwin's Shadow*, about the life and science of the

co-discoverer of natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace. He also wrote *The Borderlands of Science*, about the fuzzy land between science and pseudoscience, and *Denying History*, on Holocaust denial and other forms of pseudohistory. His book *How We Believe: Science, Skepticism, and the Search for God*, presents his theory on the origins of religion and why people believe in God. He is also the author of *Why People Believe Weird Things* on pseudoscience, superstitions, and other confusions of our time.

Dr. Shermer received his B.A. in psychology from Pepperdine University, M.A. in experimental psychology from California State University, Fullerton, and his Ph.D. in the history of science from Claremont Graduate University (1991). He was a college professor for 20 years (1979-1998), teaching psychology, evolution, and the history of science at Occidental College (1989-1998), California State University Los Angeles, and Glendale College. Since his creation of the Skeptics Society, Skeptic magazine, and the Skeptics Distinguished Science Lecture Series at Caltech, he has appeared on such shows as 20/20, Dateline, Charlie Rose, Larry King Live, Tom Snyder, Donahue, Oprah, Lezza, Unsolved Mysteries, and other shows as a skeptic of weird and extraordinary claims, as well as interviews in countless documentaries aired on PBS, A&E, Discovery, The History Channel, The Science Channel, and The Learning Channel.

“The Mind of the Market: Lessons from Evolutionary Economics, Behavioral Economics, Neuroeconomics, Complexity Economics, and Virtue Economics

How did we evolve from ancient hunter-gatherers to modern consumer-traders? Why are people so irrational when it comes to money and business? Bestselling author Dr. Michael Shermer argues that evolution provides an answer to both of these questions through the new science of evolutionary economics. Drawing on research from neuroeconomics, Shermer explores what brain scans reveal about bargaining, snap purchases, and how trust is established in business. Utilizing experiments in behavioral economics, Shermer shows why people hang on to losing stocks and failing companies, why business negotiations often disintegrate into emotional tit-for-tat disputes, and why money does not make us happy. Employing research from complexity theory, Shermer shows how evolution and economics are both examples of a larger phenomenon of complex adaptive systems. Along the way, Shermer answers such provocative questions as, Do our tribal roots mean that we will always be a sucker for brands? How is the biochemical joy of sex similar to the rewards of business cooperation? How can nations increase trust within and between their borders? Finally, Shermer considers the consequences of globalization and what will happen if nations allow free trade across their borders.

6:00-7:30 pm **Psychonomic Poster Session**

Long Beach Convention Center, Grand Ballroom

<http://www.psychonomic.org/PosSatPM07.pdf>

6:15-8:15 pm **Graduate Student Social**

Centennial Foyer

This informal event will provide student members of SJDM an opportunity to imbibe and network with the future stars of the field. But wait, there's more: SJDM is buying the first round of drinks! For more information contact Julie Downs (downs@cmu.edu).

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 18

12:00-1:30 pm **Women in SJDM Networking Event**

Centennial Ballroom, Salon A

All (women and men) are welcome to attend the fourth annual Women in SJDM event, focused on promoting the advancement of women faculty and graduate students in SJDM. Our featured speaker will be Linda Babcock, the James M. Walton Professor of Economics at the Heinz School of Public Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University. Linda Babcock is co-author of the book, “Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide,” named by *Fortune* Magazine as one of the 75 smartest business books of all time, and the forthcoming “Ask for It: How Women Can Use the Power of Negotiation to Get What They Really Want.” Linda will present some of her research on women and negotiations, after which there will be discussion and networking opportunities. Thanks to our generous sponsors, there is no fee for the Women in SJDM event, and lunch will be provided. Suggested donation contributions (listed on the SJDM conference registration form) will help sustain this event in the years to come. Donations can be made along with your SJDM conference registration fees or at the event itself. Please register for this event in advance at <http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~rj2white/wsajdm>. Extra box lunches may be available at the event, but early registration guarantees that you will be provided with one. This event is sponsored by the Risk and Decision Processes Center at the Wharton Business School, the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, and Linda Babcock. For more information about this event, please contact Rebecca White (Rebecca.White@chicagogsb.edu).

2007 SJDM Conference
PAPER ABSTRACTS LISTED BY SESSION

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17

(1A) Decision Making Under Climate Uncertainty: Empirical Results (8:30 – 10:00)

Organizers: Weber, Elke (Columbia University); Krantz, David (Columbia University); Budescu, David (UIUC)

In 2004, NSF funded several groups to study decision making under climate uncertainty, with the goal of promoting adaptation to possible global climate change. This symposium (and its companion) present results from three of these groups, the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions (CREED) at Columbia University and centers at Carnegie Mellon University and at RAND Corporation. The talks in this session focus on theoretical issues and some empirical results regarding two issues that have broad relevance to individual and group decision making with environmental consequences, namely deep uncertainty and time discounting. We also develop theory and provide empirical support for efforts that will facilitate adaptation to climate change, including ways to increase protective decision making, the selection of robust decision alternatives, and the benefit of participatory processes for the use of scientific information, and discounting of environmental goods. The studies demonstrate that the domain of environmental decisions, that is, decisions that involve consideration of uncertain and often time-delayed variables and tradeoffs between outcomes that differ in time scale and individual vs. social relevance, provides rich opportunities to investigate basic and important decision processes.

Introduction

Elke U. Weber (Columbia University)

Introduction to NSF's Decision Making Under Climate Uncertainty initiative and preview of the topics covered in this session and their interconnections.

A. Deep Uncertainty

Decision Making Under Deep Uncertainty: Comparison of Robust, Optimum, and Precautionary Approaches

Robert Lempert (RAND)

In many real world problems, the system model and the probability distributions on its inputs are not well known or agreed upon. This talk applies and compares several alternative frameworks for decision making under such conditions of deep uncertainty -- optimal expected utility, the precautionary principle, and robust decision-making. Applied to an environmental decision, we find that the robust decision approach captures the spirit of the precautionary principle while addressing some of its shortcomings and that robust strategies may be preferable to optimum strategies when the uncertainty is sufficiently deep and the set of alternative policy options is sufficiently rich.

The Effects of Presentation Format on Decisions Under Deep Uncertainty

David V. Budescu (UIUC); Stephen Broomell (UIUC); Robert Lempert (RAND); Klaus Keller (Penn State)

Problems that involve complex systems that are not fully understood, have a mix of short- and long-term implications, and depend on uncertainties that are not easily quantifiable are said to involve "deep uncertainty". Climate change is a perfect example of this class of problems. We report results from two decisions experiments – one using choices between abstract options, and the other involving decisions about policies pertaining to CO2 emissions. The results of both studies illustrate the high sensitivity of the subjects' decisions to the mode and format of presentation of the key probabilistic components of the system.

B. Time Discounting

Constructed Choice and Discounting of Environmental Goals

David H. Krantz (Columbia University)

Economic analyses usually incorporate exponential discounting of future goods. Such discounting, even at low rates, undervalues long-term environmental goals, such as limitation of global warming or conservation of wetlands, relative to many people's intuitions. I assume that tradeoffs among goals are constructed using context-sensitive weights, and demonstrate that this assumption undercuts the theoretical rationale for discounting all goods at a single rate. Empirical measurement of actual discount rates (which may be zero) for social and environmental goals is needed as a basis for sound economic analysis.

Discounting of Environmental Goods and Discounting in Social Contexts

David Hardisty (Columbia University); Kerry F. Milch (Columbia University); Kirstin Appelt (Columbia University); Michel J. J. Handgraaf (University of Amsterdam); Poonam Arora (Columbia University); David H. Krantz (Columbia University); Elke Weber (Columbia University)

Decisions regarding climate events typically involve a temporal component. However, it is unclear whether findings from studies of monetary discounting can be usefully applied to discounting of environmental goods due to the dearth of research explicitly comparing these two domains. In a series of studies, people evaluated gains and losses of money, health, air quality, garbage, and mass transit, with outcomes occurring immediately or one year in the future. Discount rates in these domains were compared to discounting of monetary and health outcomes. Another study examined group effects on time discounting with results suggesting that collaborative decision making may be one way to overcome the myopia often seen in individual decisions to delay or accelerate consumption.

C. Facilitating Climate Change Adaptation

Protective Decision Making and Global Warming

Howard C. Kunreuther (University of Pennsylvania) and David H. Krantz (Columbia University)

No individual, firm or nation can mitigate global warming appreciably on its own. In *interdependent security* games with negative externalities, there are economic incentives for each stakeholder to **not** undertake protective measures unless it knows that others are taking similar steps. This talk shows that by providing social rewards for cooperation, some key stakeholders will undertake protective measures, inducing others to follow suit. We discuss the conditions which lead to cascading and tipping behavior so that each stakeholder will be better off taking steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, thus reducing the risks associated with global warming.

Easier But Insightful? Developing A Judgment-Based Approach For Selecting Robust Alternatives In Climate Change Adaptation Decisions

Tim McDaniels (University of British Columbia) and Granger Morgan (Carnegie Mellon University)

The irreducible uncertainties associated with climate change adaptation choices make the standard methods of decision-making under uncertainty problematic. Lempert and other authors have identified robust decision making as a potentially fruitful approach, although the published approaches to robust decision-making are highly demanding. We seek to develop a practical judgment-based approach for selecting robust alternatives, using examples of forest replanting and rehabilitation after beetle infestations. Judgments of resource management specialists were elicited to characterize views on how different forest management options will perform over time, given three climate scenarios.

The Influence of Group Discussion on Information Use: Farmers' Groups, Climate Forecast Dissemination and Agricultural Planning in Uganda

Ben Orlove (UC Davis); Carla Roncoli (U of Georgia); Merit Kabugo (Makarere University); Mark Grote, David H. Krantz

During two successive agricultural seasons, we presented climate forecasts to African farmers at the time of selection of crop varieties and planting dates. One set received it as individuals and another in group settings. Data from transcripts of group discussions and post-season interviews indicate that farmers who took part in group discussions recall forecasts more fully and were more likely to make and carry out forecast-based plans. Reasons for this association include the effects of group meetings on the sense of understanding of and commitment to forecasts, the trust in the forecast, and the level of engagement with plans.

(1B) Self-predictions (8:30 – 10:00)

It's a Brand New Day: Motivated Reasoning and the Persistence of Positive Illusions

Dawson, Erica (Yale School of Management); Massey, B. Cade (Yale School of Management)

Many studies indicate people hold positive illusions about themselves, but few suggest how these illusions persist over time. We hypothesize that this persistence is due in part to people's self-serving perceptions of the imperfect correlation between the past and the future. We find that people believe processes are more stable when they've performed well, and more unstable when they've performed poorly, and that this bias facilitates the persistence of optimistic expectations.

The Price of Good Intentions

Koehler, Derek (University of Waterloo); White, Rebecca (University of Waterloo); John, Leslie (Carnegie Mellon University)

Students starting a work term estimated the probability that they would achieve a savings goal. Compared to a control group, students asked to report their progress toward their savings goal every other week were more likely to reach it. Self-predictions were insensitive to the impact of this manipulation, however, and its underestimation also produced unwillingness to pay to be part of a program that used progress reports as a means of enhancing savings. The focus of self-predictions on (good) intentions can undermine the perceived impact and thereby the use of mechanisms that could otherwise foster goal achievement.

Self-predictions of investment decisions under narrow and broad bracketing

White, Rebecca J. (University of Waterloo); Koehler, Derek J. (University of Waterloo); Li, Annie (University of Waterloo)

We examine the accuracy of self-predictions of future investment behavior. Over 40 investment decisions, participants selected either “conservative” (high probability of small gains), or “aggressive” (low probability of large gains) investments, which were presented in either a narrow (one-at-a-time) or broad (four-at-a-time) bracket. The narrow bracket produced more risk aversion than the broad bracket, consistent with myopic loss aversion, but self-predictions were insensitive to this influence. Investment decisions presented in broad brackets yielded greater adherence to initially predicted investment strategies.

On once and future things: A temporal asymmetry in judgments of likelihood

Hanko, Karlene (Cornell University); Gilovich, Thomas (Cornell University)

What do people see when they gaze into the future? Many people, at least among those in Western cultures, see a future brimming with possibilities. In the present research we hypothesized that, because people see the future as more “open” than the past, they tend to see any particular uncertain event as more likely in the future than in the past, once differences in knowledge of past versus future are eliminated. In a series of studies, we demonstrate this temporal asymmetry in judgment and test the proposed mediator, the belief in an “open” future.

(1C) Weighing Information (8:30 – 10:00)

The Ability to Disregard Knowledge: A Mental Contamination Perspective

Marks, Melissa (The Ohio State University); Arkes, Hal (The Ohio State University)

We demonstrate that participants can disregard newly learned obscure, but not familiar, information; however, forewarning participants that later they will have to disregard familiar information enables them to do so. In Experiment 1 we demonstrate participants’ inability to discount newly learned information about the well-known Revolutionary War. In Experiment 2 participants presented with obscure War of 1812 information are able to discount successfully. Participants in Experiment 3 who are told before reading a Revolutionary War essay that they will have to disregard the essay information later, are able to discount familiar information effectively. We attribute our findings to source confusion.

Preference, consensus and unpacking: Support theory models of the preferences of others

Brenner, Lyle (University of Florida); Bilgin, Baler (University of California -- Riverside)

We propose a support theory model of social projection and the (false) consensus effect. In this model, the perceived popularity of one’s preferred option can be increased in two ways. First, greater evidential support accrues to the hypothesis that others prefer one’s preferred option. Second, the preferred option is more salient and therefore less likely to be discounted when “packed” together with other options. This second principle predicts reduced unpacking effects for disjunctive hypotheses which include the judge’s preferred option. We test several models accommodating different unpacking effects based on both discrete and graded measures of preference.

Effects of Fluency on Psychological Distance and Mental Construal: Or Why New York is a large city, but nEW yORK is a civilized jungle

Alter, Adam L (Princeton University); Oppenheimer, Daniel M (Princeton University)

People construe the world along a continuum from concretely (focusing on specific, local details) to abstractly (focusing on global essences). We show that people are more likely to interpret the world through an abstract cognitive lens when they experience cognitive disfluency, or processing difficulty. We show this effect using three instantiations of fluency: visual perceptual fluency, conceptual priming fluency, and linguistic fluency. Consistent with Construal Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003), we suggest that one mechanism for this effect is people’s tendency to perceive disfluent stimuli as more psychologically distant from their current position.

Easy does it: The role of fluency in cue weighting

Shah, Anuj K. (Princeton University); Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (Princeton University)

Many models of judgment and decision making assume that people weight information according to its validity. We propose that people weight fluent, or easy to process, information more heavily than disfluent information when making judgments. Cue fluency was manipulated independent of cue validity in three studies. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants weighted visually fluent information more heavily than visually disfluent information. In Experiment 3, participants weighted linguistically fluent information more heavily than linguistically disfluent information. These studies demonstrate that fluency affects cue weighting independent of cue validity.

(2A) Risky Decision Making (10:30 – 12:00)

Tracking the Developmental Trajectory of Risky Decision Making

Levin, Irwin P. (University of Iowa); Weller, Joshua A. (Decision Research); Hart, Stephanie S. (University of Houston, Clear Lake); Pederson, Ashley A. (University of Memphis); Harshman, Lyndsay A. (University of Iowa)

Over a series of studies we developed the “cups” task as a way of studying risky decision –making in populations that include children as young as age 5. We describe how this task has been used to compare children and adults (parents) in the following ways: overall level of risk-taking; differential risk-taking to avoid losses and achieve gains; stability of risky decision-making over a 3-year period; adaptability to contingencies that make risk-taking advantageous or disadvantageous. We discuss parallels between the development of risky decision-making behaviors and the maturation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex.

A Fundamental Advantage of Dynamic Experience-based Strategies for Risky Choice

Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida); Decker, Nathaniel (University of South Florida); Hudspeth, Christopher (University of South Florida)

Using a simplified agent-based modeling approach, we simulated outcome distributions for decisions made by agents using static lottery-based strategies (expected utility, prospect theory) versus dynamic experience-based strategies (aspiration levels, experience trajectories). Static strategies always varied symmetrically around the average outcome, with effects on the likelihood of being at the extremes. Dynamic, experience-based strategies resulted in more control over the shape of outcome distributions. Only in this adaptive context was it possible to differentially influence the likelihood of ending up relatively rich versus poor. We discuss how emergent properties of dynamic strategies shed new insight on the impact of potential strategies.

A Tractable Method to Measure Utility and Loss Aversion under Prospect Theory

Abdellaoui, Mohammed (GRID, Cachan); Bleichrodt, Han (Erasmus University Rotterdam); l'Haridon, Olivier (GRID, Cachan)

This paper provides an efficient method to measure utility under prospect theory. Our method is based on the elicitation of certainty equivalents for two-outcome prospects. We found that most subjects were risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses but had concave utility both for gains and for losses. This finding illustrates empirically that risk seeking and concave utility can coincide under prospect theory. Utility was steeper for losses than for gains, which is consistent with loss aversion. Utility did not depend on the probability used in the elicitation, which offers support for prospect theory.

Loss Aversion in Decisions under Risk and the Value of a Symmetric Simplification of Prospect Theory

Ert, Eyal (Technion); Erev, Ido (Technion)

Three studies are presented that examine alternative interpretations of loss aversion. The first two studies reject a “strong” interpretation: In violations of this interpretation the proportion of risky choices was higher given prospects with mixed payoffs (gain and losses) than given prospects with nonnegative payoffs. The third study rejects a “moderate” interpretation: It shows that the elimination of the loss aversion assumption from prospect theory increases the theory’s predictive value. The results demonstrate the value of a simplified version of prospect theory that assumes a symmetric “s shaped” value function, a symmetric probability weighting function, and a stochastic response rule.

(2B) Understanding happiness and pain (10:30 – 12:00)

Wealth, warmth and wellbeing

Hsee, Christopher (University of Chicago GSB)

A fundamental question in happiness research is whether raising the wealth of all increases the happiness of all. A lab study and a field study suggest that the answer depends on where the wealth is spent -- on improving Type A or Type B consumptions. Type A consumptions, such as temperature, directly affect one’s visceral/biological system; type B outcomes, such as jewelry, do not affect one’s visceral/biological system. Spending wealth on improving Type A consumptions could increase overall happiness, whereas spending wealth on improving Type B consumptions would not.

Happiness for Sale: Do Experiential or Material Purchases lead to more Consumer Happiness?

Irwin, Julie R. (The University of Texas at Austin); Goodman, Joseph K. (University of South Carolina); Nicolao, Leonardo (The University of Texas at Austin)

Researchers have suggested that consumers would be happier if they spent their money on experiences as opposed to material possessions. In four experiments, we test this experience recommendation, and show that it may be misleading in its general form. We find that valence of the outcome significantly moderates differences in respondents’ reported retrospective happiness with material versus experiential purchases. This valence by purchase type interaction is especially strong for consumers who are not materialistic. These results have implications for consumers attempting to maximize their happiness, and for marketers and public policymakers who have an interest in consumer welfare.

Memories of yesterday’s emotions: Better, worse, and for some, even worse

Miron-Shatz, Talya (Princeton University); Stone, Arthur (Stony Brook University); Kahneman, Daniel (Princeton University)

We apply the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM, Kahneman et al., 2004) to 810 women, and demonstrate that peak-coding extends beyond pain to other emotions, so people recall being angrier, happier and friendlier than they reported feeling during the previous day. Peak coding could perpetuate one's perspective on life: positively disposed people peak-code pleasant emotions, and people high in negative affective disposition pronouncedly peak-code unpleasant emotions, especially when there is a large variance in the experiences. Thus, peak-coding is driven by memory processes, but is augmented in the presence of coherent implicit theories regarding the experience or the experiencing self.

The "Martyrdom Effect": When the Promise of Pain and Effort Increases Prosocial Contributions
Olivola, Christopher Y. (Princeton University); Shafir, Eldar (Princeton University)

Normative and lay theories of decision-making consider pain and effort to be deterrents. In contrast, we provide novel evidence that the prospect of pain and effort can promote prosocial behavior. Across a series of experiments, participants contributed more money to a prosocial cause when the contribution process was painful and effortful than when it was neutral or enjoyable. We demonstrate this "martyrdom effect" using both hypothetical scenarios and studies involving real money and pain, and show that it cannot be explained by a taste for painful-effortful donation activities, cognitive dissonance, social norms, or an attribute substitution heuristic process.

(2C) Anchoring and Adjustment Processes (10:30 – 12:00)

The first-run effect: How temporal sequence patterns affect judgments and memory
Kusev, Petko (City University); Ayton, Peter (City University); van Schaik, Paul (Teesside University); Chater, Nick (UCL)

Four experiments study relative frequency judgment and recall of sequentially presented items drawn from two categories (e.g. cities/animals). We find (a) a first-run effect whereby people overestimate the frequency of a given category when that category is the first repeated category to occur in the sequence and (b) a dissociation between judgments and memory; respondents may judge one event more likely than the other and yet recall more instances of the latter. Frequency judgements are influenced by the first run - which may reflect the operation of a judgment heuristic - while free-recall is influenced by later items.

Big raccoons and small giraffes: Anchoring in sequential judgments
Frederick, Shane (MIT); Mochon, Daniel (MIT)

We explore the extent of anchoring when respondents render multiple judgments sequentially - a situation that commonly arises in surveys. We also examine the effect of more than one anchor, to test whether the effect is limited to the previous judgment. The first study shows that previous judgments can anchor subsequent ones, even when there is no explicit comparative standard. We also show that the effect is not limited to the preceding judgment: more anchors produce more anchoring. The effect appears to require that the preceding judgments be conceptually related and that responses be produced for these judgmental objects.

Incidental environmental anchoring
Critcher, Clayton R. (Cornell University); Gilovich, Thomas (Cornell University)

Three studies examined whether numeric values that are incidentally associated with a judgment target, but uninformative with respect to the judgment at hand, may subtly attract numeric responses toward them. Participants' judgments of a football player were assimilated toward his jersey number, and the amount people were willing to pay for a restaurant meal was drawn toward an uninformative number in the restaurant's name. Neither participant expertise, depth of processing of the anchor, nor explicit attention to the anchor affected the size of the effects. Implications for preexisting accounts of anchoring phenomena will be discussed.

When do implausible anchors influence judgment? A 2-stage model of anchoring effects
Liersch, Michael J. (University of California, San Diego); McKenzie, Craig R. M. (University of California, San Diego)

Implausible anchors can exert larger, smaller, or equal effects relative to plausible anchors. No current model can explain these mixed results. A 2-stage model of anchoring is proposed and tested. In stage 1, a binary decision regarding anchor relevance is made. Only if deemed "relevant" is the anchor assimilated in stage 2; otherwise it is ignored. The model predicts that implausible anchors are less likely to be assimilated, but when assimilated, will be more influential. An experiment confirmed both predictions. Whether implausible anchors exhibit smaller, larger, or equivalent effects than plausible anchors depends on how often those anchors are incorporated.

(3A) Mental Accounting and Losses (2:45 – 4:15)

The Silver Lining Effect: A Formal Analysis and Experiments
Jarnebrant, Peter (Columbia University); Toubia, Olivier (Columbia University); Johnson, Eric J. (Columbia University)

The silver lining effect predicts that segregating a small gain from a larger loss results in greater psychological value than does integrating them into a smaller loss. Starting from the prospect theory value function, we derive conditions under which this effect should occur; the optimality of integration depends on the size of the gain and the loss, as well as the individual's degree of loss aversion and rate of diminishing sensitivity. Some of the predictions are tested and confirmed in an online consumer purchase setting where integration and segregation frames are operationalized as discounts and rebates, respectively.

Think Time (Not Money): Happiness Mindset Fosters Giving
Liu, Wendy (UCLA); Aaker, Jennifer (UC Berkeley)

This research examines how a focus on time versus money can lead to two distinct mindsets which impact people's willingness to donate to charitable causes. The results of three experiments (lab and field) reveal that asking individuals to think about "how much time they would like to donate" (versus "how much money they would like to donate") to a non-profit increases the amount that they ultimately will donate to the company. Insight into the mechanism suggests that asking people for time donations increases the happiness they perceive in donating. Implications for charitable giving, emotional well-being and happiness are discussed.

How sweet deals can turn sour: Inaction inertia explained by the sour grapes mechanism.
Van Putten, Marijke (Tilburg University); Zeelenberg, Marcel (Tilburg University); Van Dijk, Eric (Leiden University)

People turn down sweet deals, because they could have had a better deal before. We investigated the cause of this negative effect of missed, now unavailable opportunities on decisions. Three experiments confirm our prediction that people turn down sweet deals because they sour them, by trivializing or devaluing them, to reduce the frustration of missing a better deal. We show that when frustration over the missed opportunity is reduced, likelihood to act on the deal increases. Moreover, when there is less possibility to sour the deal, people stay frustrated and are more likely to act on the deal.

Issue frames in negotiations: Bearing a loss on high versus low priority issues in multi-issue negotiations
Moran, Simone (Ben Gurion University of the Negev); Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew University); Merzel, Avi (Hebrew University)

Focusing on negotiations that involve multiple issues for which negotiators have different priorities, we examine how independently framing high compared to low priority issues in terms of gains versus losses affects the negotiation process and outcome. We find that negotiations are protracted and that the probability of impasse is higher when high priority issues are framed in terms of losses compared to when low priority issues are framed in terms of losses. Framing high priority issues in terms of losses was also found to decrease negotiators' post negotiation satisfaction, even when controlling for their actual negotiation outcomes.

(3B) Symposium: The Dishonesty of "Honest" People (2:45 – 4:15)

Organizer: Mazar, Nina (University of Toronto)

Everyday, people who consider themselves to be honest human beings fall prey to the various temptations to benefit from dishonesty; ironically, however, they manage to maintain a positive view of themselves in the face of their negative actions. From the staggering economic costs of deception at the corporate level to the interpersonal costs of such deception in relationships, a better understanding of deception is needed. This symposium explores how, why, and when "honest" people are dishonest – and how to get them to stop. The first two papers explore factors that impact the likelihood that deception will be detected by others: Norton et al. show that people restructure information to justify questionable preferences such that their decisions appear evidence-based, while Gino and Bazerman show that failures to detect dishonesty can occur when dishonesty increases gradually over time. The second two papers explore internal factors that impact the likelihood that an individual will engage in deception: Nagel and Weber show how factors that increase guilt decrease people's likelihood of dishonesty, while Mazar and Ariely focus on the dynamics of the conflict between the temptation to be dishonest and one's moral standards over time.

Justifying and Rationalizing Questionable Preferences
Norton, Michael I. (Harvard University); Sommers, Samuel R. (Tufts University); Vandello, Joseph A. (University of South Florida); Darley, John M. (Princeton University)

People often are drawn to make judgments between individuals based on questionable criteria, such as those individuals' social group memberships. We suggest that people mask biased decision making by recruiting more acceptable criteria to justify such decisions, licensing them to judge on the basis of social category information while appearing unbiased. Across several kinds of decisions (employment, college admissions, and jury selection) and with several social categories (gender, race, and age), we demonstrate how participants justify decisions biased by social category information by arbitrarily inflating the relative value of their preferred candidates' qualifications over those of competitors.

Slippery Slope and Misconduct: The Effect of Gradual Deterioration on the Failure to Notice Others' Unethical Behavior
Gino, Francesca (Carnegie Mellon University); Bazerman, Max H. (Harvard University)

Four laboratory studies show that people are more likely to accept others' unethical behavior when ethical degradation occurs slowly rather than in one abrupt shift. In the studies, participants served in the role of watchdogs charged with catching cheating in a series

of trials. The cheating they observed increased either gradually or abruptly; people were more likely to overlook cheating that increased gradually. Our results also indicate that the effect is due at least in part to the failure to notice that unethical behavior is occurring when the change is gradual rather than abrupt.

Psychological Mechanisms Underlying Deception in Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Nagel, Rosemarie (Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Weber, Roberto A. (Carnegie Mellon University)

We explore bargaining when one party possesses private information that can be misrepresented. We study how the frequency of deception is influenced by psychological factors that vary guilt associated with deception. In one study, we explore individuals' willingness to misrepresent information either through actions alone (implicit) or through explicit statements (lying). In another study, we explore how the frequency of deception is influenced by whether it will be discovered. We observe high frequencies of deception across contexts, but find differences in deception and outcomes based on treatments. These relationships are moderated by personality-characteristics and the potential gains from deception.

Temporal Influences on Cheating Behavior: The "What the Hell" Effect
Mazar, Nina (University of Toronto); Ariely, Dan (Duke University)

We investigate the dynamics of people's decisions to cheat over time by proposing the idea of a "What-the-Hell"-effect. The idea is that people, who consider themselves as honest, exert cognitive self-control over multiple temptations to cheat; thus, they only cheat once in awhile and by an amount that causes no threat to their self-concept. If, however, they overstretch this leeway unintentionally, they have to face the truth about themselves being dishonest, which in turn causes them to give up self-control and cheat all the way. Data from two studies support the idea.

(3C) Risk perception (2:45 – 4:15)

The "Perceived Diversity Heuristic": The Effect of Pseudo Multiplicity and Pseudo Distinctiveness on Risk Judgments
Ayal, Shahar (Duke University); Zakay, Dan (Tel Aviv University)

The Perceived Diversity Heuristic is based on the idea that diversifying sources reduces risk. This heuristic yields biased judgments in cases where perceived multiplicity and/or perceived distinctiveness generate enhancement of the perceived diversity without actual change in the pool's normative values. In Study 1 we demonstrated how the identification of pseudo multiplicity and distinctiveness led to suboptimal choice. In Study 2 and 3 we demonstrate how these two sources interact to raise and lower the incidence of the ratio bias phenomenon. Finally, in Study 4 we found individual differences in the ability to distinguish between real and pseudo diversification.

Effects of mood and affect on everyday perceptions of risk
Hogarth, Robin M. (ICREA & Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Portell, Mariona (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona); Cuxart, Anna (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Perceptions of risk in 2,800 "incidents" were collected using ESM (experiential sampling method) from 94 part-time students. In addition, participants provided data on both mood and emotional reactions using SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994). Participants also made retrospective judgments about 6 incidents. Using hierarchical linear models, perceptions of risk were found to be a function of type of risk, consequences and possibility of occurrence, mood state and emotional reactions, and gender. Retrospective judgments of risk are lower than those made at the time of the experience. We compare results with our earlier work on this topic.

A small price to pay: Introducing small losses increases attractiveness and reduces scope insensitivity
Rai, Torge S. (Department of Psychology, UCLA); Holyoak, Keith J. (Department of Psychology, UCLA)

Small losses were introduced to increase the attractiveness of prospects across different real world contexts in single stimulus presentation. In the first set of experiments, participants were presented with a small probability of a positive gain and a complimentary probability of either no change or a small loss. Participants indicated that the 'loss' scenarios were more attractive. These results were extended to the study of scope insensitivity, in which it was found that introducing a small loss to an ecological intervention scenario induced sensitivity to scope and higher hypothetical willingness-to-pay (WTP) donations than when no loss was presented.

Perceived Risk and Contextualized Knowledge
Downs, Julie S. (Carnegie Mellon University)

Discerning signal from noise depends on many factors, including the overlap of distributions and motivations to avoid false positives vs. false negatives. In a nationwide survey, we explored behavioral responses to both legitimate and fraudulent emails. Prior negative outcomes were associated with misplaced caution about legitimate emails, $t(137)=-2.07$, $p<.05$, but not with resistance to fraudulent ones, $t(137)<1$. Knowledge specific to the frauds protected participants, $t(137)=-2.57$, $p=.01$, but knowledge about other kinds of

protection left participants vulnerable, $t(137)=2.09$, $p < .05$. These results suggest that negative experiences may change behavior, but that without contextualized knowledge they may not improve decisions.

(4A) Consumer Decision Making (4:45 – 6:15)

Choosing and Rejecting Uncertainty: Preferences for Variance in Positive (and Aversion to Variance in Negative) Experiences
Martin, Jolie M. (Harvard Business School); Barron, Gregory M. (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School)

When assessing experiences based on the ratings of others, do people prefer high variance options (about which opinions differ) or low variance options (about which there is consensus)? In a series of studies, we demonstrate that decision-makers prefer higher variance in positive domains (e.g., jelly beans, movies, and desserts) but lower variance in negative domains (e.g., dental procedures, disgusting foods). These predictable shifts in preferences for variance are due in part to individuals focusing disproportionately on achieving the best outcomes in positive domains – leading to variance-seeking – and avoiding the worst outcomes in negative domains – leading to variance-aversion.

Compatibility Effects in the Aggregation of Opinions
Maciejovsky, Boris (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Budescu, David V. (University of Illinois)

There has been a substantial increase of websites providing consumers with information about products and services. This information is usually presented in the form of verbal reviews and numerical ratings. It is assumed that consumers adequately integrate the information across both formats. Research on compatibility effects between stimulus and response formats, however, suggests that information aggregation and preference consistency are higher (lower) in cases of compatible (non-compatible) formats. The results of three experiments confirm this conjecture. Information aggregation and preference reversals were systematically affected by the compatibility of the stimulus and response format. Participants were not aware of this effect.

Motivating Discounts: Price-Induced Motivated Reasoning
Dawson, Erica (Yale School of Management); Amir, On (UCSD Rady School of Management)

Indifferent consumers tend to interpret large discounts as signals of low quality. We examine discounts with the notion that consumers frequently are not indifferent—they often approach purchase decisions with a consumption preference. By varying a priori product appeal and discount sizes, we demonstrate that large discounts can signal low quality to neutral consumers, but have the opposite effect on consumers motivated to attain the product, who perceived the product more positively (and purchased more) when offered a large rather than moderate discount in 4 studies. We explain positive distortion in product perceptions in terms of psychological theories of motivated reasoning.

Trade-offs in the Dark: Exemplar-Based Learning and Extrapolated Preference Functions
Huang, Yanliu (Marketing Department, University of Pennsylvania); Meyer, Robert (Marketing Department, University of Pennsylvania)

Our research investigates how consumers construct multi-attribute preferences over unfamiliar attribute ranges. Using an agent-learning task we find tentative support for an asymmetric pattern-matching process that yields more accurate forecasts of utility when attribute values are better than those with which decision makers have had experience than worse. At the same time, high levels of accuracy displayed in predicting over positive ranges suggests that such pattern-matching processes were accompanied by higher-order skills of linear extrapolation—though applied only when decision makers were asked to contemplate positive outcomes.

(4B) Affective Forecasting (4:45 – 6:15)

My Imagination or Your Feelings? Judging the Impact of a Medical Condition on Happiness
Walsh, Emma (City University); Ayton, Peter (City University)

People typically overestimate the impact of future events on happiness. One proposed remedy is, rather than imagining the event, people should consult a “surrogate” currently experiencing the event. Norwick, Gilbert, and Wilson (2005) forced people to use surrogate reports by withholding all other information and found people made better forecasts. However, in life surrogate information rarely supplants event information. When we presented both sorts of information, judgments improved but event information still biased forecasts. People are bad at imagining how medical conditions would affect their happiness but also inappropriately discount other people’s experience as a valid predictor of their own.

On Emotional Innumeracy: Predicted and Actual Affective Responses to Grand-Scale Tragedies
Dunn, Elizabeth (University of British Columbia); Ashton-James, Claire (University of British Columbia)

We hypothesized that affective forecasts are more sensitive to abstract quantitative information than are emotional experiences, even when forecasts are made in single-evaluation mode. Consistent with this hypothesis, we show in three studies that people predict

feeling increasingly upset as a function of death toll, but that actual emotions are largely insensitive to the number of people killed—unless abstract death tolls are translated into concrete images. We argue that affective forecasts and emotional experiences may arise from separate systems, and demonstrate that the act of forecasting primes the rational (versus experiential) system, leading to reductions in temporal discounting.

The influence of the future on judgments of self and others
Williams, Elanor F. (Cornell University); Gilovich, Tom (Cornell University)

People constantly think about and plan for the future, and it follows that the future has a large impact on judgments of the self. However, people don't as readily think about other people's futures, which raises questions about the extent to which the future influences judgments of others. We contend that the person one is striving to be is seen as a more significant component of the self than of other people, and the asymmetrical influence the future has on representations of the self and others can affect how each are perceived, understood, and assessed in the present.

Damned If You Do, But Not If You Did: How Temporal Perspective Shapes Perceptions of Fairness and Morality
Caruso, Eugene M. (University of Chicago)

People's emotional reactions tend to be more extreme for future events than for equivalent past events, and moral intuitions are often guided by emotional reactions. Therefore, moral judgments typically may be more extreme for events set in the future than for events set in the past. In five studies, participants judged future unfair events more extremely than equivalent events in the equidistant past. The results suggest that permission for actions with ethical connotations may be harder to get than forgiveness, and that moral reactions to ethical behavior can be heavily influenced by the temporal framing of events.

(4C) Symposium: Judgments and Decisions about Allocation of Humanitarian Aid (4:45 – 6:15)

Organizers: Cuddy, Amy J. C. (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Small, Deborah A. (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)

Four lines of research address judgment and decision-making processes that shape allocation of humanitarian aid, emphasizing the roles of emotion (Van Boven, Small, & Cuddy) and intergroup bias (Cuddy & Ritov). Van Boven identifies an immediacy bias in decisions about humanitarian aid allocation, experimentally demonstrating that people who are exposed to a randomly ordered sequence of distressing humanitarian crises, prefer (i.e., perceive as more aid-worthy) the final crisis in the sequence to which they experienced immediate emotional reactions. Small argues that natural disasters and other tragic events are more likely to elicit sympathy than static misfortunes like hunger because sympathy is a function of change, not states. She presents evidence that sympathy is greater when a negative state is the result of a loss than when it is a chronic condition. Cuddy argues that intergroup biases in judgments about the emotional states of disaster victims impact helping responses. Observers both deny that outgroup victims experience anger, a privileged emotion they reserve for ingroups, and deny help to outgroup victims who express anger. Ritov discusses conditions under which identifying an individual victim fails to generate donations to a larger humanitarian cause, focusing on moderating roles of social categorization and ingroup preference.

Who to Help? Immediacy Bias in Judgments and Decisions about Humanitarian Aid Allocation
Van Boven, Leaf (Cornell University); Huber, Michaela A. (University of Colorado at Boulder); McGraw, A. Peter (University of Colorado at Boulder); Johnson-Graham, Laura (University of Colorado at Boulder)

In three experiments, people exhibited an immediacy bias when allocating resources among humanitarian crises they learned about over time. After exposure to a randomly ordered sequence of distressing humanitarian crises, people perceived as more deserving, donated more money to, and were more likely to write a letter calling attention to the final crisis in the sequence to which people experienced immediate emotional reactions. The immediacy bias occurred independent of mortality information, and diminished after emotions had presumably subsided. The tendency to favor the final crisis was diminished when people allocated resources after each crisis, reacting sequentially to immediate emotions.

Reference-Dependent Sympathy
Small, Deborah A. (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)

Natural disasters and other tragic events often capture compassion and aid whereas static misfortunes like poverty and hunger fail to arouse emotion and action. Decision researchers know well that carriers of self-utility are losses and gains, rather than absolute levels of wealth. I argue that aid disparities are partly attributable to the fact that sympathy is likewise a function of changes, not states. I present evidence that, controlling for a victim's current state, sympathy is greater when that state is the result of a loss than when it is a chronic condition.

No Right to be Mad: Denying Anger and Help to Outgroup Victims
Cuddy, Amy J. C. (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School)

Biased judgments about the emotional states of outgroup members interfere with observers' decisions to offer or deny aid during humanitarian crises. In a series of experiments, participants who read news articles about disasters ascribed less anger to outgroup victims than to ingroup victims, but equal fear and sadness, though reported more interest in helping outgroup victims to whom they had ascribed anger. Ironically, however, ingroup members withdrew help when outgroup members expressed their anger. In short, observers both deny that outgroup victims experience anger, a privileged emotion reserved for ingroups, and deny help to those outgroup victims who express anger.

Who is the Victim? Identifiability Effect in Different Types of Social Categorizations

Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew University); Kogut, Tehila (Hebrew University)

When does identifying an individual victim enhance willingness to help? We suggest that increase in helping due to identifiability of the victim depends on the self social categorization of the contributor in relation to the victim, as well as the type of social categories considered. Three types of groups were examined: nationality based, politically-ideologically founded, and randomly generated groups based on the minimal group paradigm. Identifying the victim increased donations to in-group members but not to out-group ones in some types of groups, while the opposite pattern was observed for other types. We discuss possible accounts of these divergent findings.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 18

(5A) Conflict and Choice (10:30 – 12:00) (NOTE: In Salon B)

Inferences from Decision Difficulty: False Consensus or Uniqueness as a Function of Choice Conflict

Steffel, Mary (Princeton University); Shafir, Eldar (Princeton University)

Our research demonstrates that people rely on decision conflict to predict other people's choices. We find that people predict a greater proportion of others to share their preferences when decisions feel easy than when they feel hard. While relying on conflict is often a useful guide to predicting choice, this heuristic biases predictions in a systematic fashion. In a series of experiments, we manipulate conflict by varying the relative attractiveness of choice options and demonstrate errors in prediction that are based on conflict. We explore the boundaries of the decision conflict heuristic and discuss implications for individual and collective choices.

Dazed and Confused by Choice: How Underestimating the Costs of Choosing Leads to Undesirable Outcomes

Botti, Simona (London Business School); Hsee, Christopher K. (University of Chicago)

Choosing involves both benefits and costs. For example, choosing allows one to find the option that best matches personal preference. At the same time, choosing is cognitively taxing and emotionally stressing. In three experiments, we show that individuals systematically underestimate the cost of choosing, and desire choice even though they would be better off if they relinquished it. For example, participants predicted that they would perform and feel better in a problem-solving task if they could choose which problems to solve, yet in reality, those who could not choose performed and felt better than those who could and did choose.

Comprehension checks as a necessary condition for validating experimental demonstrations of normative violations.

Keren, Gideon (Eindhoven University of Technology); Willemsen, Martijn (Eindhoven University of Technology)

A recent debate on the JDM mailing list concerns unsuccessful replications of experimental results. A major reason for such failures stems from ambiguous instructions and Experimenters' inability to take participants' perspective. While many Experimenters perform manipulation checks, they fail to conduct comprehension checks. Recently, Gneezy et. al. (2006) introduced the Uncertainty effect following which a risky prospect is valued less than its worst possible outcome. We present experiments showing that the effect results from participants' misunderstanding (and misinterpretation) of complex gambles. To prevent such artefacts and ensure the validity of experimental results and their replication, rigorous comprehension checks are recommended.

When Less is More: The Effect of Processing Fluency on Preference for Hedonic Products

Pocheptsova, Anastasiya (Yale University); Labroo, Aparna (University of Chicago); Dhar, Ravi (Yale University)

Existing research posits that products that are processed more easily also feel more familiar (Schwarz 2004), and because people prefer familiar objects (Zajonc 1968), ease of processing results in enhanced liking of the target product. However, what if a product is hedonic in nature and believed to be for special occasions? We propose that for such products difficulty of processing will enhance evaluation because it will make such products feel more special. Consistent with this proposition, we find, across three studies, that consumers prefer hedonic products (such as gourmet cheese or chocolate truffles) when processing difficulty is high.

(5B) Affect and Judgment (10:30 – 12:00)

When You're Feeling Blue, Less Is True: The Influence of Negative Affect on Validity Judgments

Evans, Matt (DePaul University)

Three experiments demonstrated that negative affect suppresses judgments that information is true. In two experiments, participants judged fewer ambiguous statements to be true when primed with negative affect than when primed with positive affect. In a third experiment, participants were faster at judging obviously true statements to be true than at judging obviously false statements to be false when primed with positive affect, but this pattern was reversed when participants were primed with negative affect, such that participants tended to be faster at judging obviously false statements to be false than at judging obviously true statements to be true.

Affect As A Decision System Of The Present

Chang, Hanna (Columbia University); Pham, Michel Tuan (Columbia University)

We propose that the affective system is more likely to be engaged in decisions that are anchored in the present than in decisions that are anchored either in the future or in the past. Consistent with this proposition, results from four experiments show that both integral affect and incidental affect carry more weight in decisions about the immediate future than in decisions about a more distant future. In addition, the scope-insensitivity bias associated with affective valuation holds only when people are thinking about the present but not when they are thinking about the future or about the past.

Seeing Red (or Blue): Anger More Than Sadness Exacerbates Politically Polarized Evaluations of the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina

Huber, Michaela (University of Colorado, Boulder); Van Boven, Leaf (Cornell University); Park, Bernadette (University of Colorado, Boulder); Pizzi, William (University of Colorado, Boulder)

The general public is often divided along political lines in the face of important events or crises such as Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. Two experiments showed that anger more than sadness exacerbates the political divide. In a nationally representative sample, integral anger led to a political divide between Democrats and Republicans in terms of who they blamed for events related to Hurricane Katrina. In a community sample in Colorado, experimentally aroused incidental anger led to increased political polarization when participants evaluated the Federal Government's response to Hurricane Katrina. The importance of anger and sadness for political polarization is discussed.

Physical Contact, Emotional Responses, and Liability Judgment in Legal Cases

Zhang, Yan (University of Chicago GSB)

In legal cases, someone whose behavior caused something which consequently caused injuries is judged to be less guilty than someone whose behavior caused injuries directly (study 1). However, this is not due to the more complicated causal chains. Holding everything else constant, people gave harsher penalty if the defendant physically touched the victim than not (study 2). This is because liability judgments are mainly driven by the strong emotions associated with imagining physically touching victims. When people consider a legal case where the defendant physically touched the victim, not showing facial expressions blocks emotions and consequently reduces penalty (study 3).

(5C) Perceptions involving time (10:30 – 12:00)

Looming Losses in Future Time Perception

Bilgin, Baler (University of California, Riverside); LeBoeuf, Robyn A. (University of Florida)

We propose that a future time interval's perceived length will be affected by whether the interval ends positively or negatively, with impending losses playing a special role in time perception. We find that intervals ending with losses seem shorter than equivalent intervals ending with gains, partly because losses "loom larger" (seem nearer) than gains. Consistent with this, perceived interval length is more sensitive to changes in the magnitude of anticipated losses than anticipated gains. Furthermore, positive and negative interval endpoints have a less pronounced effect on time perception when they are no longer interpreted as "gains" and "losses."

Subjective Time Perception and Temporal Discounting

Zauberman, Gal (University of Pennsylvania); Kim, B. Kyu (University of Pennsylvania); Malkoc, Selin A. (University of Minnesota); Bettman, James R. (Duke University)

In this work we explore the effect of time perception in preferences over time. We suggest that people are relatively insensitive to changes in objective time horizon and that this insensitivity itself leads to a declining rate of discounting with increased time intervals (i.e., hyperbolic discounting). Results from three studies show that the subjective estimates of time horizon are significantly more compressed relative to objective time. When discount rate is calculated using the subjective estimates of duration rather than actual duration, discounting is no longer hyperbolic.

Perceptions Of The Length Of Future Time Intervals: The Role Of Certainty

LeBoeuf, Robyn A. (University of Florida); Simmons, Joseph P. (Yale University)

We posit that uncertainty (versus certainty) about what will happen in a future time interval makes that interval seem longer. Consistent with this, future intervals seem shorter when participants consider the events that will transpire in them (thereby diminishing uncertainty) than when they contemplate “empty” intervals of equal length; similarly, intervals seem shorter when filled with many events, instead of few. Furthermore, those who consider many (versus few) things occurring during an interval are more willing to defer income until the interval ends (i.e., exhibit lower discount rates), presumably because diminished uncertainty about the interval makes the interval seem shorter.

Culture and judgment based on time
 Ji, Li-Jun (Queen's University)

The same information may be judged differently, depending on the timeframe associated with it. Such judgment is also affected by people's cultural background. Research from my lab has shown that (1) Chinese participants perceived events happening in the past to be more relevant to the present than Canadian participants, (2) Chinese participants remembered information on the past better than Canadian participants, and (3) Chinese assigned greater monetary value to events in the past than to identical events in the future, whereas Canadians assigned greater monetary value to events in the future than to identical events in the past.

(6A) Behavioral Economics (2:45 – 4:15)

Unraveling the Disposition Effect: The role of prospect theory and emotions
 Summers, Barbara (Leeds University Business School); Duxbury, Darren (Leeds University Business School)

The ‘disposition effect’ (Sheffrin and Statman, 1985) describes the tendency of investors to selling winning shares too soon while holding losing shares for too long. The effect was explained using prospect theory, but prospect theory's causal role has been questioned by recent studies (Barberis & Xiong, 2006; Hens & Vlcek, 2005). To examine this, we explore the minimum conditions required for the disposition effect. We find that the disposition effect can be explained by the balance between positive and negative affect in a way that is in line with the predictions of subjective expected pleasure theory (Mellers et. al., 1999).

Limited Strategic Thinking in the Field: The Box Office Premium to Unreviewed “Cold Opened” Movies
 Brown, Alexander L (California Institute of Technology); Camerer, Colin F. (California Institute of Technology); Lovallo, Dan (University of Western Australia)

In the US, distributors occasionally choose to not prescreen their worst movies to critics, causing movie quality to be unknown for some time. Our data suggests this tactic is profitable. While at equilibrium rational moviegoers should infer movie quality from the distributor's decision not to screen them, laboratory experiments suggest that people do not reach this level of sophisticated thinking. Our paper is the first to fit models designed and calibrated from these laboratory results to field data, and in this specific area, consumer, but not distributor behavior, closely matches the level of thinking of subjects in the lab.

The psychology of benefits decisions: A field experiment with Flexible Spending Accounts
 Schwartz, Janet (Princeton University); Bertrand, Marianne (University of Chicago); Mullainathan, Sendhil (Harvard University); Shafir, Eldar (Princeton University)

Although decision science principles have shown great power in laboratory settings, policy makers have largely ignored them in making actual policy. To assess the relevance of these principles for social policy and managerial decision making we present a field experiment designed to boost participation rates and contribution amounts in employer-sponsored healthcare Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs). On the whole, the intervention was a success, resulting in significant increases in FSA take-up among non-users and in contribution amounts among users. The results show the extent to which psychological variables can have a meaningful impact on benefits programs' participation.

Choice Architecture
 Thaler, Richard H (University of Chicago); Sunstein, Cass (University of Chicago)

JDM researchers have long known that context and framing influence choice. This paper proposes that choices can be improved by paying more attention to the design of the choice environment, what we call “choice architecture”. Drawing on Don Norman's work on product design, we identify 6 guidelines for the design of choice architecture systems. Applications in both the public and private sector are discussed.

(6B) Socially-influenced preferences (2:45 – 4:15)

Trade-offs Between Economic and Social Goals
 Arora, Poonam (Columbia University); Krantz, David H. (Columbia University); Hardisty, David (Columbia University); Peterson, Nicole (Columbia University); Reddy, Kavita (Columbia University)

We examine the consequences of two commonly held assumptions: first, that “preferences” are constructed, and thus can be strongly context-dependent; second, that social as well as economic goals are important, and therefore tradeoffs between these two goal types can be a major factor in context-dependent choice. Our two studies show that an increase in affiliation increases the saliency of social goals making cooperative action more likely, changing the perception of payoffs and reducing importance of self-gain. Changes in the temporal framing, i.e., delay of payoffs can attenuate this increased saliency of social goals vis-à-vis economic goals thus reducing cooperative action.

Mistaken Identity: Social Identity as a Specious Cue for Decision Making

Fox, Craig (UCLA); Carranza, Erica (Columbia University); Morris, Michael (Columbia University)

Four studies show that preferences can be biased by a salient social identity that is only superficially related to available options. In Studies 1 and 2, Republicans were more likely to favor “conservative” (less risky) gambles and/or investments after they had been asked about their political identity, while there was no such effect among Democrats. Study 3 finds that this effect disappears when there is no “conservative” label. Study 4 shows that attraction to identity-congruent labels persists when labels are reversed and participants elaborate on why the “conservative” label applies. These results suggest top-down rather than bottom-up construction of preferences.

The Bold – Timid Divide in Consumer Choice

Maimaran, Michal (Stanford University); Simonson, Itamar (Stanford University)

We propose that many seemingly different choice problems decision makers face involve fundamentally similar options. Specifically, we argue that across a wide range of problems some options represent more “timid” choices (e.g., compromise, safe, and standard options) whereas other options represent more “bold” choices (e.g., extreme, risky, and unique options). The tendency to select a more timid or bold option is affected by situational cues which trigger a more timid or bold mindset. Several studies demonstrate this distinction between options and the correspondence between mindsets and choice behavior.

Motivation in Judgment and Choice: Strategy, Duration, and Accuracy of Judgment as a Function of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motives

DeCaro, Daniel, A. (Department of Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056); Johnson, Joseph, G. (Department of Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056)

Within JDM, motivation is traditionally conceptualized as task importance – greater effort arises from associated incentive returns and situational requirements such as justifiability (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). However, self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2004) suggests that economic-based task importance is just one element of a complementary motivational system involving both extrinsic (instrumental) and intrinsic (self-identity based) incentives. We examined the influence of extrinsic v. intrinsic incentives in a complex judgment task. Participants judged the guiltiness of mock murder case suspects within a computerized process-tracing paradigm. Compared to extrinsic, intrinsic motivation increased information search completeness and duration and improved guiltiness judgments.

(6C) Individual Differences (2:45 – 4:15)

Do maximizers make better decisions than satisficers?

Parker, Andrew M. (RAND Corporation); Bruine de Bruin, Wändi (Carnegie Mellon University); Fischhoff, Baruch (Carnegie Mellon University)

Schwartz et al. (2002) measured the extent to which people try to maximize vs. satisfice when making decisions, and found that maximizers tend to be more regretful and less happy than satisficers. We examine how maximizing vs. satisficing tendencies relate to (a) other decision-making styles, (b) decision-making competence, and (d) decision-making outcomes. Self-reported maximizers are more likely than satisficers to experience regret, to depend on others when making decisions, and to avoid decisions. More importantly, they also display worse decision-making competence and report worse life outcomes -- even after controlling for other decision-making styles, decision-making competence, and demographic variables.

The Pain of Paying Varies Across Situations and Individuals: Evidence from an International Survey

Rick, Scott (Wharton); Cryder, Cynthia (Carnegie Mellon); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon)

We develop a Spendthrift-Tightwad (ST-TW) scale to measure individual differences in the pain of paying. In an international sample of over 13,000 respondents, we find that tightwads outnumber spendthrifts by a 3:2 ratio. Although ST-TW scale scores correlate significantly with credit card debt and total savings, situational determinants of the pain of paying moderate the influence of individual differences. Spending differences between tightwads and spendthrifts are greatest when situational factors intensify the pain of paying and smallest when situational factors mitigate the pain of paying.

Numeracy and intuitive number sense in decision making

Peters, Ellen (Decision Research); Vastfjall, Daniel (Decision Research and Goteborg University); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)

Previous research has shown that individuals low and high in numeracy (number skill) rely on different sources of information in decision making. We demonstrate that numeracy is associated with a low-level intuitive number sense such that highly numerate individuals have more precise representations of numeric quantities compared to their less numerate peers. We further show that number sense is associated with decisions involving number comparisons both indirectly through numeracy and directly through number-comparison processes in the decision context. This intuitive representation appears to underlie numeric abilities and the meaning, utility, and weighting of information in decisions involving number comparisons.

Affective versus deliberative processing in younger and older adults' risk taking: The role of cognitive control
Figner, Bernd (Columbia University); Murphy, Ryan O. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

The role of affective versus deliberative processing and cognitive control in risk taking in young and older adults was investigated with two versions of a dynamic computer card game, a Go/No-Go task, and skin conductance recording. Age effects in risk taking were observed only in the affective condition. Further, increased affect-based risk taking was correlated with lower cognitive control in young adults. The results are consistent with the explanation that increased risk taking in young adults is caused by a developmentally transient imbalance between affective and deliberative processes with cognitive control playing a mediation role.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19

(7A) Decision Strategies (8:45 – 10:15)

Testing unconscious thought: Is distraction really a panacea for difficult decisions?
Phillips, Nathaniel D. (Ohio University); González-Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University); Bellezza, F. S. (Ohio University); Chimeli, Janna (Ohio University); Harman, Jason (Ohio University); Lassiter, G. D., Lindberg, Matthew J.

Dijksterhuis et al.'s (2006) Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) suggests that distraction from a problem leads to better decisions than deliberate thought due to the activation of unconscious thought. An alternative hypothesis is that people form online-judgments during pre-distraction information acquisition which serve as the basis of what is reported after distraction. To test this hypothesis, Einhorn and Hogarth's (1992) belief-adjustment model was used to model choice data resulting from different orders of stimuli presentation. In support of our hypothesis and in contrast to UTT, stimuli order-effects were found conforming to predictions of fatigue and belief-perseverance from the belief-adjustment model.

Decisions by Coin Toss and the Limits of Rationality
Keren, Gideon (Eindhoven University of Technology); Teigen, Karl H (University of Oslo)

Faced with equally attractive options, rational choice theory implicitly prescribes a randomizer (e.g., coin) as a tie breaker. Similarly, when lacking convincing arguments in favor of one option, considerations of fairness (e.g., which patient should receive the life saving kidney) advocate using a randomizer. Contrary to these normative considerations, we present empirical evidence demonstrating people's strong aversion for coin tossing, even when (i) they judge the options as equally (un)attractive, and (ii) observable fairness is desired. Evidently, visibly arbitrary chance is often repulsive. The results are examined in light of different conceptions of rationality, from an economic and psychological perspective.

Decision Amnesia: Motivated Forgetting of Difficult Choices
Chance, Zoe (Harvard); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard)

Quite famously, past research has suggested that following difficult decisions, people are motivated to bolster the chosen option and deride the foregone alternatives (Festinger 1957), but we show that individuals sometimes use the even simpler strategy of forgetting the original decision entirely. We demonstrate first that, in seeming violation of standard memory effects, decision amnesia is most likely to occur for those decisions consumers spent the most time considering. Furthermore, participants seem to fill in the missing elements of past decisions with originally absent options: the desire to maintain the amnesia is strong enough to reconstruct the fabric of memory.

The Effect of Manipulating Category Width on Consumer Decision Making
Chakravarti, Amitav (New York University); Ulkumen, Gulden M. (University of Southern California); Morwitz, Vicki G. (New York University)

In this paper we show that the fine-grained nature of one decision context (e.g., answering questions on simple 3-point scales vs. more differentiated 7-point ones), systematically and reliably affects judgments and decisions made in a subsequent and unrelated decision. This occurs because exposure to a more (less) fine-grained decision context narrows (broadens) people's category widths, and induces more (less) careful and meticulous information processing. This change in processing style leads to carryover effects on basic cognitive behaviors (e.g., grouping, categorization), in consumer domains (e.g., new product adoption, brand extension evaluation), and for general decision making strategies (e.g., susceptibility to heuristics).

(7B) Self-control and self-regulation (8:45 – 10:15)*Activating Self-Control: Isolated versus Interrelated Temptations*

Myrseth, Kristian Ove R. (University of Chicago GSB); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago GSB)

Some temptations are not damaging when consumed in moderation (e.g., eating one small dessert, smoking one cigarette), but will conflict with long-term goals when consumed extensively. We argue that people perceive such choice opportunities as self-control dilemmas, and thus exercise restraint, only if the opportunities for indulgence are perceived as interrelated. Otherwise, there is no experience of a dilemma and hence no exercise of restraint. We report three experiments that manipulated the perceived relationship between choice opportunities, and we find more self-control when opportunities seem interrelated versus isolated.

To Have One's Mind Set on it: Mindsets and Self-Control Dilemmas

Bruyneel, Sabrina D. (Carnegie Mellon / KULeuven); Dewitte, Siegfried (KULeuven)

The self-control strength model states that exerting self-control taxes a limited resource akin to energy or strength, thus bringing people in a state of resource depletion and reducing their capacity to exert self-control subsequently. We attempt to gain more insight in the processes underlying depletion. We show that exerting self-control induces a myopic mindset (Study 1) which subsequently drives depletion effects (Studies 2 and 3). We also show that the myopic mindset rather than the exertion of effort induces self-control loss. A state of depletion may thus better be characterized as a cognitive state than as a loss of strength.

Myopic Procrastination of Positive Experiences

Shu, Suzanne B. (UCLA); Gneezy, Ayelet (University of California, San Diego)

The tendency to delay what could be done today applies not only to effortful, undesirable tasks but also to positive experiences that we look forward to having. Existing models of myopic procrastination for aversive tasks can also apply to these situations to explain how positive events can be continually delayed. A large multi-city study surveying tourists and residents shows that individuals procrastinate visiting desirable city landmarks when given unlimited time windows. This procrastination, however, is reduced once the window of opportunity is constrained. A second study provides evidence that temporal construal effects contribute to this myopic procrastination.

I won't think about you unless I need you: The influence of money on social perception

Mead, Nicole (Florida State University); Vohs, Kathleen (University of Minnesota)

Building on recent research showing that money leads to self-sufficient behavior (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006), the present research tested whether and how money influences basic social cognition. People reminded of money showed poorer recall for social information, but not for non-social information, relative to people not reminded of money (Study 1). People primed with money were worse at perspective-taking than people not primed with money (Study 2). Offering a financial incentive for accuracy improved money participants' perspective-taking, but a social incentive did not (Study 3). Thus, money leads to egocentric biases unless sufficient motivation for accuracy is given.

(7C) Likelihood Judgments (8:45 – 10:15)*Outcome Dependency of Subjective Probability Estimates*

Vosgerau, Joachim (Carnegie Mellon)

Do subjective probability estimates depend on the nature of the outcome? In three studies, it is shown that the stake in an outcome (e.g. winning \$5 or losing \$5 if the outcome occurs vs. no gain or loss if the outcome occurs) leads to elevated probability judgments. In study 1, stake in the outcome is shown to elevate both subjective probabilities, the likelihood of the outcome occurring and the likelihood of the outcome not occurring. Study 2 and 3 manipulate the mediating variable arousal directly. Aroused participants are shown to give higher likelihood judgments for complementary outcomes than non-aroused participants.

Locus of control as a factor in gambler's fallacy and hot-outcome effect

Hart, Stephanie S. (University of Houston-Clear Lake); Levin, Irwin P. (University of Iowa)

We investigate perceptions of randomness in children (9- to 10- years old) and adults. In a binary choice paradigm, children showed positive recency (e.g., the "hot outcome" fallacy), in contrast to adults who showed negative recency (e.g., the gambler's fallacy). We discuss developmental differences in locus of control as a contributing factor in the use of a "stay" or "switch" strategy, and suggest future research to further test this hypothesis.

Within-Subject Preference Reversals and Order Effects in Decisions from Experience

Ungemach, Christoph (University of Warwick); Stewart, Neil (University of Warwick); Chater, Nick (University College London)

We investigated whether differences between decisions made from descriptions and experience can be observed within participants. 150 subjects made choices between six pairs of decision problems presented in a descriptive and an experiential format. Unlike previous studies, the experienced probabilities were matched exactly to the probabilities in the descriptions, so any differences between formats cannot be ascribed to sampling error. In addition, three order conditions were implemented but no order effects were found. Preference reversals consistent with underweighting of small probabilities in decision from experience were still observed but cannot be explained by sampling error or undersampling of rare events.

On the Determinants of the Psychological Weighting of Rare Events
Erev, Ido (Technion); Hertwig, Ralph (Univ. of Basel); Schurr, Amos (Hebrew Univ.)

Many important behavioral phenomena can be described as consequences of sub-optimal weighting of rare events. Interestingly, the direction of the deviations from optimal weighting varies between experimental paradigms. Indications of overweighting rare events have been observed in the study of decision-making under risk and uncertainty, judgment, and reaction to aversive experiences. Deviations in the opposite direction have been observed in the study decisions from experience and perceptual decisions. The current paper reviews these findings and demonstrates that the direction of the deviations can be captured with a simple model that assumes reliance on small samples of available scenarios.

(8A) Choice Sets and Choices (10:30 – 12:00)

Making a Difference: Expectation-Driven Separation in Consumer Choices
Carlson, Kurt A. (Duke University); Tal, Aner (Duke University)

When decision makers lack prior knowledge of the available choice options, their choice depends exclusively on the acquisition and evaluation of option information. We find that even when decision makers lack option-specific knowledge, they have expectations regarding the choice set as a whole which influence the choice process. As the expected difference in overall quality between options increases so does depth of search and information distortion to favor the tentatively leading option. These results are consistent with the idea that the threshold decision makers need to breach before making a choice depends on their expectations regarding the choice set.

The Influence of Decision-Making Order on Consumers' Likelihood to Buy
Gao, Leilei (Stanford University); Simonson, Itamar (Stanford University)

We contrast two perspectives on consumer decision process or order: (a) first deciding whether to choose and then making a selection from a choice set, (b) first making a selection and then deciding whether to make any purchase. We show that the two orders systematically affect consumers' likelihood of making a purchase across a wide range of problems. Generally, when a selection decision is made first, purchase likelihood is mainly affected by the difficulty of comparing alternatives in a set; when a buy/no-buy decision is made first, purchase likelihood is mainly affected by the overall features of a choice set.

Decision Quicksands: Assortment Size, Justification, and Self-Control
Berger, Jonah A. (Wharton); Sela, Aner (Stanford); Liu, Wendy (UCLA)

Recent work has demonstrated how variety influences choice likelihood, but given that consumers end up making a selection, we suggest assortment size may also influence the type of item they select. Specifically, because choosing between a larger number of options requires making more tradeoff comparisons, it promotes greater reliance on reasons or justifications for choice. Consequently, we suggest that choosing from a larger set of options will lead consumers to select options that are easier to justify. Four studies support this hypothesis and demonstrate that assortment size influences the choice between vice and virtue.

Not in my backyard: The influence of arbitrary boundaries on consumer choice
Galak, Jeff (New York University); Kruger, Justin (New York University); Rozin, Paul (University of Pennsylvania)

The present research suggests that symbolic boundaries such as political borders act as psychological buffers. Participants in one study were less troubled by the threat of contamination from a hypothetical nuclear power plant if it was on the other side of a state border (holding constant distance), and consumers in another study were less likely to travel to a virtual store if they had to cross a town border in the process. Just as symbolic connection can convey the feeling of contamination (Morales and Fitzsimons, 2007; Rozin and Nemeroff, 2002), so too can symbolic disconnection serve as a psychological buffer.

(8B) Trust (10:30 – 12:00)

The comparative advantage of procedural legitimacy in social dilemmas
Gaissmaier, Wolfgang (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Tontrup, Stephan (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

The legitimacy of procedures could be an important determinant of people's willingness to cooperate in social dilemma situations. In a public goods game, we manipulated procedural legitimacy by either allowing people to vote on a set of rules or to give them rules other people voted for exogenously. Although game theoretically, this should make no difference, we expect that it does psychologically, with voting resulting in higher commitment. As hypothesized, average contributions to the public good were much higher in the voting than in the control condition (85.2% vs. 58.5%), independent of the actual outcome of the voting procedure.

Searching for Privacy in all the Wrong Places: A behavioral economics perspective on individual concern for privacy

John, Leslie (Carnegie Mellon University); Acquisti, Alessandro (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)

Willingness to disclose private information was tested in three survey-based experiments. The first indicated a paradoxical effect of reassurance: substantive assurances of confidentiality backfired, making individuals less likely to admit to having engaged in sensitive behaviors. The second study examined the impact of overt versus covert inquiries about sensitive behaviors. Participants were most likely to reveal incriminating information in the covert conditions, in which admissions did not "feel" like disclosure. A third study revealed an effect of question order on disclosure. Disclosure is likely to depend on a wide range of motives, not all of which are normatively appropriate.

Trusting Or Not Trusting One's Feelings In Ultimatum Games

Pham, Michel Tuan (Columbia University); Stephen, Andrew (Columbia University)

Four experiments show that, compared to lower trust in one's feelings, (1) higher trust in one's feelings results in less generous offers in ultimatum games, (2) especially in the dictator version of the game. Higher trust in one's feelings also results in (3) greater rejection of unfair offers, but equivalent acceptance of fair offers. The findings are not driven by differences in perceptions of what players see as "fair" divisions under high versus low trust of feelings. Rather, players with high trust in their feelings appear play the game as if they represented it in a more literal fashion.

Don't Get Mad, Get Even: On Consumers' Revenge

Gneezy, Ayelet (Rady, UC San Diego); Ariely, Dan (Duke)

Data from three field studies show that when annoyed, consumers will revenge; take direct actions to "correct" matters even at the cost of behaving in a dishonest manner. We further test the roles of an apology, and that of a principal-agent distinction, in mitigating, and aggravating the tendency for revenge.

(8C) Multiple Opinions (10:30 – 12:00)

The cost and benefit of independent opinions: On being less confident in one's more accurate judgments

Yaniv, Ilan (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Choshen, Shoham (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Milyavsky, Maxim (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

A DM polls others' opinions and finds they highly agree with each other. Should this increase her confidence in her final decision? Our experiments shed light on a puzzling phenomenon whereby high intercorrelations among opinions increase confidence and decrease validity. Participants made more accurate judgments on the basis of independent opinions, but they reported greater confidence in judgments based on dependent (agreeing) opinions. Paradoxically, they were more confident in their less accurate estimates, although they were aware of the nature of sampling of the opinions on each trial. The implications for sampling of opinions in decision making are considered.

Ironic Effects of Personalized Product Recommendations on Subjective Consumer Decision Outcomes

Häubl, Gerald (University of Alberta); Dellaert, Benedict G. C. (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Usta, Murat (University of Alberta)

Personalized product recommendations are a form of decision assistance, provided either by a human advisor (realtor, salesperson, etc.) or a computer-based decision aid, designed to identify the most attractive available alternatives based on an understanding of a consumer's preference. We argue that personalized recommendations can have opposing effects on objective and subjective decision outcomes. While such assistance enables consumers to make objectively better choices, it tends to reduce their satisfaction with the chosen alternatives. In a series of experiments, we demonstrate the proposed ironic effects of personalized recommendations on subjective decision outcomes and examine the psychological mechanism underlying this phenomenon.

Are we wise about the "wisdom of crowds"?

Mannes, Albert E. (Duke University)

An aggregated group judgment is frequently more accurate than that of the group's average member. This research examines whether this "wisdom of crowds" is appreciated by laypersons when offered a group judgment as an aid to their own. In two studies, participants made a categorical distinction between individual and group judgments, placing more weight on the latter when forming

or revising their own. Their judgment policies, however, were insensitive to group size and underperformed a simple, weighted-averaging policy. In a third study, participants were sensitive to group size manipulated within-subject, but again made insufficient use of group advice.

Why are Experts Correlated? Decomposing Correlations Between Judges.

Broomell, Stephen (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Budescu, David V. (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

We derive an analytic model of the inter-expert correlation as a function of five underlying factors. Inter-cue correlation and the number of cues capture our assumptions about the environment of the decision, while similarity in training, differentiations in cue use, and accuracy describe assumptions about the judges. We study the relative importance of, and interrelations between, these five factors with respect to inter-judge correlation. Results highlight the centrality of the inter-cue correlation. We also address a variety of practical questions. For example, we find that additional judges increase efficacy at a greater rate than additional cues.

2007 SJDM Conference
POSTER TITLES LISTED BY SESSION

Session #1 w/ Continental Breakfast (Sunday, 8:30- 10:30am, Long Beach Convention Center, Grand Ballroom)

(1) When Unfairness doesn't Matter: The Role of Outcome and Attribution in Unfair Distributions

Ma, Jingjing (UCLA Anderson)

(2) Affect, risk and future optimism after the tsunami disaster

Västfjäll, Daniel (Decision Research, Eugene, OR); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research, Eugene, OR); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research, Eugene, OR)

(3) Back to valence: Process-tracing evidence that hedonic tone, not certainty appraisal drives the effect of emotion on decision making

Bachkurov, Alexandre (Leeds University Business School (UK), Mazoon College (Oman)); Maule, John (Leeds University Business School (UK))

(4) The role of affective reactions on investment decision-making

Rubaltelli, Enrico (University of Padova); Pasini, Giacomo (University of Venice); Rumiati, Rino (University of Padova); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)

(5) When anger yields financial rewards

Litvak, Paul (Carnegie Mellon University); Lerner, Jennifer (Harvard University)

(6) Feeling Good Enough to Do Wrong: The Role of Moral Identity in Moral Behavior

Sachdeva, Sonya (Northwestern University); Medin, Douglas L. (Northwestern University)

(7) On the Generality of Emotion effect on Scope Sensitivity

Gong, Min (University of Pennsylvania); Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania)

(8) Friend or Foe: The effect of implicit trustworthiness judgments in social decision-making.

Van 't Wout, Mascha (NDSL, University of Arizona); Sanfey, Alan G. (NDSL, University of Arizona)

(9) The influence of mood on decision making in the aging adult

Carpenter, Stephanie M. (University of Oregon); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research and University of Oregon); Västfjäll, Daniel (Goteborg University and Decision Research); Isen, Alice M. (Cornell University)

(10) Charitable Giving: How Ego-Threats Impact Donations of Time and Money

Duclos, Rod (University of North Carolina); Jim Bettman (Duke University); Paul Bloom (Duke University); Gal Zauberman (University of Pennsylvania)

(11) Affective Decision Making in Consumer Choice

Hafenbrädl, Sebastian (HEC Lausanne); Hoffrage, Ulrich (HEC Lausanne); White, Chris M. (HEC Lausanne)

(12) Involuntary Switching Behavior in Restricted Decision Environments

Ozcan, Timucin (University of Rhode Island)

(13) Knowing, feeling and thinking about it: A cognitive-affective model of preference construction

Trujillo, Carlos A. (Universidad de los Andes, School of Management)

(14) Decisions About Objects: Influences of Cognition, Personality and Psychopathology

Preston, Stephanie (University of Michigan)

(15) Individual strategy preferences for intuition and deliberation and decisional fit

Betsch, Cornelia (Erfurt, Germany); Kunz, Justus J. (Jena, Germany)

(16) Emotional and cognitive processes of decision-making in the Iowa Gambling Task

Beck, Brianna (Scripps College); Wood, Stacey (Scripps College)

(17) *Persuasive and Comforting Consistency: Accountability and Affective Functions of Coherence Shifts in Decision Making*
Chen, Lydia L. (University of Michigan); Yates, J. Frank (University of Michigan)

(18) *The Role of Implied Socio-Economic Advantage in Reactions of Outrage and Blame*
Krosch, Amy R. (Columbia University); Moore, Colleen F. (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

(19) *A Falling in Love Heuristic? An Exploration of Mate Choice Determinates*
Burke, Monica (University of West Florida); Schneider, Sandra (University of South Florida)

(20) *Retrospective evaluation of stories: Is it what you remember that counts?*
Poirier, Marie (City University); Hasic, Majda (City University); Aldrovandi, Sylvio (City University)

(21) *Beauty and folly: a study of risk and benefit perceptions in online dating profiles*
Krishnamurti, Tamar (Carnegie Mellon University); Downs, Julie (Carnegie Mellon University)

(22) *Hide or seek: The motivational processes behind decisions to avoid or pursue counter-attitudinal information*
Walker-Smith, Katherine Z. (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)

(23) *Affective forecasting can change decision behavior*
Angott, Andrea M. (University of Michigan); Yates, J. Frank (University of Michigan)

(24) *Acting without thinking: Rage, rashness, and moral evaluation*
Inbar, Yoel (Cornell University); Critcher, Clayton (Cornell University)

(25) *Happiness Pump: The Impact of Similarity and Accessibility of Past Experiences on Current Happiness*
Zhang, Yan (University of Chicago); Hsee, Chris (University of Chicago)

(26) *Two Routes to the Perception of Need: The role of affective and deliberative information processing in pro-social behavior.*
Dickert, Stephan (University of Oregon; Decision Research); Sagara, Namika (University of Oregon; Decision Research); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research; University of Oregon); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research; University of Oregon)

(27) *Psychophysical Judgments Before, During, After; How the Time of Judgment Interacts with Magnitude and Context Sensitivity.*
Hoffman, Moshe (University of Chicago); Hsee, Chris (University of Chicago); Myrseth, Kristian (University of Chicago)

(28) *Strategic perspective-taking: When wearing others' shoes makes you smarter*
Li, Ye (University of Chicago, GSB); Hastie, Reid (University of Chicago, GSB)

(29) *Bargaining with Time*
Nakazawa, Fusae (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México); Bouzas, Arturo (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)

(30) *Film Rentals and Procrastination: A Study of Intertemporal Reversals in Preferences and Intrapersonal Conflict*
Milkman, Katherine L. (Harvard University); Rogers, Todd (Harvard University); Bazerman, Max H. (Harvard University)

(31) *Norms and Contributions: A field experiment in public library fundraising*
Krupka, Erin (IZA); Croson, Rachel (Univ. of Texas at Dallas)

(32) *Distortion of Payoffs and Probabilities in Mixed Monetary Gambles*
DeKay, Michael L. (The Ohio State University); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest University)

(33) *Modeling the Effects of Reference Point Dependence and Loss Aversion on Supplier Selection*
Feng, Tianjun (University of California, Irvine); Keller, L. Robin (University of California, Irvine)

(34) *The psychological representation of corporate personality*
Otto, Philipp (UCL); Chater, Nick (UCL); Stott, Henry (Decision Technology)

(35) *The impact of participation and beneficiaries on the decision to cooperate*
Wahl, Ingrid (University of Vienna); Muehlbacher, Stephan (University of Vienna); Kirchler, Erich (University of Vienna)

(36) *Comparing the decision field theory with the proportional difference model for decisions under risk*
Scheibehenne, Benjamin (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); Rieskamp, Jörg (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin); González-Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio State University, Athens)

(37) The Long and Short of Temptations and Decision-Making

Magen, Eran (Stanford University); Newman, Frank M. (Stanford University); Torrance, Tina M. (Stanford University); Gross, James J. (Stanford University)

(38) Getting Ourselves Together: The cybernetic process model of self-control

Magen, Eran (Stanford University); Gross, James J. (Stanford University)

(39) The Trust Allocator Game: Observing the Effects of Credible Signaling on Trust-Based Cooperation in Dyads

Wood, Alison M. (Princeton University); Murphy, Ryan O. (Columbia University)

(40) Field and Lab Equilibration in the Poisson LUPI Game

Ostling, Robert (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics); Wang, Joseph Tao-yi (Division for the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech); Camerer, Colin F. (Division for the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech); Chou, Eileen Y. (Management and Organization, Kellogg School of Management)

(41) Patience Auctions: Using Novel Auction Mechanisms to Elicit Discount Rates Under Time or Money Framing

Olivola, Christopher Y. (Princeton University); Wang, Stephanie W. (Princeton University)

(42) Fractionating masculinity: Effects of dominance and systemising on Ultimatum Game behaviour

Reimers, Stian (University College London); Harvey, Nigel (University College London); Chater, Nick (University College London)

(43) The Goal-Gradient Explanation of Escalation of Commitment

Ting, Hsueh (University of Maryland, College Park); Wallsten, Thomas (University of Maryland, College Park)

(44) Excess entry: the roles of judgmental fallibility and overconfidence.

Hogarth, Robin (ICREA & Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain); Karelaia, Natalia (HEC Université de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland)

(45) Individual rationality and social rationality: Logical thinking and the ultimatum game

Nakamura, Kuninori (JSPS/Tokyo Institute of Technology); Yamagishi, Kimihiko (Tokyo Institute of Technology)

(46) Effects of Consistent and Accurate Predictions of Stock Prices on Herding in a Simulated Financial Market

Andersson, Maria A. (Göteborg University, Department of Psychology); Hedesström, Martin T. (Göteborg University, Department of Psychology); Gärling, Tommy (Göteborg University, Department of Psychology)

(47) A Race to the Finish: Coming Close to Fund-Raising Goals Increases the Rate of Donation

Cryder, Cynthia E. (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University); Seltman, Howard (Carnegie Mellon University)

(48) Signaling and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Abele, Susanne (Miami University); Stasser, Garold (Miami University)

(49) The Relationship between Risky and Delayed Decisions: A Model Comparison Approach

Bishara, Anthony J. (Indiana University); Busemeyer, Jerome R. (Indiana University); Ahn, Woo Y. (Indiana University); Kim, Woojae (Indiana University); Stout, Julie C. (Indiana University)

(50) The Houston Retirement Project-A Progress Report

Rude, Dale (U of Houston); Epstein, David (U of Houston)

(51) Context Effects in the Moral Domain

Iliev, Rumen (Northwestern University); Medin, Douglas (Northwestern University)

(52) Cross-Category Consideration Depends on Psychological Distance

Spiller, Stephen A. (Duke University); Lynch Jr., John G. (Duke University)

(53) When and Where Defaults Are Chosen

Crow, Janis (Kansas State University)

(54) Think, Blink or Sleep on it? The impact of mode of thought on decision making.

Newell, Ben (University of New South Wales); Cheung, Jeremy (University of New South Wales); Wong, Kwan Yao (University of New South Wales)

(55) Too Much Choice: Older Adults' Decision Making Related to Medicare Part D

Tanius, Betty E. (Claremont Graduate University); Wood, Stacey (Scripps College); Hanoch, Yaniv (Plymouth, UK); Rice, Thomas (University of California, Los Angeles); Ly, Martina (Scripps College); Horn, Laurel

(56) *Choice as a Means versus an End*

Choi, Jinhee (University of Chicago); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago)

(57) *I'll Have the Ice Cream Soon and the Vegetables Later: Decreasing Impatience over Time in Online Grocery Orders*

Rogers, Todd (Harvard Business School); Milkman, Katherine L. (Harvard Business School); Bazerman, Max H. (Harvard Business School)

(58) *Decoy Effects in Romantic Partner Selection*

Pettibone, Jonathan (Southern Illinois University Edwardsville)

(59) *How Chinese Consumers Choose between Hedonic and Utilitarian Products*

Ma, Xinxin (Central University for Nationalities); Ma, Jingjing (UCLA Anderson); Zhang, Li (Peking University)

(60) *Moderators of Choice Preference: An Archival Test of Implicit Egotism*

Kleyman, Kerry S. (University of Nevada, Reno); Kimmelmeier, Markus (University of Nevada, Reno)

(61) *Money and Fame: Vividness Effects in the National Basketball Association*

Wang, Long (Northwestern University)

(62) *Unwilling to initiate or willing to avoid the decision process: A two-dimensional model predicting decision process avoidance*

McNeill, Ilona M. (Universiteit van Amsterdam); Nijstad, Bernard A. (Universiteit van Amsterdam); Handgraaf, Michel J. J. (Universiteit van Amsterdam); De Dreu, Carsten K. W. (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

(63) *The self as heuristic: The interaction of shared initials and decision importance in job applications and Major League Baseball*

Hetts, John J. (Washington University); Gilbert, Elizabeth (Washington University); Kahntroff, Jeff (Washington University)

(64) *The benefits of unconscious thought in feature matching comparison*

Rim, Hye Bin (Yonsei University); Lee, Hana (Yonsei University); Park, So Ri (Yonsei University); Sohn, Young Woo (Yonsei University)

(65) *Is it appropriate to kill unarmed civilians in war? The impact of obedience on undergraduates' responses to moral scenarios*

Schueller, Stephen M. (University of Pennsylvania); Jayawickreme, Nuwan (University of Pennsylvania); Eidelson, Ben (University of Pennsylvania)

(66) *So many men, so little time: How people choose mates in the modern world*

Lenton, Alison (University of Edinburgh)

(67) *The psychology of vaccination and the appeal of "100%"*

Li, Meng (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University); Thomas, Dave (Yale University); Galvani, Alison (Yale University)

(68) *Taking Risks to Have Fun: A Reversal of Loss Aversion in Leisure-Oriented Choice*

Hur, Taekyun (Korea University); Cho, Ja Ee (Korea University); Namkoong, Jae Eun (Korea University); Roese, Neal, J. (University of Illinois)

(69) *Cognitive and Socio-Affective Processes in Dyad Choices among Two-Outcome Lotteries*

Mukherjee, Moumita (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)

(70) *Gain-Loss Separability in Certainty Equivalents of Mixed Gambles*

Budescu, David V. (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Templin, Sara E. (Georgia Center for Assessment, University of Georgia)

(71) *Neuroimaging of multiple forms of risk*

Weber, Bethany (Duke University); Huettel, Scott (Duke University)

(72) *On the Folly of Rewarding A+, While Only Needing A: The Tradeoff between Jacks of All Trades and Masters of One in the NBA*

Wang, Long (Northwestern University); Brett, Jeanne M (Northwestern University); Murnighan, J. Keith (Northwestern University)

(73) *Neural Correlates of Wins and Losses during the Georgia Gambling Task in Pathological and Non-Pathological Gamblers: An MEG Examination*

Goodie, Adam S. (University of Georgia); Clementz, Brett A. (University of Georgia); Camchong, Jazmin (University of Georgia); Krusemark, Elizabeth (University of Georgia); Young, Diana L. (University of Georgia); McDowell, Jennifer E. (University of Georgia)

(74) *Offering chemotherapy and hospice jointly: One solution to hospice underuse among lung cancer patients*
Salz, Talya (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill); Brewer, Noel T. (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

(75) *The psychology of the fluency heuristic: Do differences in fluency make us smart?*
Herzog, Stefan (University of Basel); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel)

(76) *Abstract Mental Construals Promote Adoption of Counteractive Self-Control Strategies.*
Roberts, Joseph C. (The Ohio State University); Fujita, Kentaro (The Ohio State University)

(77) *How Does Experience and Inference Impact Decisions?*
Gilino, Timothy (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana (Auburn University); Pleskac, Tim (Michigan State University)

(78) *Feedback Engenders Underweighting of Small Probabilities in Decisions from Description*
Jessup, Ryan K. (Indiana University)

(79) *Judgments and choices between alternatives with moral consequences*
Tyszka, Tadeusz (Center for Economic Psychology and Decision Making, Warsaw); Zaleskiewicz, Tomasz (Warsaw School of Social Psychology)

(80) *Decisions from experience: The effect of social comparison on risk-taking judgments*
Lee, Jae In (Yonsei University); Sohn, Young Woo (Yonsei University)

(81) *The Effect of Juror Ethnicity on Judgments and Perceptions of Courtroom Testimony*
Tomlinson, Tracy D. (University of Maryland, College Park); Dougherty, Michael R.P (University of Maryland, College Park)

(82) *Streak biases and decision making: the importance of perceived mechanism*
Cox, Cecilia R. (University of Sydney); Burns, Bruce D. (University of Sydney)

(83) *Overestimating Consumers' Sensitivity to Price Variations*
Shen, Luxi (Fudan University); Hsee, Chris (University of Chicago)

(84) *The Effect of Price Volatility on Decision Making*
Pirouz, Dante (University of California, Irvine)

(86) *Identifying Decision Strategies in a Consumer Choice Situation*
Reisen, Nils (University of Lausanne, Faculty of Business and Economics); Hoffrage, U. (University of Lausanne, Faculty of Business and Economics)

(87) *Parochialism in the Marketplace*
Szymanska, Ewa J. (University of Pennsylvania); Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania)

(88) *When is Difficult Planning Good Planning? The Impact of Planning Difficulty on Optimistic Prediction Bias*
Min, Kyeong Sam (University of South Dakota); Arkes, Hal R. (The Ohio State University)

(89) *From Thrift Stores to Cheap Old Lawyers: A Multi-Dimensional Association Approach to Sequential Consumer Judgments*
Sleeth-Keppler, David (Stanford University); Wheeler, S. Christian (Stanford University)

(90) *Processing Graphical Information: Perceptual Illusions of Risk and Return*
Raghubir, Priya (UC Berkeley); Das, Sanjiv (Santa Clara University)

(91) *Taking Statistics Courses May Increase Use of Sample Size Information*
Obrecht, Natalie A. (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen B. (Rutgers University); Gelman, Rochel (Rutgers University)

(92) *How complex decision rules can impede behavior adherence*
Mata, Jutta (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Todd, Peter M. (Indiana University Bloomington); Lippke, Sonia (Freie Universitaet Berlin)

(93) *Planning to use it everyday: Optimistic predictions about holiday gifts*
Vietri, Jeffrey T. (Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey); Schwartz, Janet (Princeton University); Chapman, Gretchen B. (Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey)

(94) The impact of purchase frequency of goods with stable vs. enhanced prices on perceived inflation
Huber, Odilo W. (Department of Psychology, University of Fribourg, Switzerland)

(95) Asymmetric Disconfirmation In Managerial Beliefs about Employee Motivation
Markle, Alex (The Stern School of Business, New York University)

(96) The role of the Attractiveness of the Stimuli in the Sunk Cost Effect in Children
Sala, Valentina (University of Milan - Bicocca); Passerini, Gabriella (University of Milan - Bicocca); Macchi, Laura (University of Milan - Bicocca); Bagassi, Maria (University of Milan - Bicocca); D'Addario, Marco (University of Milan - Bicocca)

Session #2 with Cash Bar (Sunday, 5:15- 7:15pm, Long Beach Convention Center, Grand Ballroom)*(1) The Effect of Risk on Moral Cognition*

Hudspeth, Christopher (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra (University of South Florida); Decker, Nathaniel (University of South Florida)

(2) The role of egocentrism in judgmental biases in social comparison

ENDO, Yumi (Kansai University)

(3) Cognitive modeling analysis of gambling tasks: measuring stable traits or just mimicry?

Ahn, Woo Young (Indiana University, Bloomington); Busemeyer, Jerome R. (Indiana University, Bloomington); Stout, Julie C. (Indiana University, Bloomington)

(4) 'Using the same processes, but different values' – Decision-making strategies of cancer patients in Germany and the USA

Wegwarth, Odette (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany)

(5) The Effect of Belief in Implicit Assumption on Evaluation of the Enthymeme.

Tanaka, Yuuko. (Kyoto University); Kusumi, Takashi (Kyoto University)

(6) Comparing Policy Use by those who Draft and those who Coach in the NBA

Young, Michael E (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale)

(7) Decision Making with Prostate Cancer

Simon, Jay (The Paul Merage School of Business, UC Irvine)

(8) A critical analysis on pseudodiagnosticity

D'Addario, Marco (University of Milano-Bicocca); Macchi, Laura (University of Milano-Bicocca); Bagassi, Maria (University of Milano-Bicocca); Passerini, Gabriella (University of Milano-Bicocca); Sala, Valentina (University of Milano-Bicocca)

(9) Modeling Decision Situations with Spatially-Varying Attributes

Keller, L. Robin (Univ. of Calif., Irvine); Kirkwood, Craig (Arizona State Univ.); Simon, Jay (Univ. of Calif., Irvine)

(10) Consumer usage of positive and negative customer reviews in online decision making tasks

Willemsen, Martijn C. (Eindhoven University of Technology)

(11) Strategies for estimation: When do estimations follow an exemplar-based versus a rule-based cognitive process?

von Helversen, Bettina (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Rieskamp, Jörg (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

(12) The Gambler's Fallacy and the Hot Hand: Trajectories and Long-Run Probabilities

Decker, Nathaniel (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra (University of South Florida)

(13) How memory limits strategy selection: The fluency heuristic

Marewski, Julian N. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Schooler, Lael J. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

(14) Manipulating the Reasons for Optimism: Reversing Bias by Shifting Consequences

Armor, David A. (San Diego State University); Sackett, Aaron M. (University of Chicago GSB)

(15) Intuited Consequences of Prediction Biases and their Effects on Unrealistic Optimism

Sackett, Aaron M. (University of Chicago GSB); Armor, David A. (San Diego State University)

(16) Resolving ethical dilemmas: Exploring the role of moral principles

Blais, Ann-Renee (Defence R& D Canada Toronto); Thompson, Megan (Defence R& D Canada Toronto)

(17) Mechanisms of Superior Judgment Under Uncertainty: Rational Choices from Simple Heuristics and Elaborative Strategies

Cokely, Edward T. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Kelley, Colleen M. (Florida State University)

(18) Evidential Reasoning in Teacher Assessment

Recesso, Arthur (Learning & Performance Support Lab., University of Georgia); Templin, Sara E. (Georgia Center for Assessment, University of Georgia); Ekici, Celil (Learning & Performance Support Lab., University of Georgia); Cohen, Allan (Georgia Center

(19) The effect of information distribution on the communication of magnitude judgment

Qian, Jing (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Olsson, Henrik (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

(20) Scientific objectivity: Everyone's imaginary friend

Wintle, Bonnie C. (University of Melbourne); Fidler, Fiona (University of Melbourne); Burgman, Mark (University of Melbourne)

(21) Fishing for the right words: Human foraging behavior in external and internal search tasks

Wilke, Andreas (UCLA Anthropology); Todd, Peter M. (Indiana University); Hutchinson, John M.C. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

(22) Ratings of Physicians Relying on Experts Versus Physicians Relying on Decision Aids

Probst, C. Adam (Wichita State University); Shaffer, Victoria (Wichita State University); Lambdin, Charles (Wichita State University); Arkes, Hal (Ohio State University); Medow, Mitchell (Ohio State University)

(23) Similarity and Temporal Distance

Day, Samuel B. (Northwestern University); Bartels, Daniel M. (University of Chicago)

(24) Framing in Text Ads: Preferences for Grammar Structures Depending on Valence of Information

Nelson, Noelle M. (University of Minnesota); Malkoc, Selin A. (University of Minnesota)

(25) Part-Set Cuing in Option Generation

Del Missier, F. (University of Trieste); Terpini, C. (University of Trieste); Gerbino, W. (University of Trieste)

(26) How the '400 people not saved' matter: Processes behind the framing effect

Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Michael (University of Bergen); Kuhberger, Anton (University of Salzburg)

(27) Use of heuristics, the influence of emotions, and the effects of framing on decisions about climate change and food safety

Soane, Emma (Kingston Business School)

(28) When a Negotiation is About Price, Selling Fits Promotion and Buying Fits Prevention

Appelt, Kirstin C. (Columbia University); Higgins, E. Tory (Columbia University)

(29) Earwitness misinterpretations: Top-down biases of auditory evidence.

Lange, Nick D. (University of Oklahoma); Thomas, Rick P. (University of Oklahoma); Dana, Jason (University of Pennsylvania); Dawes, Robyn (Carnegie Mellon University)

(30) Bad advice alters choice in the probabilistic selection task

Doll, Bradley B. (NDSL / ARG, Psychology, University of Arizona); Frank, Michael J. (LNCC, Psychology, University of Arizona); Sanfey, Alan G. (NDSL, Psychology, University of Arizona); Jacobs, W. Jake (ARG, Psychology, University of Arizona)

(31) Interval judgments when variability is real: The case of statistical replication

Lai, Jerry (La Trobe University, Melbourne Australia); Fidler, Fiona (La Trobe University, Melbourne Australia); Cumming, Geoff (La Trobe University, Melbourne Australia)

(32) Evaluating experts' interval judgments

McBride, Marissa (University of Melbourne, Australia); Burgman, Mark (University of Melbourne, Australia)

(33) Decision Making Style as a Predictor of Depression

Zarnoth, Paul (Saint Mary's College of California); Freimuth, John W. (Saint Mary's College of California); Pope, Jenna E. (Saint Mary's College of California); Rodriguez, Megan I. (Saint Mary's College of California)

(34) Dynamic interactions in medical decision making in Emergency Departments

Guglielmetti, Chiara (State University of Milan); Gilardi, Silvia (State University of Milan); Pravettoni, Gabriella (State University of Milan); Vago, Gianluca (State University of Milan)

(35) Effects of Motivational Orientation on Decision Making in Virtual Teams

Melchior, Stefan N. (University of Rostock); Nerdinger, Friedemann W. (University of Rostock)

(36) Citizens' conceptions of their duty

Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania)

(37) What goes up must come down: Cognitive, ecological, and contextual accounts of trend damping in judgmental forecasting

Harvey, Nigel (University College London); Reimers, Stian (University College London)

(38) The information bias in medical decision making

Pravettoni, Gabriella (University of Milan); Lucchiari, Claudio (University of Milan); Leotta, Salvatore Nuccio (University of Milan); Vago, Gianluca (University of Milan)

(39) *The Superset Bias*

Peterson, Nathaniel R (Carnegie Mellon); Dawes, Robyn M (Carnegie Mellon)

(40) *Compensatory selection among noncompensatory tools: Reevaluating the nature of fast and frugal heuristics*

Hochman, Guy (Technion - Israel Institute of Technology); Ayal, Shahar (Duke University)

(41) *Numeracy and Natural Frequencies in Bayesian Reasoning*

Liu, Jingjin (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen B. (Rutgers University)

(42) *How to mislead without lying: Selective presentation of results*

Silverman, Gabriel K. (Carnegie Mellon University); Anderson, Britta (American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University); Zinberg, Stanley (American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists); Shulkin, Jay (American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists)

(43) *Trait Transference in Reputation Markets*

Sivanathan, N (Kellogg School of Management - Northwestern University)

(44) *Memory and Judgment Bias in Retrospective Evaluations*

Aldrovandi, Silvio (City University, London (UK)); Poirier, Marie (City University, London (UK)); Ayton, Peter (City University, London (UK))

(45) *Information search and outcome focus in medical decisions from experience*

Pachur, Thorsten (University of Basel); Riepl, Patrick (University of Basel)

(46) *My loss is your loss...but only if I say so: Loss aversion and the effect of motivational biases*

Wilson, Robyn S. (The Ohio State University); Arvai, Joseph L. (Michigan State University); Arkes, Hal R. (The Ohio State University)

(47) *A study of the conjunction fallacy using an ecologically representative design were the representativeness heuristic can not be applied.*

Nilsson, Håkan (Department of psychology, Uppsala university.); Winman, Anders (Department of psychology, Uppsala university.)

(48) *Most People are Above-Average, Sometimes*

Roy, Michael M. (Elizabethtown College)

(49) *Why does the base rate appear to be neglected? The equiprobability hypothesis*

Hattori, Masasi (Ritsumeikan Univ); Nishida, Yutaka (Osaka Univ)

(50) *Metacognitive processing in different types of tests*

de Carvalho F., Moises K. (Kyoto University); Isobe, Miyoshi (Meiji University)

(51) *A critical meta-analytic perspective of the components of the Lens Model Equation in judgment achievement*

Kaufmann, Esther (University of Mannheim, Germany); Sjö Dahl, Lars (University of Lund, Sweden); Athanasou, James A (University of Technology, Sydney); Wittmann, Werner W. (University of Mannheim, Germany)

(52) *How an Assessment Orientation Produces Over-correction in Negotiation*

Zi, Xou (Columbia University); Appelt, Kirstin C. (Columbia University); Higgins, E. Tory (Columbia University)

(53) *Individual differences in the reliance on belief and logic across multiple reasoning domains.*

Martin, Nadia (University of Waterloo); Fugelsang, Jonathan A. (University of Waterloo)

(54) *Consumer Perceptions of Intelligence Forecasts*

Dieckmann, Nathan F (Decision Research & University of Oregon); Mauro, Robert (Decision Research & University of Oregon); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research & University of Oregon)

(55) *Strength of Handedness and Sunk Cost*

Westfall, Jonathan E. (The University of Toledo); Jasper, J.D. (The University of Toledo)

(56) *Authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and perceptions of threat in predicting judgments of support for the policy of preemption*

Dunwoody, Philip T. (Juniata College); Plane, Dennis L. (Juniata College); Rice, Devin (Stony Brook University)

(57) *The Changing of an Occupied Mind: Belief Adjustment under Divided Attention*

Harbison, J. Isaiah (University of Maryland); Dougherty, Michael R. (University of Maryland)

(58) *Differences in the subjective utility of gains as a function of mindfulness*

Young, Diana L. (University of Georgia); Lakey, Chad E. (University of Georgia); Goodie, Adam S. (University of Georgia)

(59) *Repeated trust interactions with non-random matching protocols*

Murphy, Ryan O. (Columbia University); Rapoport, Amnon (University of Arizona)

(60) *Similarity in intertemporal choice: an outcome and process approach*

Stevens, Jeffrey R. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

(61) *Tethered by tense: "Reality checks" constrain retrospection more than prospection*

Kane, Joanne E. (University of Colorado, Boulder); Van Boven, Leaf (Cornell University); McGraw, A. Peter (University of Colorado, Boulder)

(62) *The Incongruence between Jurors' Probability Judgments and their Verdicts*

Arkes, Hal R. (Ohio State University); Mayes, Ryan S. (Ohio State University); Shoots-Rinehard, Brittany (Ohio State University); Sleesman, Dustin J. (Ohio State University)

(63) *A change in medical risk perception over treatment stages of blood cancer patients*

Hirahara, Norimichi (Grad. Sch. of Decis. Sci. & Tech., Tokyo Inst. of Technology); Yamagishi, Kimihiko (Grad. Sch. of Decis. Sci. & Tech., Tokyo Inst. of Technology)

(64) *The Dynamics of Aging and Disease Risk Recognition*

Finucane, Melissa L. (Kaiser Permanente Center for Health Research, Hawai'i); Williams, Andrew E (Kaiser Permanente Center for Health Research, Hawai'i)

(65) *The Great Between-Subjects Assumption*

Lambdin, Charles (Wichita State University); Shaffer, Victoria (Wichita State University)

(66) *Covariance analysis of the hard-easy effect*

Merkle, Edgar C. (Wichita State University)

(67) *The overweighting of rare events in decisions from experience*

Haberstroh, Susanne (University of Osnabrück, Germany); Körner, Dorothee (University of Osnabrück, Germany)

(68) *Decisions about alcohol use among youth*

Weiss, Jie W. (California State University, Fullerton); Mouttapa, Michele (California State University, Fullerton)

(69) *Emotions in the process of risky decision making: Spontaneous verbal expressions*

Bär, Arlette S. (University of Fribourg, Dep. of Psychology, Switzerland); Huber, Odilo W. (University of Fribourg, Dep. of Psychology, Switzerland); Huber, Oswald (University of Fribourg, Dep. of Psychology, Switzerland)

(70) *Emotional processes in decision behavior of empathizers and systemizers*

Samson, Andrea C. (Dep of Psychology, University of Fribourg, Switzerland); Baer, Arlette S. (Dep of Psychology, University of Fribourg, Switzerland)

(71) *Modeling option generation and resulting choices in realistic, dynamic sports situations*

Raab, Markus (University of Flensburg); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University); DeCaro, Daniel (Miami University)

(72) *Heuristics and Group Decision Making: More Can Be Less and Less Can Be More*

Luan, Shenghua (Singapore Management University); Katsikopoulos, Konstantinos (Max Planck Institute); Reimer, Torsten (University of Maryland, College Park)

(73) *The Effects of Problem Source and Personal Relevance on Solution Generation*

Milch, Kerry F. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

(74) *When good decisions have a bad outcome: A biasing effect of experienced regret on subsequent choices*

Marcatto, Francesco (University of Trieste); Ferrante, Donatella (University of Trieste)

(75) *The regret frequencies and the ease retrieval of action/inaction regret*

Dohke, Rumiko (Hitotsubashi University); Murata, Koji (Hitotsubashi University)

(76) *Why Are We in Dread of SARS?*

Xie, Xiaofei (Peking University); Zheng, Rui (Chinese Academy of Science); Stone, Eric (Wake Forest University)

(77) *A Fuzzy-Trace Theory of Developmental Differences in Gist-Based Thinking and Risk-Taking*

Estrada, Steven M. (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University); Mills, Britain A. (Cornell University)

(78) *Self-Other Differences in Decision Making*

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